Suchergebnisse

Die Länder zwischen Ostsee und Schwarzem Meer sind durch ein gemeinsames Schicksal und geteilte Risiken verbunden. Um an Stärke gegenüber Russland zu gewinnen, könnten sie sich in einer Koalition zusammenschließen. Diese kann auf einer Idee aus Polen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg aufbauen : ein Block der Länder des Intermariums. (IP)

How to solve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the Donets Basin? Until now, the international
community – the OSCE, and especially Germany and France, within the so-called Normandy
Format – has been trying to mediate bilateral talks between Kyiv and Moscow. The activities of
the so-called Contact Group, with considerable support from Berlin and Paris, have led to the wellknown
Minsk Agreements. With the delay, these agreements have, in combination with other
factors, such as the collapse of world energy prices and growing effects of Western sanctions on
Russia, achieved a decline of military activity since summer 2015. Yet, the agreements have
neither led to a full ceasefire, nor to any serious steps towards a return, under Kyiv's control, of
the occupied areas and the Russian-Ukrainian border in the Donbas.

A main reason for the recent escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe is the absence of an
effective security structure encompassing such militarily weak countries as Moldova, Georgia,
and Ukraine. While Ukrainian public opinion has recently made a U-turn from a rejection to
an embrace of NATO, the Alliance will not be ready to extend its commitments farther east
anytime soon. Although future enlargement of the Alliance is possible, Ukraine's confrontation
with Russia as well as Moscow's anti-Western stance would have to decrease significantly for
that to happen. Recently, the opposite tendency was on display: The more aggression the
Kremlin has shown, the less likely it is that the North Atlantic Council will open its doors to
new members in conflict with Moscow.

The Kremlin's "hybrid war" on the Revolution of Dignity has been distracting pro-Western forces, in Ukraine's civil society, public administration and Western diaspora, from pushing through reforms.

For obvious reasons, Moscow's aggression against Kyiv has led to a marked growth in
Ukrainians' support for, and salience of, accession to NATO. During the last two years,
Ukrainian public opinion has made a U-turn from skepticism against the Atlantic alliance to
its enthusiastic embrace. Until 2013, almost two-thirds of Ukraine's population was strictly
against NATO membership. Today, around half of the Ukrainians explicitly want to join the
alliance, with only a relatively small minority speaking out against. Kyiv is both actively
introducing NATO standards in its army, and pressuring the West to finally open NATO's
doors to Ukraine.

The international study of fascism has, over the last 25 years, experienced considerable consolidation. Inspired by influential theoretical publications of Roger D. Griffin and others, a new sub-discipline, "comparative fascist studies," has emerged that proceeds from a largely common conceptualization of fascism. It explicitly includes and particularly promotes the cross-cultural, as well as inter-epochal investigation into ultra-nationalisms outside Central and Western Europe after the year 1945. The concepts, approaches and hypotheses of this new sub-discipline are well-suited to be applied to the study of interwar and post-Soviet right-wing radicalism in Eastern Europe. However, before comprehensive classification and informative comparison becomes possible, the putative fascist phenomena of Eastern Europe need more thorough descriptive analysis, field research, and empirical investigation by researchers, in the region.

Die westliche Fixierung auf die Regierungsqualität und weniger die Überlebenschancen des ukrainischen Staates ist überholt. Jetzt muss vor allem das durch den Krieg vergiftete Geschäftsklima verbessert werden. Was in der Ost- und Südukraine gebraucht wird, sind Garantien des Westens zur Sicherung in- und ausländischer Investitionen. (IP)

Europäische Fehlinterpretationen der ukrainischen Innenpolitik sowie der ukrainisch-russischen Gemengelage sind u.a. Resultat der Unterentwicklung der Ukrainistik in den Mitgliedsstaaten der EU. Jüngstes Beispiel ist eine Übertragung vorrevolutionärer skeptischer Sichtweisen auf die nachrevolutionäre Ukraine - ein ahistorischer Ansatz, der die Tiefe der soziopolitischen Veränderungen im Jahr 2014 ausblendet. Ähnlich den Fehlschlüssen infolge zweifelhafter Axiome zur Erklärung der Ursachen der Revolution sind künftige Fehleinschätzungen aufgrund von Missverständnissen neuer Herausforderungen der Ukraine nach der Revolution bereits programmiert. Dies gilt etwa für die Identifizierung äußerer vs. innerer Bestimmungsfaktoren für die vermutlich noch länger anhaltande Wirtschaftskrise. Obwohl der Reformprozess der Ukraine stockend und holprig sein wird, kann aufgrund neuer innen- und außenpolitischer Rahmenbedingungen damit gerechnet werden, dass die Reformen letztlich mehr oder minder konsequent umgesetzt werden