Covert action and congressional oversight: A deontology
In: Studies in conflict and terrorism, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 87-97
ISSN: 1521-0731
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In: Studies in conflict and terrorism, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 87-97
ISSN: 1521-0731
In: Studies in conflict & terrorism, Band 16, S. 87-97
ISSN: 1057-610X
Examines the development of intelligence control mechanisms, with emphasis on CIA undercover operations during the cold war.
In: International Policy Report
World Affairs Online
"April 7, 2009." ; Shipping list no.: 2009-0308-P. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Executive summary -- Assessing TARP strategy -- The federal government's current strategy -- Historical approaches and lessons -- Europe: current crises and response -- Taking stock: options for moving forward -- Additional views -- Richard H. Neimen and John E. Sununu -- John E. Sununu -- Corerspondance wit Treasury update -- TARP updates since last report -- Oversight activities -- About the Congressional Oversight Panel -- Appendix I: Letter from Treasury Secretary Mr. Timothy Geithner to Congressional Oversight Panel Cahir Elizabeth Warren, dated April 2, 2009 -- Appendix II: Letter from Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Mr. Ben Bernanke to Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren, dated April 1, 2009 -- Appendix III: Letter from Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren to Treasury Secretary Mr. Timothy Geithner, dated March 30, 2009 -- Appendix IV: Letter from Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren to Treasury Secretary Mr. Timothy Geithner, dated March 25, 2009 -- Appendix V: Letter from Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren to Treasury Secretary Mr. Timothy Geithner, dated March 24, 2009 -- Appendix VI: Letter from Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren to Treasury Secretary Mr. Timothy Geithner, dated March 20, 2009 -- Appendix VII: Letter from Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren to Treasury Secretary Mr. Timothy Geithner, dated March 5, 2009 -- Appendix VIII: Letter from Congressional Oversight Panel Chair Elizabeth Warren to Treasury Secretary Mr. Timothy Geithner, dated January 28, 2009. ; Mode of access: Internet.
BASE
In: International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence, Band 11, S. 185-210
ISSN: 0885-0607
Evaluates significance of the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act and whether its provisions will help to curb abuses by the US intelligence community; focuses on the history of congressional oversight since World War II through the Iran-Contra affair.
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 111-111
ISSN: 0048-5950
In: American journal of political science, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 387-401
ISSN: 1540-5907
Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy. Adapted from the source document.
A panel of three D.C. Circuit judges rejected the House Judiciary Committee's request for testimony from Don McGahn, former White House Counsel, finding that the Committee lacked Article III standing to enforce a congressional subpoena in federal court. Framing the issue as one of separation of powers, the court declined to intervene in what it described as a purely political dispute between the executive and legislative branches. The ruling was a significant setback for the House in their efforts to force the Trump administration to comply with Congressional subpoenas and to yield to Congressional oversight more generally. Interestingly, in March, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the three-judge panel's decision and opted to hold a rehearing en banc on April 28, 2020. Despite court proceedings around the country being delayed as a result of COVID-19, it is expected that this hearing will go forward as planned. This article looks at what we can expect to see in that hearing and what impact a decision could have.
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In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 109, S. 669-687
ISSN: 0032-3195
Argues that when the goals of good public policy, influence, and reelection conflict, the goal of reelection does not always dominate legislators' oversight of the executive; US. Based on case studies of congressional-bureaucratic interactions in the development of the Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and in highway demonstration projects.
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 109, Heft 4, S. 669-688
ISSN: 0032-3195
In: Policy studies review: PSR, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 557-564
ISSN: 0278-4416
ATTEMPTS TO REIGN-IN RUNAWAY REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY FAIL BECAUSE THE BUREAUCRACY HAS ALL THE IMPORTANT RESOURCES. THE BUREAUCRACY ALSO HOLDS THE UPPER HAND IN POLICY MAKING BECAUSE CONGRESS HAS NEITHER THE TIME NOR INCLINATION TO EFFECT LEGISLATIVE CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT. THE TRAVAIL OF THE FTC DURING THE 1970'S TO SHOW THE BLURRED DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTOMONY AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROL IS EXAMINED.
SSRN
Working paper
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 165
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Review of Policy Research, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 557-564
ISSN: 1541-1338
Attempts to reign‐in runaway regulatory bureaucracy fail because the bureaucracy has all the important resources. The bureaucracy also holds the upper hand in policy‐making because Congress has neither the time nor inclination to effect legislative control and oversight. The authors examine the travails of the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s to show the blurred distinction between bureaucratic autonomy and legislative control.
In: Yale Journal of Regulation (Notice and Comment), 2020
SSRN
Working paper