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This paper argues that the issues raised by the industrial policy debate are as much political as they are economic. There is every reason to believe that, without substantial reform of political institutions, efforts to administer a rational new industrial policy would soon degenerate into the type of inconsistent morass of special‐interest‐generated policies which industrial policy advocates rightfully criticize as our de facto set of industrial policies.This important political dimension has been overlooked by many industrial policy advocates. An important exception is Robert Reich, who has proposed a new centralized industrial policy agency in hopes that the battle of conflicting interests would promote greater aggregate efficiency. We argue that on theoretical grounds, however, such centralization might either increase or decrease efficiency. The competition of the military services under the Defense Department gives us a close analogue for study. Unfortunately, however, our review of efficiency in defense policy suggests that this would be a very poor model on which to base a broader industrial policy. To promote substantial increases in defense and industrial policy efficiency appears to require that much more fundamental institutional reforms be considered.

SUMMARYMinimum‐wage, maximum hours legislation constrains employers in the hours of work they offer weekly to employees. Implications of this standardized work week are discussed here in the context of theories of the allocation of time. Some confounding of the effects due to income differences in such theories is shown to be possible because the value of consumers' time is no longer indicated by their wage rates. Retail organization and service industries also can be expected to adjust to the differences in time value. Possible welfare bases for the standardized work week are noted.

As the twentieth century draws to a close, one can find sharply contrasting views among leading scholars on almost every key issue in positive international political economy. How strong are international as opposed to domestic influences on policy? How important are issues of national security ("high politics") versus economic considerations("low politics")? What role do institutions—international and domestic—play in influencing and constraining the behavior of governments? Why is international cooperation rare but not unheard of? The list goes on and on.

International monetary problems moved from the back pages to the front pages long ago, and yet, despite much attention, they continue to trouble national leaders, entrepreneurs, international officials and scholars, and to affect the average citizen. World payments imbalances and currency fluctuations have substantial domestic economic effects, give rise to protectionist pressures, put unwelcome heat on politicians, and raise fears that resulting governmental conflicts could unravel political-security relations. Thus, large and small nations meet in various fora, from bilateral sessions through the Group-of-Seven powers to the annual IMF conference, to negotiate proposed changes.