Suchergebnisse

The implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and especially the Dayton Constitution has become a vehicle for constitutional protection of collectivist ethnopolitical practice of discriminatory subordination of citizens on basis of their ethnic «kinship» or their religious affiliation. Therefore, it is important to explore possibilities of re-focusing the attention from a collective-rights-oriented to an individual-rights-oriented political arrangement as possible mode for accommodation of ethnic differences in Bosnia. Furthermore, I intend to claim that every attempt to institutionalize ethnic differences in the political arena generates an untenable crisis with the prospects of possible war.

Charles Taylor (1994) & Will Kymlicka (eg, 1995) consider how to best protect minority group identities & their special, collective rights. In their analyses, Taylor & Kymlicka seem to have some specific, historically settled minority groups in mind: the native Indian peoples of North America, & the French-speaking community in Quebec, respectively. Examined here is whether this plea for special rights can be transferred to the Western European &, more specific, Dutch context. In this context, minorities are not historically settled communities, but rather, ethnic minorities, migrant workers, & refugees, who have settled only recently. It is argued that such special, collective rights are not the best way to protect their identity. Rather, in the Western European setting, cultural pluralism may be best guaranteed by sticking to quite ordinary individual human rights. If these rights are implemented fully & effectively, special rights are not needed. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

Introductory Remarks -- PART I: On Equality -- Equality Paradigms and Non-Discrimination: Theoretical Approximations -- Equality Principles and Institutionalism: Judicial Spill-Overs and Dialogues -- PART II: Redefining Recognition -- Equality Paradigms and Contemporary Politics of Recognition -- Principles of Recognition – or How to Move Forward? -- PART III: Towards Collectivisation -- Exploring Counterbalancing Paradigms: Positive Discrimination and Collectivisation -- Collective Subject-Holdership, Processes and Scales of Collectivisation -- Concluding Thoughts.

AbstractThis paper examines how Muslim American advocacy organizations have responded to recent spikes in anti-Muslim discrimination, particularly in the context of the 2016 elections. It asks how Muslim American interest groups have helped frame and communicate the policy interests of U.S. Muslims and, consequently, the collective claims of the group on whose behalf they claim to speak. Relying on political ethnography as the main method of inquiry, I conduct in-depth participant observation, qualitative interviews with Muslim American leaders, and an analysis of primary documents and social media communication produced by Muslim American organizations. This data was collected between June 2016 and July 2017, and transcribed and coded using Nvivo. Through this analysis, I find that being targeted as "other" has driven Muslim advocacy organizations to rely on constituent empowerment strategies, mobilize in demand of Muslim American group rights, defend their constitutional rights, and claim their place as an American minority.

A discussion of whether ethical individualism provides the proper framework for a liberal theory of collective rights maintains that a politics of recognition toward component nations is a requirement for the viability of multi-nation states. The tendency of liberal philosophers to overlook the close relationship between liberalism & the traditional nation-state has led them to argue against a politics of recognition while simultaneously arguing for the integration of some nations into multi-nation states. The link between liberalism & the nation-state is explored, along with its foundation in ethical individualism, & Will Kymlicka's (1989) theory of group-differentiated rights. Although Kymlicka correctly contends that liberal philosophers must acknowledge the collective rights of "societal cultures," he misunderstands the importance of the cultural diversity argument. In addition, his assertion that the only way to integrate liberalism & collective rights is by emphasizing their compatibility with ethical individualism is misleading. Suggestions are made for an alternative liberal theory of collective rights capable of providing a foundation for an effective law of peoples. 21 References. J. Lindroth