Foreign policy beliefs and support for Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party
In: Canadian foreign policy: La politique étrangère du Canada, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 111-130
ISSN: 2157-0817
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In: Canadian foreign policy: La politique étrangère du Canada, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 111-130
ISSN: 2157-0817
Similar to other recent Canadian elections, foreign policy did not feature prominently in the 2011 federal election campaign. In fact, many doubt Canadian public opinion on international affairs is linked to the actions taken by recent Governments. In this paper, we examine Canadian public opinion toward a range of foreign policy issues and argue that the survey questions measure two latent dimensions —militarism and internationalism. Our survey evidence indicates the existence of an "issue public" which is prepared to endorse military action and is skeptical of human rights and overseas aid programs, and this group is far more supportive of Prime Minister Harper and the Conservative Party than other Canadians. The absence of an elite discussion, either among politicians or between media elites, about the direction of Canadian foreign policy does not prevent the Canadian voter from thinking coherently about questions pertaining to this issue domain and employing these beliefs to support or oppose political parties and their leaders.
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In: Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 139-165
ISSN: 1745-7297
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: National Institute economic review: journal of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Band 265, S. 144-156
ISSN: 1741-3036
AbstractThe contemporary relevance of Adam Smith is evidenced by continued reference to his name. Computational analysis identifies over 700 mentions of Smith and his two famous works—The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations—in post-World War 1 House of Commons debates. We find some parliamentarians appreciate Smith's complex ideas, but most references are 'ornamental'. Charting Smith's use over the decades, this paper builds on Kirk Willis' idea that studying parliamentary debates are an ideal way to understand how, at best, policy ideas, germinate and disseminate over time, or, at worst, how 'complex ideas became slogans'.
In: Electoral Studies, Band 40, S. 462-470
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 40, S. 462-470
ISSN: 0261-3794
While the existence of a 'Democratic Peace' (DP) is widely accepted, the various DP theories that seek to explain why democracies rarely fight one another are highly contested. A 'commercial/capitalist peace' counterargument maintains that the relationship between democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is greater trade among democracies. Meanwhile, Realists counter that it is alliances among democratic states, not their democratic nature, that causes peace among them. This research note utilizes novel country feeling thermometer data to explore the debate's micro-foundations: the underlying drivers of international amity and enmity among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and Germany. Utilizing Freedom House and other quantitative measures of freedom, trade, military strength, and racial and cultural difference, it pits the micro-foundations of the DP against its rivals to explain attitude formation among a group of Western democratic publics. Given the resurgence of authoritarianism around the world today, a better understanding of the role of regime type in shaping public opinion – and subsequently war and peace – is urgently needed.
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In: Political research exchange: PRX : an ECPR journal, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 1716630
ISSN: 2474-736X
While the existence of a 'Democratic Peace' (DP) is widely accepted, the various DP theories that seek to explain why democracies rarely fight one another are highly contested. A 'commercial/capitalist peace' counterargument maintains that the relationship between democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is greater trade among democracies. Meanwhile, Realists counter that it is alliances among democratic states, not their democratic nature, that causes peace among them. This research note utilizes novel country feeling thermometer data to explore the debate's micro-foundations: the underlying drivers of international amity and enmity among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and Germany. Utilizing Freedom House and other quantitative measures of freedom, trade, military strength, and racial and cultural difference, it pits the micro-foundations of the DP against its rivals to explain attitude formation among a group of Western democratic publics. Given the resurgence of authoritarianism around the world today, a better understanding of the role of regime type in shaping public opinion – and subsequently war and peace – is urgently needed.
BASE
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 124-137
ISSN: 1468-2478
Previous research has shown that on issues of foreign policy, individuals have "general stances," "postures," "dispositions" or "orientations" that inform their beliefs toward more discrete issues in international relations. While these approaches delineate the proximate sources of public opinion in the foreign policy domain, they evade an even more important question: what gives rise to these foreign policy orientations in the first place? Combining an original survey on a nationally representative sample of Americans with Schwartz's theory of values from political psychology, we show that people take foreign policy personally: the same basic values we know people use to guide choices in their daily lives also travel to the domain of foreign affairs, offering one potential explanation why people who are otherwise uninformed about world politics nonetheless express coherent foreign policy beliefs.
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In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 124-137
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
Previous research shows that, when it comes to foreign policy, individuals have general orientations that inform their beliefs toward more specific issues in international relations. But such studies evade an even more important question: what gives rise to such foreign-policy orientations in the first place? Combining an original survey on a nationally representative sample of Americans with Schwartz's theory of values from political psychology, we show that people take foreign policy personally: the same basic values that people use to guide choices in their daily lives also travel to the domain of foreign affairs. Conservation values are most strongly linked to "militant internationalism," a general hawkishness in international relations. The value of universalism is the most important value for predicting "cooperative internationalism," the foreignpolicy orientation marked by a preference for multilateralism and cosmopolitanism in international affairs. This relatively parsimonious and elegant system of values and foreign-policy beliefs is consistent across both high- and low-knowledge respondents, offering one potential explanation for why those people who are otherwise uninformed about world politics nonetheless express coherent foreign-policy beliefs.
BASE
Previous research shows that, when it comes to foreign policy, individuals have general orientations that inform their beliefs toward more specific issues in international relations. But such studies evade an even more important question: what gives rise to such foreign-policy orientations in the first place? Combining an original survey on a nationally representative sample of Americans with Schwartz's theory of values from political psychology, we show that people take foreign policy personally: the same basic values that people use to guide choices in their daily lives also travel to the domain of foreign affairs. Conservation values are most strongly linked to "militant internationalism," a general hawkishness in international relations. The value of universalism is the most important value for predicting "cooperative internationalism," the foreign-policy orientation marked by a preference for multilateralism and cosmopolitanism in international affairs. This relatively parsimonious and elegant system of values and foreign-policy beliefs is consistent across both high- and low-knowledge respondents, offering one potential explanation for why those people who are otherwise uninformed about world politics nonetheless express coherent foreign-policy beliefs.
BASE