The Dynamics of Senatorial Representation, 1952-1991
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 705-736
ISSN: 0022-3816
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In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 705-736
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 141-162
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 141
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 468
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 468-498
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American political science review, Band 89, Heft 1, S. 108-120
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: American journal of political science, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 497
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 497-528
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 685
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 1-39
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 685-699
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 12, S. 685-699
ISSN: 0276-8739
Identifies changes in EPA hazardous waste enforcement policy and factors influencing them.
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 559-564
In: American political science review, Band 85, Heft 3, S. 801-828
ISSN: 1537-5943
A new paradigm of political-bureaucratic relations emerged through the 1980s holding that U.S. democratic institutions continuously shape nonelective public bureaucracies. Several empirical studies support the paradigm with evidence suggestive of political manipulation but none reveals the scope or specific mechanisms of political control. We explore the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy explicitly to determine the scope and mechanisms. We examine output time series from seven different public bureaucracies for responsiveness to political tools applied in the late Carter and early Reagan administrations. We find responsiveness in all seven cases. The evidence also shows that political appointments—a shared power of the president and Congress—is the most important instrument of political control; changing budgets, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations are less important. These findings confirm intuitive assertions by institutional scholars and suggest a method of "policy monitoring" that could enhance future democratic control of the bureaucracy.