Suchergebnisse

Even though the EU clearly leads the global fight against climate change and despite the additional reduction in emissions due to the global crisis and European recession, the ambitious objectives flagged in the "20-20-20 by 2020" strategy and 'climate-energy package' are probably out of reach if a more resolute and consistent policy of carbon taxation is not rapidly put in place. First, the EU is not as 'virtuous' as it may seem, and shows signs of a 'fatigue' in mitigating climate change; this is explained by the weak incentive structure of current climate institutions, due to both narrow coverage and insufficient stringency of the European 'Emission Trading Scheme' (ETS) - the European 'carbon market'-, and to excessive reliance on emission standards combined with weak energy taxation. Fears of loosing competitiveness are a major argument against imposing a higher carbon price on industries, feeding tax competition both within the EU and vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Though not fully satisfactory, the Commission's recent proposal (a revision of the 2003 energy taxation directive introducing floors on national excises based on carbon content) would help solving the intra-EU conundrum. Alternatively, an extension of the EU ETS to households and the transport sector via the 'upstream' inclusion of fossil fuel dealers would also be a feasible solution. In order to answer the 'carbon leakage' argument and to send appropriate price signals to European consumers on extra-EU imports, a border adjustment mechanism - carbon levy or inclusion of importers into the EU ETS - is also necessary. Ultimately though, in order to make sure that economic agents face a uniform carbon price, a generalized carbon tax, in the form of a European 'Carbon Added Tax' (ECAT), would be the most effective instrument in the fight against climate change, as well as the pillar of a thorough tax reform inducing the 'decarbonisation shift' of the European economy.

Even though the EU clearly leads the global fight against climate change and despite the additional reduction in emissions due to the global crisis and European recession, the ambitious objectives flagged in the "20-20-20 by 2020" strategy and 'climate-energy package' are probably out of reach if a more resolute and consistent policy of carbon taxation is not rapidly put in place. First, the EU is not as 'virtuous' as it may seem, and shows signs of a 'fatigue' in mitigating climate change; this is explained by the weak incentive structure of current climate institutions, due to both narrow coverage and insufficient stringency of the European 'Emission Trading Scheme' (ETS) - the European 'carbon market'-, and to excessive reliance on emission standards combined with weak energy taxation. Fears of loosing competitiveness are a major argument against imposing a higher carbon price on industries, feeding tax competition both within the EU and vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Though not fully satisfactory, the Commission's recent proposal (a revision of the 2003 energy taxation directive introducing floors on national excises based on carbon content) would help solving the intra-EU conundrum. Alternatively, an extension of the EU ETS to households and the transport sector via the 'upstream' inclusion of fossil fuel dealers would also be a feasible solution. In order to answer the 'carbon leakage' argument and to send appropriate price signals to European consumers on extra-EU imports, a border adjustment mechanism - carbon levy or inclusion of importers into the EU ETS - is also necessary. Ultimately though, in order to make sure that economic agents face a uniform carbon price, a generalized carbon tax, in the form of a European 'Carbon Added Tax' (ECAT), would be the most effective instrument in the fight against climate change, as well as the pillar of a thorough tax reform inducing the 'decarbonisation shift' of the European economy.

In groundbreaking peer-reviewed research forthcoming in the journal "Climatic Change", researcher Richard Heede offers the most complete picture to date of which institutions have extracted the fossil fuels that have been the root cause of global warming since the Industrial Revolution. Rather than attribute emissions to nations, the study aggregates historical emissions according to carbon producing entities themselves. Heede concludes that nearly two-thirds of carbon dioxide emitted since the 1750s can be traced to the 90 largest fossil fuel and cement producers, most of which still operate today.

Under the international climate legal regime, many tree planting and forest management activities have been conducted in developing countries with the intention to generate carbon offsets (forest carbon projects). However, studies have shown that some foreign forest carbon projects lead to severely unsustainable results. The current international institutional framework cannot guarantee the long-term environmental and social benefits. This study set out to investigate how to design institutional reforms to promote sustainable results in foreign forest carbon projects in developing countries. The study provides one possible solution to this question that lies in the existing governing systems of multilateral funds. _Part I_ reviews the international institutional framework on forest carbon projects in developing countries using doctrinal and historical approaches. _Part II_ analyses the incentive schemes and the financial streams among major project actors from developed and developing countries. _Part III_ presents a case study of China, which examines the national institutional framework and practices based on interviews and project-site visits. Based on the analysis in the previous parts, Chapter 9 confirms that multilateral funds, which invest in foreign forest carbon projects in developing countries as financial intermediaries between the North and the South, have institutional and economic advantages in addressing the problems identified in the institutional framework and in the incentive schemes. Ten measures are discussed and tailored to address identified problems, based on evidence from practice, and embedded in a workable existing system.

[EN] The sensing of carbon monoxide (CO) using electrochemical cells or semiconducting metal oxides has led to inexpensive alarms for the home and workplace. It is now recognised that chronic exposure to low levels of CO also poses a significant health risk. It is perhaps surprising therefore that the CO is used in cell-signalling pathways and plays a growing role in therapy. However, the selective monitoring of low levels of CO remains challenging, and it is this area that has benefited from the development of probes which give a colour or fluorescence response. This feature article covers the design of chromofluorogenic probes and their application to CO sensing in air, solution and in cells. ; The authors wish to express their gratitude to the Spanish Government (project MAT2012-38429-CO4 and MAT2015-64139-C4-1) and Generalitat Valenciana (project PROMETEOII/2014/047) for their support. C. M.-H. thanks the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness for her grant. The Leverhulme Trust is gratefully acknowledged for a studentship to A. T. (RPG-2012-634). The Imperial College Global Engagements fund is thanked by J. D. E. T. W.-E. for provision of a travel grant. ; Marín-Hernández, C.; Toscani, A.; Sancenón Galarza, F.; Wilton-Ely, JDET.; Martínez-Máñez, R. (2016). Chromo-fluorogenic probes for carbon monoxide detection. Chemical Communications. 52(35):5902-5911. https://doi.org/10.1039/c6cc01335j ; S ; 5902 ; 5911 ; 52 ; 35