Suchergebnisse

Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.

Electoral competition is a cornerstone of representative democracies. However, measuring its extent and intensity constitutes a challenging task for the discipline. Based on multilevel conceptualizations, we discuss three different measures of political competition (electoral volatility, vote switching, and voters' availability) and their relation to each other. We argue that electoral volatility and vote switching as indicators of electoral competitiveness tend to misestimate the degree of competition in multiparty systems. As an alternative, we propose focusing on the individual's propensity to vote for different parties, i.e. electoral availability. Using data provided by the European Election Studies, we compare availability to electoral volatility and vote switching in the framework of necessary and sufficient conditions. Our regression results show that operationalizing electoral competitiveness based on voter availability – which is increasingly retrievable from cross-national voter surveys – helps to avoid type-II errors, i.e. identifying competitive elections as less or non-competitive.

Electoral competition is a cornerstone of representative democracies. However, measuring its extent and intensity constitutes a challenging task for the discipline. Based on multilevel conceptualizations, we discuss three different measures of political competition (electoral volatility, vote switching, and voters' availability) and their relation to each other. We argue that electoral volatility and vote switching as indicators of electoral competitiveness tend to misestimate the degree of competition in multiparty systems. As an alternative, we propose focusing on the individual's propensity to vote for different parties, i.e. electoral availability. Using data provided by the European Election Studies, we compare availability to electoral volatility and vote switching in the framework of necessary and sufficient conditions. Our regression results show that operationalizing electoral competitiveness based on voter availability - which is increasingly retrievable from cross-national voter surveys - helps to avoid type-II errors, i.e. identifying competitive elections as less or non-competitive.

John Curtice says Labour will struggle to win in 2015 if it simply relies on capturing the votes of disaffected Liberal Democrats and those who did not vote in 2010.

AbstractAlthough racial identity is usually assumed to be unchanging, recent research shows otherwise. The role of politics in racial identity change has received little attention. Using panel data with waves around two recent presidential elections, this article reveals survey evidence of racial fluidity and its strong relationship with vote switching patterns. Across several models and robust to various controls, switching from a non-Republican vote in 2012 to a 2016 Republican vote (i.e., non-Romney to Trump) significantly predicts nonwhite to white race change. Among nonwhites who did not vote Republican in 2012, switching to a Republican vote in 2016 increases the probability of adopting a white racial identity from a 0.03 baseline to 0.49, a 1,533 percent increase. Individuals originally identifying as Mixed and Hispanic drive this identity-voting link. A parallel dynamic on the Democratic side—new Democratic voters moving from white to nonwhite identities—does not occur. The systematic relationship between Trump switching and white identity adoption is unlikely to be spurious or due to measurement error, does not appear for the 2008–2012 election period, and makes theoretical sense in light of 2016 campaign rhetoric and trends in political-social identity alignment.

THIS PAPER PRESENTS TWO PERSPECTIVES ON A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF ELECTIONS AS MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY. ONE IS THE INTERELCTION FLOATING VOTER HYPOTHESIS, WHICH IMPLIES THAT IT IS THE LEAST INFORMENT SEGMENT OF THE ELECTORATE THAT CONTRIBUTES MOST TO ELECTORAL CHANGE. THE SECOND PERSPECTIVE IS FROM V.O. KEY'S ARGUMENT VOTE SWITCHING IS ROOTED IN RATIONAL POLICY CONCERNS.

ZusammenfassungLängsschnittliche Studien zu den sozioökonomischen und einstellungsbezogenen Ursachen für Wählerwanderungen zur AfD sind bislang rar. Wir schließen diese Lücke auf Basis eines Modells, das Abwanderungen zur AfD bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 unter Berücksichtigung der Änderungen migrationsbezogener und ökonomischer Einstellungen sowie der sozioökonomischen Situation von CDU/CSU- und SPD-Wähler*innen des Jahres 2013 erklärt. Für ein logistisches Regressionsmodell basierend auf zwei Messzeitpunkten ziehen wir Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) heran. Eine Abwanderung zur AfD ist für Wähler*innen der Koalitionsparteien umso wahrscheinlicher, je stärker ihre subjektive Sorge um die Zuwanderung nach Deutschland im Jahr 2013 ausfällt bzw. zwischen den beiden Messzeitpunkten ansteigt. Ein geringes Nettoäquivalenzeinkommen steigert die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Wanderung von CDU/CSU-Wähler*innen zur AfD, nicht aber von der SPD. Hingegen verringert eine Identifikation mit der SPD die Abwanderung. Zukünftig sollten weitere Messzeitpunkte und verfeinerte Veränderungsmessungen auf Basis größerer Samples berücksichtigt werden, um den Aufstieg der AfD bei Parlamentswahlen in Deutschland erklären zu können.

AbstractPolitical scientists generally consider that the incentive for legislators to switch parties lies in their desire to be re-elected. While some scholars attribute defection to the legislators' popularity and strong connections with their constituents which enable them to be re-elected without relying on party labels, others assert that legislators switch if they perceive that staying put might threaten their chances of re-election. In this paper, we find that the two assumptions, to some extent, contradict each other. More surprisingly, the two contradictory hypotheses cohabit under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. From an analysis of the switching in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, the empirical evidence shows that because of fierce intraparty competition in the multimember districts, not only barely elected but also top-ranked legislators switched party affiliation in order to avoid the loss in votes or even seats to their copartisans and to maximize their chances of re-election.

A great deal of research has suggested that scholarly and popular concerns about low levels of citizen political knowledge are exaggerated. One implication of that research is that political history would have unfolded just as it did even if electorates had been more politically informed. This paper presents evidence that counters these claims, showing an infusion of electorally relevant information in twenty-seven democracies would have likely led to a lot of vote 'switching', ultimately changing the composition of many governments. The paper also directly and systematically examines what we might call the 'enlightened natural constituency' hypothesis, which expects lower-income citizens to vote disproportionately for left parties once armed with more political knowledge. While the basic argument about how political ignorance disproportionately affects the left's natural constituency is not new, the hypothesis has thus far not been tested. The analysis provides provisional support for the hypothesis. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science. The literature tends to understand it as a syndrome, and therefore has difficulty explaining variations in institutionalisation. We suggest a new approach based on the transaction between a legislative party and its deputies, the failure of which is observable in party switching. We identify three routes to institutionalisation by appealing to the vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking motivations of deputies. Poland has had a large volume of party switching, along with wide variation in the incentives facing differently-motivated deputies. Our survival analyses of switching in four Polish parliaments find that vote-seeking is the most likely route to institutionalisation for Polish parties. Moreover, we establish a concrete hypothesis for comparative testing: legislative parties can survive as long as their popular support exceeds forty per cent of their share in the previous election.

Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science. The literature tends to understand it as a syndrome and therefore has difficulty explaining variations. This article suggests a new approach based on the transaction between a legislative party and its deputies, the failure of which is observable in party switching. Three routes to institutionalisation are identified by appealing to the vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking motivations of deputies. Poland has had a large volume of party switching, along with wide variation in the incentives facing differently-motivated deputies. Survival analyses of switching in four Polish parliaments find that vote-seeking is the most likely route to institutionalisation for Polish parties. Moreover, in this article a concrete hypothesis is established for comparative testing: legislative parties can survive as long as their popular support exceeds 40 per cent of their share in the previous election. Adapted from the source document.