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Contributing to the growing discourse on political parties in Asia, this book looks at parties in Southeast Asia's most competitive electoral democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. It highlights the diverse dynamics of party politics in the region and provides new insights into organizational structures, mobilizational strategies and the multiple dimensions of linkages between political parties and their voters. The book focuses on the prominence of clientelistic practices and strategies, both within parties as well as between parties and their voters. It demonstrates that cli.

Contributing to the growing discourse on political parties in Asia, this book looks at parties in Southeast Asia's most competitive electoral democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. It highlights the diverse dynamics of party politics in the region and provides new insights into organizational structures, mobilizational strategies and the multiple dimensions of linkages between political parties and their voters. The book focuses on the prominence of clientelistic practices and strategies, both within parties as well as between parties and their voters. It demonstrates that cli

The Movimiento Territorial de Liberacion (MTL) is a radical piquetero (picketer) group formed by unemployed workers and activists from the Communist party in Argentina. The autonomous and radical nature of the MTL is primarily attributable to prior linkages of the Communist party to urban and skilled workers outside Peronist clientelistic networks and party access to project financing independent of state spending. The relationship is beneficial to both the movement and the party. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.]

This interdisciplinary study applies human rights theory to the problems of rural poverty in the Third World. Considering the interdependence of minimal food and health security with minimal assurance of basic freedoms, political scientist Alan G. Smith traces the linkage to the need of the food-insecure to seek clientelistic dependencies on better-off neighborsÑrelationships that often operate to restrict freedom of choice. In contrast to conventional rural development aid, which can introduce new client dependency if pursued alone, Smith stresses the need to find other forms of aid that woul

It is sometimes argued that political funding in Africa has a distinctive character. Some scholars claim that a particular form of party–state linkage may be prevalent across Africa in which parties amass money from the state through patronage, clientelistic practices and political corruption (Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007; Basedau et al. 2007). The exploration of non-African cases, however, can help illuminate the common patterns that exist across a wider range of societies. In this way it can shed light on African political financing practices. The pathologies surrounding political finance in many African states, such as clientelism, influence-buying and corruption, are important aspects of political life across the developing world – and also, one might add, in the states of the north.

This article makes a contribution in the literature on electoral behavior in Colombia. Previous explanations have employed theories that emphasize the explanatory power of income, psico-social considerations and retrospective evaluation in order to assess the impact of programmatic, clientelistic and personalistic party-voter linkages on vote-choice. There is a gap in the literature that we propose to fill through the inclusion of governability appeals as a criterion that electors use when defining their electoral preferences. The fact that certain candidates are perceived with better conditions (or not) to overcome challenges to governability based on their links with powerful veto players is another factor that influences vote choice in addition to key variables (e.g. ideology). Original empirical information, based on the analysis of a national survey data, confirms the hypothesis proposed.

This dissertation conceptualizes a new type of clientelistic party, which despite being widespread has not been properly theorized. I refer to it as modular. Since clientelism — the exchange of goods for votes — requires substantial organization, scholars often assume that only dominant parties or solid political machines can engage in clientelistic mobilization. I show that is not the case. Rather, modular parties are makeshift organizations whose integrity from one election to the next is uncertain, but whose politicians are nevertheless able to mobilize voters through patron-client relationships.Modular parties do not own, but "hire" or outsource the networks of clients they use. Well before the advent of elections, community chiefs, community organization leaders, ethnic leaders, landowners, local officials, and other types of local notables already established considerable political capital through their private and relatively small clienteles. Instead of ignoring or dismantling these networks, politicians running elections above the local level created modular parties to connect these networks. In this sense, modular par- ties are made up of two tiers: one on top, responsible for acquiring state resources and acting at the level of subnational or national politics; and one at the bottom composed of multiple modules, each with a local notable running local politics and acting as broker in favor of the upper stratum. Throughout time, these local leaders may take new roles, such as union leaders, bureaucrats, and local politicians, but they remain responsible for the construction and maintenance of patron–client networks. Today in Brazil, this local no- table is usually a mayoral candidate diligently brokering votes for the party offering most state resources or direct payments.Such outsourcing of the organization of patron-client linkages to local authorities may facilitate the rapid mobilization of voters for politicians in modular parties, but it also prevents these politicians from building a reliable support base. Brokers in modular parties act as free–agents, and switch parties as they see appropriate. As long as there are other parties outsourcing clientelistic mobilization, brokers may switch whenever they receive a more lucrative proposal.Using a research design that detects when parties receive resources they can use to hire brokers as-if randomly, I am able to show that variations in resources cause parties to expand or contract the number of modules working for them. Moreover, taking advantage of an unexpected institutional reform that made party switching potentially costly, and employing regression discontinuities to separate the brokers who were subject to this new ruling, I was able to evaluate how party switching drastically damages the electoral prospects of modular parties.Substantively, the fluidity of modules sheds light on why clientelism can be resilient and widespread on many parts of the developing world, at the same time that strong clientelistic machines are relatively rare. It is durable because brokers offer their services to the highest bidding party, thus maximizing their ability to nurture their networks. However, by relying on these autonomous brokers parties will not create direct linkages of their own, frustrating any hope of making parties organizationally strong.

Calvo and Murillo consider the non-policy benefits that voters consider when deciding their vote. While parties advertise policies, they also deliver non-policy benefits in the form of competent economic management, constituency service, and patronage jobs. Different from much of the existing research, which focuses on the implementation of policy or on the delivery of clientelistic benefits, this book provides a unified view of how politicians deliver broad portfolios of policy and non-policy benefits to their constituency. The authors' theory shows how these non-policy resources also shape parties' ideological positions and which type of electoral offers they target to poorer or richer voters. With exhaustive empirical work, both qualitative and quantitative, the research documents how linkages between parties and voters shape the delivery of non-policy benefits in Argentina and Chile

This paper contributes to an agenda that views the effects of policies and institutional reforms as dependent on the structure of political incentives for national and subnational political actors. The paper studies political incentive structures at the subnational level and the mechanisms whereby they affect national-level politics and policymaking at the national level in Argentina, a highly decentralized middle-income democracy, Argentina. The Argentine political system makes subnational political power structures very influential in national politics. Moreover, most Argentine provinces are local bastions of power dominated by entrenched elites, characterized by scarce political competition, weak division of powers, and clientelistic political linkages. Political dominance in the provinces and political importance at the national level reinforce each other, dragging the Argentine political and policymaking system towards the practices and features of its most politically backward regions.

AbstractThe logic behind redistribution theories is that incumbents target benefits to build and sustain linkages with voters. However, a recent literature shows that some benefits can have a countervailing effect in environments plagued by clientelism: by permanently boosting voters' incomes, irrevocable and durable benefits might reduce their dependence on incumbents. This article explains how parties strategically allocate these benefits when trading off the income effect relative to the standard electoral rewards of redistribution. The theory highlights a previously unstudied rationale to target opposition areas: to weaken voters' dependence on machines. The framework is tested with administrative data on the allocation of cisterns by state governments across Brazilian semi‐arid municipalities, where clientelism is rampant. States favor areas governed by copartisans, but only where local clientelistic mobilization is weak. Where it is strong, states favor municipalities led by the opposition, while avoiding their own local strongholds.

Este artículo propone un nuevo método comparado para el estudio de los vínculos entre los partidos políticos y los electores. Visto desde los electores, la principal distinción entre los partidos clientelares y los programáticos se encuentra en el modo de acceso a los beneficios públicos. En el primer caso, partidos clientelares, las redes partidarias median en el acceso a los beneficios públicos. En el segundo caso, partidos programáticos, los beneficiarios son definidos por el gobierno mediante política pública y el acceso a los mismos es independiente de las redes de distribución partidarias. Por medio de una novedosa metodología para medir redes partidarias, este artículo muestra que diferentes mecanismos de acceso a los beneficios moldean las expectativas distributivas de los votantes y la naturaleza de su vínculo con los partidos políticos. El método utiliza encuestas originales de Argentina y Chile y muestra la variación en los vínculos entre los partidos políticos y los votantes, midiendo la variación al interior de los países así como entre países. ; This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of partyvoter linkages from the perspective of voters where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is access to publicly provided benefits. In the former case, partisan networks mediate access to goods. In the latter, beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. We show that these different access mechanisms shape voters' distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks. We test it using original survey data from Argentina and Chile and show variation both across and within countries on party-voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties' organizational capacity. ; Cet article propose une nouvelle méthode comparée pour l'étude des liens entre les partis politiques et les électeurs. Depuis le point de vue des électeurs, la principale distinction entre les partis clientélaires et les partis programmatiques se trouve dans la manière d'accéder aux bénéfices publics. Dans le cas des partis clientélaires, les réseaux partisans interviennent dans l'accès aux bénéfices publics. Dans le cas des partis programmatiques, les bénéficiaires sont définis par le gouvernement grâce à la politique publique et l'accès à ces derniers est indépendant des réseaux de distribution partisans. Au moyen d'une nouvelle technologie pour mesurer les réseaux partisans, cet article montre que les différents mécanismes d'accès aux bénéfices façonnent les attentes distributives des votants et la nature de leur lien avec les partis politiques. La méthode utilise des enquêtes originales d'Argentine et du Chili et montre la variation dans les liens entre les partis politiques et les votants en mesurant la variation à l'intérieur des pays ainsi qu'entre les pays.

In 2014 Myanmar introduced a constituency development fund (CDF) to sponsor small public works and development projects in each of the country's 330 electoral constituencies. As a form of "pork-barrel" spending, CDF programmes have long remained controversial among international donors, anti-corruption agencies and civil society watchdogs for their potential for corruption, embezzlement, waste of public money, vote-buying and other clientelistic behaviours. The CDF has however emerged in as an extremely popular instrument for lawmakers, in offering new opportunities for meeting the basic infrastructure and development needs of local communities. The scheme has also fostered more frequent interactions among parliamentarians, local bureaucrats, and citizens. Mechanisms for vetting and monitoring the CDF projects seem also to have grown stronger each year. Rumours about petty corruption and misappropriation cases have gradually surfaced, particularly since the National League for Democracy (NLD) took control of the legislature in 2016. Yet in the first three fiscal years of its implementation, the scheme did not lead to any known major punitive action. There is also not yet enough of a record to identify credible linkages between the use of CDFs and the building of an electoral clientele by politicians — another common criticism of "pork-barrel" funding.

AbstractAlthough there are numerous studies showing the significance of clientelism in the electoral mobilization of the poor in Turkey, scant attention has been paid on the specific clientelistic strategies employed by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) among the Kurdish population in İstanbul. Addressing this gap, this study focuses on the AKP's clientelist politics among Kurdish voters in Bağcılar, a lower-income district on the European side of İstanbul. Drawing on fieldwork, this study argues that the AKP successfully mobilizes Kurdish voters through machine politics and relational clientelism, which are facilitated by co-ethnic brokerage and intermediary linkages. By analyzing different modalities of Kurdish brokers – Kurdish (male) entrepreneurs, Kurdish housewives and Kurdish associations – the study discloses the intricate dynamics of the AKP's clientelist–machine politics at the local level. It reveals that the AKP's co-ethnic brokers not only distribute material benefits but also cultivate enduring personal relationships with Kurdish voters, providing problem-solving networks for the Kurdish poor in everyday life. The AKP's co-ethnic brokerage relations foster trust, care, solidarity, and affectivity among Kurds. The study concludes that the AKP employs both material and symbolic dimensions of clientelism to mobilize the Kurdish electorate in İstanbul.

ABSTRACTWhy does electoral clientelism persist when ballots are secret and elections are competitive? The provision of material rewards during campaigns is seen as the standard way politicians secure votes in 'patronage democracies'. Yet monitoring clientelistic bargains is difficult when voting is secret, several competitors may provide material inducements simultaneously, voters view such inducements as gifts and not obligations, and candidates' records are more credible signals of future performance. I argue that where elections are competitive and voters expect gifts, candidates engage in a two-pronged strategy: affirm their own status through public displays of wealth, and undermine opponents' rewards by matching inducements or encouraging voters to break reciprocity norms. In result, neither side's gifts are sufficient for a win, and parties are forced to pursue different linkage mechanisms to voters. One such mechanism involves defining and targeting broader constituencies through policy proposals. Micro-level data from Ghana confirm these expectations. The theory is better suited to environments where candidates' past records are known to constituents than existing explanations, and accounts for the apparent contradiction between the ubiquity of campaign clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa and recent empirical findings that performance evaluations and non-contingent incentives matter most to voters.