Suchergebnisse

It comes as no surprise to current visitors to China that their hosts place great emphasis on the accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution. While production increases and improvements in living conditions are repeatedly cited, the basic change is spiritual – before the Cultural Revolution, elitist and selfish attitudes were allegedly widespread; since the Revolution, a new commitment to the common good by cadres and masses alike has purportedly enriched Chinese life. This preoccupation with the Cultural Revolution stems from more than a need to justify past upheavals, it reflects an ongoing debate over the realization of goals sanctified by that movement. The twin efforts of rebuilding the system and institutionalizing Cultural Revolution reforms have apparently caused deep misgivings on the part of some leaders who see a thinly disguised effort to "restore the old." Thus the question of how China has changed since 1965 is of current policy relevance as well as intrinsic scholarly interest.

In December 1957, after the rectification-turned-anti-rightist campaign, an eleven-month series of provincial purges began. They affected twelve Chinese provinces and autonomous regions, in roughly chrono-logical order: Chekiang, Anhwei, Kansu, Tsinghai, Shantung, Hopei, Yunnan, Kwangtung, Sinkiang, Kwangsi, Honan, Liaoning and Shantung, again. With the exception of the Liaoning and second Shantung purges, all of these cases were reviewed at the second session of the Eighth Party Congress in May, 1958. The victims of the purges included four alternate members of the Central Committee, one provincial first secretary, eighteen members of standing committees of provincial committees, five secretaries of provincial committee secretariats, ten members of these secretariats, four governors, and ten vice-governors as well as approximately twenty-five other officials holding Party or government positions on the provincial level. In brief, this was no minor matter.

Introduction: the protagonists in the Politburo, 1972-76 -- 1. Coming to terms with Lin Biao: "ultra-left" and "ultra-right" on the road to the tenth Party Congress, 1972-73 -- 2. "The Second Cultural Revolution," fall 1973-summer 1974 -- 3. Toward the fourth National People's Congress, August 1974-January 1975 -- 4. Mao, Deng, and the politics of consolidation: from the fourth NPC to summer 1975 -- 5. Deng 's period "in charge:" comprehensive consolidation, July-October 1975 -- 6. The unfolding of a new leadership equation: the turn against Deng and the ascent of Hua, November 1975-March 1976 -- 7. The Tiananmen Incident and Mao's last days, April-September 1976 -- 8. The purge of the "Gang of Four," September-October 1976

The author left Australia patriotically attracted to the new China created by the communist revolution. She stayed nearly 30 years through a period of initial promise followed by a series of disasters. Here, she explores her experience, beliefs, confusion and fear in China, her young life in Melbourne that led to China and her post-China journey once back in Australia. (She is now a Buddhist). Her story puts a human face on the tortuous history of Mao's China.

Although the broad outlines of the conflicting views and interests concerning economic readjustment following the December 1978 Third Plenum are adequately understood in the existing literature, academic accounts and the official narrative seriously misunderstand or misrepresent the élite politics surrounding the readjustment program in 1979-80. The view that Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun joined forces in an alliance against Hua Guofeng has merit, but not, as commonly claimed, as a rejection of Hua's failed economic policies-Deng in fact was the most forceful advocate of the pre-plenum policies which Chen found most detrimental. The second widely accepted proposition, that Deng and Chen subsequently fell out along reform vs. readjustment lines, with Chen gaining the upper hand by late 1980, also distorts political reality. When readjustment finally achieved its most forceful manifestation, the actual policies were formulated by Zhao Ziyang, with Deng's crucial backing. (China J/GIGA)

This study debunks Deng Xiaoping's creation myth, the official narrative largely adopted by Western scholarship, which credits Deng with initiating the PRC's new post-Mao reforms at the Third Plenum in December 1978. In the Western literature, this is further portrayed as the outcome of a power struggle between CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, identified as the leader of an alleged "whateverist" faction, against a coalition of forces led by Deng Xiaoping, variously identified as "modernizers" or "reformers". The analysis in this article focuses on the central aspect of the myth (economic policy): the claim that before the Third Plenum Hua carried out a reckless and unsustainable neo-Maoist policy, the so-called "Western leap forward", until he was pushed aside at the plenum by Deng, who then initiated the start of the "reform and opening" program. Contrary to this narrative, Hua and Deng were in essential agreement on all key aspects of economic policy before the Third Plenum, including both the subsequently rejected "Western leap forward" (with Deng arguably more reckless than Hua in pushing this approach), and the early moves toward "reform and opening". Moreover, the evidence suggests that Hua, not Deng, was in the forefront of efforts to promote economic system reform. (China J/GIGA)