Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The right to counsel is a cornerstone of due process. This article explores the legal construction of "indigency" in criminal county courts. I examine Texas's Fair Defense Act (2001), a policy mandate that required all 254 counties to create formal criteria used for determining eligibility for access to counsel, as an empirical case for understanding local policy choices that shape access to justice. Drawing on novel data from court plans, I find significant variation in the stringency of eligibility criteria used to determine indigency. Results show that socioeconomic conditions, racial threat, interest group presence, and elements of judicial discretion are key determinants of restrictive eligibility criteria. These findings suggest racial threat can be tied to the institutional design of policies, rather than the enforcement or dormancy of criminal law. The variable institutionalization of eligibility criteria has implications for understanding the entrenchment of racial and class-based inequalities in access to legal institutions.

Procedural fairness and equal protection were the core of Gideon's reasoning for a right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Under the same constitutional values, there should be a right to legal assistance of counsel for indigent civil litigants, especially in adversarial proceedings. This Article outlines the constitutional basis for a civil right to counsel. Further, it stresses the need for legislation to address the massive shortfall in legal representation available to indigent persons in the United States. Recognition of civil Gideon as part of the Constitution's promise of justice accommodates a moral revolution. It exemplifies a shift in consciousness, rippling beyond the scope of the law and encompassing interpersonal relations.