Suchergebnisse

When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established more than twenty years ago, the international community had little experience prosecuting the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities. Unfortunately, there has been ample opportunity to build expertise in the intervening decades; ad hoc tribunals have been established to address past crimes in Cambodia and Sierra Leone, and a formal International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was convened in the aftermath of Rwanda's 1994 genocide. Since 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has assumed responsibility for new prosecutions, pursuing war criminals in countries unable or unwilling to bring them to justice domestically. Yet, after more than two decades of experience, the limits of these courts' capabilities are becoming clear. While they have brought some senior leaders to justice, the scope of the courts' budgets and their enquiries can never reach all -- or even most -- perpetrators of atrocities. They are physically far removed from the scenes of the crimes they are prosecuting, cannot compel evidence or conduct independent investigations, and are vulnerable to changes in funding and international political support. This book provides important insights into the strengths and limitations of current international justice mechanisms. It makes a clear case for increasing support to national legal systems and outlines a variety of ways that the U.S. government can improve and coordinate its aid with others. While there will always be a place for international courts in countries that cannot or will not prosecute perpetrators themselves, this report successfully argues that domestic systems can and should play a more meaningful role.

The New START Treaty, signed by presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in April 2010, was an important achievement. A follow-on to the 1991 START treaty, New START commits both countries to substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Pending ratification, New START limits both countries to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, far below the Cold War peak of 31,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the United States alone. Moreover, the New START treaty furthers Obama's goal of "resetting" U.S.-Russia relations. In just the past two years, the former adversaries also finalized an agreement on plutonium disposition, imposed UN sanctions against Iran in reaction to its nuclear program, and enhanced security for non-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Despite these signs of progress, it is unwise to be complacent. Even after the implementation of the New START Treaty, Obama's goal of a "world free of nuclear weapons" will remain elusive: the United States and Russia will still command enough nuclear weapons to annihilate each other several times over. In this report, the author argues that reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles even further than New START treaty levels -- to one thousand warheads, including tactical nuclear weapons -- would be both strategically and politically advantageous. It would decrease the risk of nuclear weapons theft and nuclear attack and increase international political support for future U.S. initiatives to reduce or control nuclear warheads, all while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve such a significant reduction in a follow-on to the New START treaty, the United States and Russia would need to reach agreement on three long-standing and contentious issues. Tactical nuclear weapons deployments will be the most difficult of these challenges, since Russia has a much larger arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons than does the United States and will therefore bear the brunt of the tactical nuclear weapons cuts. Missile defense is the second obstacle toward further significant nuclear reductions. Much work remains to secure Moscow's cooperation on, or acceptance of, the project. Finally, the United States and Russia must reach agreement on the use of nuclear vehicles for conventional weapons. It is difficult to overstate the potential danger if either country mistook a conventional missile for a nuclear one.

The United States has long been a leading force behind international efforts to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice. It spearheaded the prosecution of German and Japanese officials after World War II and more recently supported tribunals to deal with events in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Washington has kept far more distance, however, from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although President Bill Clinton allowed U.S. negotiators to sign the Rome Statute, the agreement that established the court, he and subsequent presidents have maintained objections to elements of the court's jurisdiction and prosecutorial authority. U.S. administrations have since cooperated to varying degrees with the ICC, but the notion of ratifying the Rome Statute and joining the court has never been seriously entertained. Even as a nonmember, though, the United States has important interests at stake in the ICC's operations. On the one hand, the court can bring to justice those responsible for atrocities, something with both moral and strategic benefits. On the other hand, there are fears that the court could seek to investigate American actions and prosecute American citizens, as well as concerns that it will weaken the role of the UN Security Council (where the United States has a veto) as the preeminent arbiter of international peace and security.

In this report, the author explores the political and institutional changes that have contributed to congressional gridlock and examines their consequences for foreign policy making. Some of these developments, she notes, are national trends that have developed over a number of decades. Successive redistricting efforts, for example, have all but eliminated interparty competition in some House districts, leaving the real competition to the primaries and the most ideologically driven voters. King further notes that the rising cost of elections has increased the time devoted to fundraising at the expense of substantive priorities, and the twenty-four hour news cycle has decreased the time and incentive for reflective debate. More subtle, but equally important, institutional changes have likewise diminished Congress's effectiveness. A decline in committee chairmen's authority and expertise, tighter control over voting by party leaders, and the relaxation of traditional customs limiting the use of procedural tools to practical ends have all, led to a breakdown in comity. The consequences highlighted are both broad and significant, from delayed presidential appointments to a poorly coordinated budget process for critical foreign policy areas such as intelligence, diplomacy, and development.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the character of Russia, its principal successor state, remains unresolved. So, too, does the character of Russia's relationship with the West. Though the intense U.S.-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War is over, Russia has not become the consistent partner that many on the outside hoped would emerge after the Cold War's end. The United States and Europe have taken issue with many elements of Russia's domestic trajectory and regional and international posture, including its democratic practices, energy-related activities in Europe, stance on Iran's nuclear program, and actions in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. At the same time, many Russians are also disappointed with Western policies and actions, including sympathy for Georgia, U.S. plans for missile defense, and, above all, the enlargement of NATO. This has made for a mix of resentment and assertiveness in Moscow. A principal factor enabling this assertiveness in recent years has been Russia's strong economic growth. Since 2008, though, Russia, like many other countries, has experienced a deep economic crisis. The question is how this crisis might affect Russia's domestic politics and foreign policy and, consequently, whether any change is warranted in U.S. policy toward Moscow.

Prologue -- Principles for defense -- Security at the source -- Building blocks -- The beginnings of a true system -- Warning -- A wider universe of nuclear plots and defenses -- The way forward -- Appendix: Radiation detection and weapons effects calculations