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104 S's of apparently Italian descent in New Haven who were registered voters were interviewed by 8 experimenters. They were asked to give their preference among a number of real & imagined candidates seeking political office. The purpose was to determine whether preelection interviewing stimulates voting among the least stimulated voters. The results show that being interviewed in a PO survey does increase the probability that the R would vote in the following election. 1 Table. S. Karganovic.

The author's firm of consultants conducted a number of constituency opinion surveys during the 1966 British election campaign. This seemed to provide a useful opportunity to undertake an experiment to ascertain whether sample survey methods could reveal any signif diff's between various methods of obtaining information on past voting & voting intention. IPSA.

Understanding the incentives of politicians requires understanding the nature of voting behavior. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether voters focus on the problem of electoral selection or if they instead focus on electoral sanctioning. If voters are forward‐looking but uncertain about politicians' unobservable characteristics, then it is rational to focus on selection. But doing so undermines democratic accountability because selection renders sanctioning an empty threat. In contrast to rational choice predictions, the experimental results indicate a strong behavioral tendency to use a retrospective voting rule. Additional experiments support the interpretation that retrospective voting is a simple heuristic that voters use to cope with a cognitively difficult inference and decision problem and, in addition, suggest that voters have a preference for accountability. The results pose a challenge for theories of electoral selection and voter learning and suggest new interpretations of empirical studies of economic and retrospective voting.

We discussed the increasing interest in the use of technical means for voting in elections and referendums with a gradual transition to electronic voting. Our article deals with the peculiarities of the experiment on the organization and conduct of remote electronic voting in the elections of deputies of the Moscow City Duma of the seventh convocation, scheduled for September 8, 2019. In addition, the article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of electronic voting, offers recommendations on eliminating some risks associated with the use of this type of electronic voting. The received results of the experiment will allow to define directions of the further work on perfection of legal regulation of introduction in selective process of modern digital technologies. In case of positive results, practical and technological solutions can be developed, which will ensure further development of the remote electronic voting system in Russia.

This article analyzes the predictors of preferential voting in flexible list systems, focusing on political sophistication, voting rules and district size. It relies on a field experiment carried out in Portugal on the 2015 legislative election day. We found that the effect of district size depends on the nature of the voting rules introduced (optional or compulsory preferential voting). Also, political interest tends to lose its significance when preferential voting is compulsory. Thus, preferential voting does not constitute an obstacle for those with less political sophistication to express a vote, especially when the voting rules make preferential voting compulsory. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

International audience ; Electoral systems in which voters can cast preference votes for individual candidates within a party list are increasingly popular. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on whether and how the scale used to evaluate candidates can affect electoral behavior and results. In this paper, we analyze data from an original voting experiment leveraging real-life political preferences and embedded in a nationally representative online survey in Austria. We show that the scale used by voters to evaluate candidates makes differences. For example, the possibility to give up to two points advantages male candidates because male voters are more likely to give 'zero points' to female candidates. Yet this pattern does not exist in the system in which voters can give positive and negative points because male voters seem reluctant to actively withdraw points from female candidates. We thus encourage constitution makers to think carefully about the design of preference voting.

International audience ; Electoral systems in which voters can cast preference votes for individual candidates within a party list are increasingly popular. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on whether and how the scale used to evaluate candidates can affect electoral behavior and results. In this paper, we analyze data from an original voting experiment leveraging real-life political preferences and embedded in a nationally representative online survey in Austria. We show that the scale used by voters to evaluate candidates makes differences. For example, the possibility to give up to two points advantages male candidates because male voters are more likely to give 'zero points' to female candidates. Yet this pattern does not exist in the system in which voters can give positive and negative points because male voters seem reluctant to actively withdraw points from female candidates. We thus encourage constitution makers to think carefully about the design of preference voting.

International audience ; Electoral systems in which voters can cast preference votes for individual candidates within a party list are increasingly popular. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on whether and how the scale used to evaluate candidates can affect electoral behavior and results. In this paper, we analyze data from an original voting experiment leveraging real-life political preferences and embedded in a nationally representative online survey in Austria. We show that the scale used by voters to evaluate candidates makes differences. For example, the possibility to give up to two points advantages male candidates because male voters are more likely to give 'zero points' to female candidates. Yet this pattern does not exist in the system in which voters can give positive and negative points because male voters seem reluctant to actively withdraw points from female candidates. We thus encourage constitution makers to think carefully about the design of preference voting.

International audience ; Electoral systems in which voters can cast preference votes for individual candidates within a party list are increasingly popular. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on whether and how the scale used to evaluate candidates can affect electoral behavior and results. In this paper, we analyze data from an original voting experiment leveraging real-life political preferences and embedded in a nationally representative online survey in Austria. We show that the scale used by voters to evaluate candidates makes differences. For example, the possibility to give up to two points advantages male candidates because male voters are more likely to give 'zero points' to female candidates. Yet this pattern does not exist in the system in which voters can give positive and negative points because male voters seem reluctant to actively withdraw points from female candidates. We thus encourage constitution makers to think carefully about the design of preference voting.

International audience ; Electoral systems in which voters can cast preference votes for individual candidates within a party list are increasingly popular. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on whether and how the scale used to evaluate candidates can affect electoral behavior and results. In this paper, we analyze data from an original voting experiment leveraging real-life political preferences and embedded in a nationally representative online survey in Austria. We show that the scale used by voters to evaluate candidates makes differences. For example, the possibility to give up to two points advantages male candidates because male voters are more likely to give 'zero points' to female candidates. Yet this pattern does not exist in the system in which voters can give positive and negative points because male voters seem reluctant to actively withdraw points from female candidates. We thus encourage constitution makers to think carefully about the design of preference voting.