Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: From the GATT to the Uruguay Round and the Future
In: Études internationales, Band 19980, S. 993-994
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In: Études internationales, Band 19980, S. 993-994
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 233-263
ISSN: 1911-9917
Temporary foreign worker programs are typically seen as short-term solutions to shortages of regional or occupational labour. During the past decade, Canadian regions experienced unequal economic growth, and some suffered from significant excess labour demand. The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program was thus expanded and conditions to access it made easier. During the same period, the pattern of regional disparities in unemployment rates became more persistent. This paper shows that some of the persistence is due to the increased availability of temporary foreign workers. This suggests that policy makers did not price them correctly to avoid adverse effects on the Canadian labour market.
In: Canadian public policy: a journal for the discussion of social and economic policy in Canada = Analyse de politiques, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 233-265
ISSN: 0317-0861
We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a simple two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle. Origin taxes are shown to have very attractive properties: they lead to lower levels of optimal taxes, they converge as parallel imports increase (while destination taxes diverge), and they lead to higher welfare levels
BASE
In: Journal of development economics, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 293-312
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of international economics, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 89-112
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Journal of development economics, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 85-104
ISSN: 0304-3878
This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from u sing tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third, the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of ta riffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics. These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.
BASE
In: Études internationales: revue trimestrielle, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 748-749
ISSN: 0014-2123
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 132, Heft 2, S. 278-303
ISSN: 0932-4569
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6705
SSRN
Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5269
SSRN
In: Études internationales: revue trimestrielle, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 428-430
ISSN: 0014-2123
In: Journal of international economics, Band 38, Heft 3-4, S. 321-337
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Études internationales: revue trimestrielle, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 612-613
ISSN: 0014-2123