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Do governments in less-democratic newly industrialized countries (NICs) bargain with their citizens? In this article we develop a game-theoretic model to show that the government may not be able to avoid bargaining in open economies such as the Asian NICs when economic conditions are less than optimal. The reason is that, in the absence of government bargaining, citizens acting rationally and strategically choose to withdraw resources such as labor or production investment from a weak economy. Under these circumstances, government bargaining to elicit resource investment is a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome. To test the model, we analyze data on production investment in the Asian NICs of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia from the 1960s to the 1990s. The analysis supports the prediction of the formal model and, hence, makes three contributions to the study of this topic. First, when we relax the assumption that citizens are naïve, governments in less-democratic open economies such as the Asian NICs may not be able to avoid bargaining with their citizens. Second, resource-withholding or withdrawal is an equilibrium strategy that convinces the government to bargain. Third, governments may bargain credibly even in the absence of formal constraints.

Do governments in less-democratic newly industrialized countries (NICs) bargain with their citizens? In this article we develop a game-theoretic model to show that the government may not be able to avoid bargaining in open economies such as the Asian NICs when economic conditions are less than optimal. The reason is that, in the absence of government bargaining, citizens acting rationally & strategically choose to withdraw resources such as labor or production investment from a weak economy. Under these circumstances, government bargaining to elicit resource investment is a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome. To test the model, we analyze data on production investment in the Asian NICs of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, & Malaysia from the 1960s to the 1990s. The analysis supports the prediction of the formal model &, hence, makes three contributions to the study of this topic. First, when we relax the assumption that citizens are naive, governments in less-democratic open economies such as the Asian NICs may not be able to avoid bargaining with their citizens. Second, resource-withholding or withdrawal is an equilibrium strategy that convinces the government to bargain. Third, governments may bargain credibly even in the absence of formal constraints. 2 Tables, 3 Figures, 69 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]

From the 1960s to the 1990s, the Asian newly industrialize countries (NICs) received much attention because of their strong economic performance. Governments were credited for creating social stability & political quiescence that led to the economic success. This paper analyzes the citizens' economic & political support for governments & their policies during the Asian financial crisis & shows that there is a new social contract in Asia. Transparent governments attentive to citizens' concerns earned the economic & political support of their citizens, whereas governments that failed to provide such transparency & clarity lost their citizens' political & economic support which in turn aggravated the problems. The author concludes that citizens' will not support a reestablishment of authoritarian policy making. E. Sanchez

I appreciate the work that Professor Lowry has put into the evaluation of the credible apologies argument presented in my article, 'Non-Electoral Responsiveness Mechanisms'. Lowry states that I assume 'a causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies'. I am obliged to point out that this is inaccurate – I make no such assumption. What does cause the government's credible apologies? It is the need for the economic resources of labour quiescence and production investment from the respective resource-owners. Theory and empirical studies suggest that the withdrawal of such resources follows less-than-optimal economic performance; it follows, then, that governments in the less-democratic countries who need these resources are forced to pay attention to economic performance and offer credible apologies following sub-optimal economic performance.

A reply to Robert C. Lowry's comment on O. Fiona Yap's article, "Non-Electoral Responsiveness Mechanisms" (2003), argues that Lowry wrongly claims that the article assumes that there is a "causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies." Rather, these apologies stem from the need for economic resources like a stable labor pool & production investment on the part of resource owners. Lowry's assertions that a causal relationship is needed for the concept of accountability & that credible apologies must be made in response to poor economic performance in order for governments to be held accountable for the consequences of their policies are challenged. An example of the link between disputes & the appearance of flowers is used to show that these assertions are inconsistent with theoretical & empirical conventions. Lowry's critique of the data contained in the Appendix is contested. It is concluded that the tests & models used in the article offer substantial support for the credible apologies argument. 1 Table. J. Lindroth

Does the lack of competitive elections in the less democratic newly industrialized or industrializing countries (NICs) mean that their governments are unconstrained by their citizens' preferences for economic performance? In this article, I show how non-electoral mechanisms in the less democratic NICs of South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia constrain their governments. Governments pay attention to the effects of policies on economic performance because labour disquiet and disinvestment are likely to arise otherwise. To pre-empt labour disquiet and disinvestment, the governments offer 'credible apologies' that include punishment and monitoring of government when economic performance is less than optimal in these countries. When they fail to offer credible apologies, labour and producers respond with strikes and disinvestment. Governments' credible apologies play an important role in explaining labour quiescence and production investment. The argument and evidence contrasts with the general impression that governments in the less democratic NICs are constrained only by elites or are responsible only to themselves. The analysis shows that governments use bargaining mechanisms even where the citizens are perceived as meek and without bargaining strength. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

Does the lack of competitive elections in the less democratic newly industrialized or industrializing countries (NICs) mean that their governments are unconstrained by their citizens' preferences for economic performance? In this article, I show how non-electoral mechanisms in the less democratic NICs of South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia constrain their governments. Governments pay attention to the effects of policies on economic performance because labour disquiet and disinvestment are likely to arise otherwise. To pre-empt labour disquiet and disinvestment, the governments offer 'credible apologies' that include punishment and monitoring of government when economic performance is less than optimal in these countries. When they fail to offer credible apologies, labour and producers respond with strikes and disinvestment. Governments' credible apologies play an important role in explaining labour quiescence and production investment. The argument and evidence contrasts with the general impression that governments in the less democratic NICs are constrained only by elites or are responsible only to themselves. The analysis shows that governments use bargaining mechanisms even where the citizens are perceived as meek and without bargaining strength.