Examines the relation between political knowledge & interest in public affairs, after George Bishop's (1987) observation that an inability to answer a political knowledge question decreased self-reported interest in public affairs. This effect was unaffected by the introduction of up to 101 unrelated buffer items. Explanations for the effect are tested here by providing 454 respondents (Rs) to a national telephone survey with an alternative explanation to lack of knowledge. Results reveal that a single buffer item giving Rs an external explanation for their lack of knowledge greatly reduced the context effect. Implications for the operation of buffer items are discussed. 1 Appendix, 11 References. Adapted from the source document.
This study examined the impact of mood on the production of persuasive arguments. Research demonstrates that a happy (as opposed to neutral or sad) mood often leads to less systematic information processing but to greater creativity in production tasks. It was hypothesized that individuals in a happy (as opposed to sad) mood produce more original and more persuasive arguments, especially when asked to advocate an unfamiliar (i.e., counterattitudinal) position. Eighty-seven college students were put in a happy or sad mood and asked to write a proattitudinal or a counterattitudinal essay on one of two topics. Happy subjects generally rated their own essays as being more persuasive than sad subjects did. External ratings revealed, however, that happy subjects' essays were judged to be more persuasive when they were counter-attitudinal but not when proattitudinal. No mood effects on various measures of originality were found. Thus support for the hypothesis was found with respect to judged persuasiveness but not to originality. Results are discussed within the framework of models of mood and cognition.
Abstract The same quantity can be expressed at different levels of granularity, for example, "1 year," "12 months," or "365 days." Consumers attend to the granularity chosen by a communicator and draw pragmatic inferences that influence judgment and choice. They consider estimates expressed in finer granularity more precise and have more confidence in their accuracy (studies 1–4). This effect is eliminated when consumers doubt that the communicator complies with Gricean norms of cooperative conversational conduct (studies 2–3). Based on their pragmatic inferences, consumers perceive products as more likely to deliver on their promises when the promise is described in fine-grained rather than coarse terms and choose accordingly (study 4). These findings highlight the role of pragmatic inferences in consumer judgment and have important implications for the design of marketing communications.
Specific numeric values presented in a rating scale may change the meaning of the scale's verbal endpoints, & yield different results. Per 299 telephone interviews & 138 mail surveys, adults in Mannheim & Heidelberg, Germany rated 6 politicians on 2 different scales -- a "-5 to +5" & a "0-10" -- with the same verbal qualifiers of endpoints. The statistical differences in results replicated the findings of Norbert Schwarz et al (see SA 40:4/92Y9430) in that combining a verbal label with negative numeric values yielded a more negative interpretation of the verbal scale anchor, thus, a more positive movement on the scale. Results did not differ by interview method (phone vs mail). 4 References. M. Pflum
Previous research on the use of "no opinion"-filters has indicated that respondents (Rs) are least likely to offer a substantive response the more strongly the filter question is worded. Here, results of 3 experiments conducted in Urbana, Ill, & Mannheim, Federal Republic of Germany (total N = 424 college students & 336 other randomly selected adults) demonstrate that filter questions influence Rs' perception of their task: the more strongly the filter question is worded, the more Rs assume that they will have to answer difficult questions, & that they may not have the required knowledge to do so; accordingly, they are discouraged from offering global opinions. In line with this assumption, all Rs who reported not having an opinion in response to a filter question subsequently provided substantive responses on a global opinion question -- presumably because the global question asked was less demanding than expected on the basis of the filter. Analyses of these substantive responses indicate that Rs who initially reported not having an opinion differed from Rs who reported having one. Methodological implications for the use of filter questions & for research on the nature of "floating" are discussed. 3 Tables, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.
Previous survey research has demonstrated that Rs are more likely to endorse the idea that something should "not be allowed" (or "not be forbidden") than to endorse the idea that it should be "forbidden" (or "allowed"), even though these expressions seem logically equivalent. The hypothesis is advanced that this asymmetry is due to the response behavior of indifferent Rs who neither endorse that something should be forbidden nor that it should be allowed, resulting in higher endorsements of the negative form of both question wordings. A mail questionnaire administered to a random sample of 720 adults in an industrial city of the Federal Republic of Germany (87% response rate) produced data consistent with this explanation. The cognitive mechanisms underlying the response behavior of indifferents is discussed, & evidence for cross-cultural stability of the forbid-allow effect presented. 1 Table, 1 Appendix, 7 References. Modified HA
PART I: PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS: Evolutionary analyses in social psychology / Eugene Burnstein and Christine Branigan -- The cultural grounding of social psychological theory / Joan G. Miller -- A lifespan developmental perspective / Kevin Durkin -- Cognitive indices of social information processing / John N. Bassili -- The psychophysiological perspective on the social mind / Piotr Winkielman, Gary G. Berntson, and John T. Cacioppo -- PART II: COGNITION: Mental representation / Eliot R. Smith and Sarah Queller -- The social unconscious / Mahzarin R. Banaji, Kristi M. Lemm, and Siri J. Carpenter -- Language and social cognition / Gun R. Semin -- Conversational processes in reasoning and explanation / Denis J. Hilton and Ben R. Slugoski -- The heuristics and biases approach to judgment of uncertainty / Dale Griffin, Richard Gonzalez, and Carol Varey -- How the mind moves: knowledge accessibility and the fine-tuning of the cognitive system / Leonard L. Martin, Fritz Strack, and Diederik A. Stapel -- Standards, expectancies, and social comparison / Monica Biernat and Laura S. Billings -- Individual differences in information processing / Peter Suedfeld and Philip E. Tetlock -- PART III: SOCIAL MOTIVATION: Self-regulation / Charles S. Carver -- Gaol setting and goal striving / Gabriele Oettingen and Peter M. Gollwitzer -- On the motives underlying social cognition / David Dunning -- The nature of emotion / W. Gerrod Parrott -- The consequences of mood on the processing of social information / Herbert Bless -- Attitudes, persuasion, and behavior / Gerd Bohner and Norbert Schwarz -- The construction of attitudes / Norbert Schwarz and Gerd Bohner -- Values and ideologies / Meg J. Rohan and Mark P. Zanna -- Self-esteem / Abraham Tesser -- Self-concept and identity / Daphna Oyserman -- Identity through time: constructing personal pasts and futures / Michael Ross and Roger Buchler -- PART IV: APPLICATIONS: Psychology and law / Gunter Kohnken, Maria Fiedler, and Charlotte Mohlenbeck -- Consumer behavior / Sharon Shavitt and Michaela Wanke -- Dealing with adversity: self-regulation, coping, adaptation, and health / Lisa G. Aspinwall -- The psychological determinants of political judgments / Victor C. Ottati
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