Suchergebnisse

A review article on five documents, Documents diplomatiques francais. 1961, Vol. I, 1 janvier-20 juin; 1961, Vol. II, 1 juillet-31 decembre; 1962, Vol. I, 1 janvier-30 juin; 1962, Vol. II, 1 juillet-31 decembre; 1963, Vol. I, 1 janvier-30 juin (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997-2000). Based upon recently published volumes of French diplomatic documents, this review article examines the course of the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community, 1961-1963, & the reasons why France vetoed GB's application. It is clear that even before the British government launched its application, the French government was aware of the threat it posed to the cohesion of the community & to French interests. It therefore pursued tactics of delay. The British, who were in a hurry to join, vainly sought to convince the French of their conversion to the Gaullist conception of a confederal Europe that would be independent of both the Soviet Union & the US, even dangling the prospect of nuclear cooperation before President de Gaulle. The latter's position inside France was relatively weak until he won a referendum on the direct election of the president in October 1962 & his party triumphed in the legislative elections the following month. De Gaulle then felt secure enough to tell Prime Minister Macmillan quite bluntly at their Rambouillet meeting on 15-16 Dec 1962 that he did not believe that GB was ready for EEC membership. He had thus already made up his mind to exclude GB before the Nassau agreement between President Kennedy & Mr. Macmillan in which the former agreed to supply with Polaris nuclear missiles, although gbthis agreement confirmed his belief that GB was excessively dependent upon the US. Although economic questions -- particularly those relating to the system of agricultural support & to GB's request for special concessions to Australia, Canada, & New Zealand -- did play an important part in de Gaulle's decision, it is clear that political factors were uppermost in his mind. He did not want either a diluted community or one in which there was a possible rival to French leadership. Adapted from the source document.

The success of black or white mothers in obtaining adequate prenatal care is examined. Two departures from public health convention are employed. The independent variables' marginal effects are calculated from their logit coefficients. The odds ratio of care adequacy between races is derived from race-specific regressions. It yields a smaller variance and type II decision error likelihood compared to the race dummy method. A working-class life outlook and apathetic fathers are the highest barriers to adequate care. Wantedness, in the form of desired timing, is a very strong motivator. Improving upward socioeconomic mobility and paternal attitudes are important aspects of increasing prenatal care adequacy rates.