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That dogs show behavior suggestive of jealousy has long been known and has been demonstrated under controlled conditions. Cook et al. have now shown arousal in the amygdala when dogs see a caregiver feeding another dog. This finding has ethical significance in two respects. First, the consideration shown by the investigators for the welfare of their experimental subjects sets an example for other researchers using animals. Second, the greater understanding of the emotional lives of animals should lead to more concern for their needs.

". we cannot avoid concluding that by not giving more than we do, people in rich countries are allowing those in poor countries to suffer from absolute poverty, with consequent malnutrition, ill health and death. This is not a conclusion that applies only to governments. It applies to each absolutely affluent individual, for each of us has the opportunity to do something about the situation; for instance, to give our time or money to voluntary organisations. If, then, allowing someone to die is not intrinsically different from killing someone, it would seem that we are all murderers ." - page 1

Andrew Kuper begins his critique of my views on poverty by accepting the crux of my moral argument: The interests of all persons ought to count equally, and geographic location and citizenship make no intrinsic difference to the rights and obligations of individuals. Kuper also sets out some key facts about global poverty, for example, that 30,000 children die every day from preventable illness and starvation, while most people in developed nations have plenty of disposable income that they spend on luxuries and items that satisfy mere wants, not basic needs.

The one central point in all my writing on this topic, from "Famine, Affluence and Morality" onward, has been that the failure of people in the rich nations to make any significant sacrifices in order to assist people who are dying from poverty related causes is ethically indefensible. It is not simply the absence of charity, let alone of moral saintliness: It is wrong, and one cannot claim to be a morally decent person unless one is doing far more than the typical comfortably-off person does.

Singer replies to Andrew Kuper's (2002) critique of his (1999) position that maximizing charitable donations will alleviate poverty. He takes particular issue with Kuper's claim that such a practice would actually harm the poor, & refutes examples of charitable-distribution problems in Africa. Nor is charitable donation incompatible with Kuper's notion that Americans should also support ethical production in foreign countries or help via either tourism or activism; however, most impoverished people lack access to international markets & thus would not directly benefit from Kuper's market-based proposals. Kuper invokes political philosophy as theists invoke religion, with an absolute faith that disregards evidence. Kuper's discouragement of donation is likely to appeal to the majority of people in developed countries already disinclined to assist the world's poor. K. Coddon

Singer makes a final response to Kuper (2002), defending his (1999) position that individuals in developed countries have an ethical obligation to make charitable donations to ease global poverty. He disputes Kuper's charge that his views of justice are not theoretically grounded; as for the notions of political economy & political sociology that Kuper finds lacking in Singer's position, the author rejoins that Marxism itself is based in abstraction, & its program for social change is largely discredited. He reiterates his support for charitable groups such as Oxfam, & invokes Oskar Schindler as an example of how individual moral action is valuable even when not explicitly linked to structural change. K. Coddon