Suchergebnisse

Despite many claims for and against the use of risk comparisons in risk communication, few empirical studies have explored their effect. Even fewer have examined the public's relative preferences among different kinds of risk comparisons. Two studies, published in this journal in 1990 and 2003, used seven measures of "acceptability" to examine public reaction to 14 examples of risk comparisons, as used by a hypothetical factory manager to explain risks of his ethylene oxide plant. This study examined the effect on preferences of scenarios involving low or high conflict between the factory manager and residents of the hypothetical town (as had the 2003 study), and inclusion of a claim that the comparison demonstrated the risks' acceptability. It also tested the Finucane et al. (2000) affect hypothesis that information emphasizing low risks—as in these risk comparisons—would raise benefits estimates without changing risk estimates. Using similar but revised scenarios, risk comparison examples (10 instead of 14), and evaluation measures, an opportunity sample of 303 New Jersey residents rated the comparisons, and the risks and benefits of the factory. On average, all comparisons received positive ratings on all evaluation measures in all conditions. Direct and indirect measures showed that the conflict manipulation worked; overall, No‐Conflict and Conflict scenarios evoked scores that were not significantly different. The attachment to each risk comparison of a risk acceptability claim ("So our factory's risks should be acceptable to you.") did not worsen ratings relative to conditions lacking this claim. Readers who did or did not see this claim were equally likely to infer an attempt to persuade them to accept the risk from the comparison. As in the 2003 article, there was great individual variability in inferred rankings of the risk comparisons. However, exposure to the risk comparisons did not reduce risk estimates significantly (while raising benefit estimates), and Conflict‐Claim respondents found the risk of the hypothetical factory less acceptable than No‐Conflict respondents. Results suggest that neither risk comparisons nor risk acceptability claims are automatically anathema to audiences, but they may have tiny or unintended effects on audience judgments about risky situations.

I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010- 2016. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

In spite of the maturity reached by many of the methods used in risk assessment and risk management, broad consensus has not been established on fundamental concepts and principles. The risk fields still suffer from a lack of clarity on many key scientific pillars. The purpose of this article is to point to this situation and through some illustrating examples discuss the challenges that the fields here face. Moreover, the purpose of the article is to reflect on how to improve the present situation and enhance the risk fields. We argue that the establishment of some common scientific pillars as well as a strong and continuous research focus on foundational issues are critical success factors. The article specifically addresses the role of the peer‐reviewed journals and the international standards in the fields. We hope that the article can contribute to a revitalization of the discussion of foundational issues in risk assessment and risk management.

The tragic attacks of September 11 and the bioterrorist threats with respect to anthrax that followed have raised a set of issues regarding how we deal with events where there is considerable ambiguity and uncertainty about the likelihood of their occurrence and their potential consequences. This paper discusses how one can link the tools of risk assessment and our knowledge of risk perception to develop risk management options for dealing with extreme events. In particular, it suggests ways that the members of the Society for Risk Analysis can apply their expertise and talent to the risks associated with terrorism and discusses the changing roles of the public and private sectors in dealing with extreme events.

AbstractThe impact of climate change on human health was identified as a priority for the UN COP26 conference. In this article, we consider climate‐induced changes to mortality risks and how to incorporate these formally in the policy appraisal process. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) is used to monetarize the benefits of policies to reduce mortality risks but it remains an open, empirical question as to whether the current VSL (£2.14 million per fatality prevented, December 2021 values) for traffic accidents should be applied in other contexts without any modification and particularly for extreme weather event fatalities. Using a representative sample of the UK population, we aim to estimate and better understand the trade‐offs people make when comparing mortality risks, drawing on psychological insights from construal level and regulatory focus theories. We design a stated preference survey using a relative valuation framework with nonmonetary, risk–risk trade‐off questions between extreme weather event and traffic accident mortality risks. We find evidence of an extreme weather event risk premium of 1.2–1.6 (implying a climate‐related VSL of £2.52–£3.41 million). We also find that participants who are psychologically close to climate change (based on construal level theory), weigh reducing extreme weather event mortality risks almost two times that of reducing traffic accident mortality risks.

This paper reviews the history of risk analysis and risk management, giving special emphasis to the neglected period prior to the 20th century. The overall objective of the paper is to: (1) dampen the prevailing tendency to view present‐day concerns about risk in an ahistorical context; (2) shed light on the intellectual antecedents of current thinking about risk; (3) clarify how contemporary ideas about risk analysis and societal risk management differ significantly from the past; and (4) provide a basis for anticipating future directions in risk analysis and management.

This is a perspective article on foundational issues in risk assessment and management. The aim is to discuss the needs, obstacles, and challenges for the establishment of a renewed, strong scientific foundation for risk assessment and risk management suited for the current and future technological challenges. The focus is on (i) reviewing and discussing the present situation and (ii) identifying how to best proceed in the future, to develop the risk discipline in the directions needed. The article provides some reflections on the interpretation and understanding of the concept of "foundations of risk assessment and risk management" and the challenges therein. One main recommendation is that different arenas and moments for discussion are needed to specifically address foundational issues in a way that embraces the many disciplinary communities involved (from social scientists to engineers, from behavioral scientists to statisticians, from health physicists to lawyers, etc.). One such opportunity is sought in the constitution of a novel specialty group of the Society of Risk Analysis.

I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a persistent drop in investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Policy interventions face a trade-off between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.

Risk asserts the ongoing importance of the analysis of risk in our age of permacrisis and mounting scepticism about experts and science, and calls for a re-turn to risk theory. This fully revised and expanded new edition includes a new chapter on risk information and denial in the context of the climate crisis and COVID-19 pandemic