Immobilizing Corporate Income Shifting: Should It Be Safe to Strip in the Harbour?
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5609
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5609
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5314
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In: NHH Dept. of Business and Management Science Discussion Paper No. 2015/19
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Working paper
By introducing controlled-foreign-corporation (CFC) rules, the parent country of a multinational firm reserves the right to tax the income of the firm's foreign affiliates, if the tax rate in the affiliate's host country is below a specified threshold. In this paper, we identify the conditions under which binding CFC rules are part of the optimal tax mix chosen by governments. We show that this is the case when the financial structure of the multinational firm responds elastically to the introduction of the CFC rule, outweighing the negative effects on the firm's investment decision in the parent country, and on the profits of the home-owned firm in the parent country's welfare objective. We also show that if the government is mostly interested in maximizing tax revenues, a tighter CFC rule is associated with a tighter thin capitalization rule in its policy optimum.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2529
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4975
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 10272
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 9384
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7133
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In: CESifo working paper series 5130
In: Public finance
This paper examines the flexibility of multinational firms to use income-shifting strategies within a tax year to react to operating losses. First, we develop an analytical model that considers how affiliate losses can be adjusted by using the transfer prices of tangible and intangible assets, as well as internal debt shifting, either by ex-post (i.e., by the end of the tax year) or ex-ante income shifting (i.e., before the current tax year). Our model predicts that, due to income shifting, multinational firms report lower profits when running profits, and lower losses when running losses, compared to domestic firms. It also suggests that under ex-post income shifting, loss affiliates have lower transfer prices and internal leverage than profitable affiliates, whereas under ex-ante income shifting, affiliates feature the same transfer prices and internal capital structure, regardless of making losses. Second, using data on direct transfer payments and internal debt of Norwegian affiliates, we find empirical evidence that, under losses, transfer pricing gives substantial flexibility to adjust income shifting ex post. In contrast, we do not find evidence for flexibility in the use of internal debt to shift income ex post. We contribute to the literature that neglecting the precautionary income-shifting behavior of potential loss affiliates underestimates the sensitivity of tax rates to transfer payments and to internal debt, whenever some ex-ante income shifting is present.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3519
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In: CESifo working paper series 5075
In: Public finance
This paper studies the market and welfare effects of two main tax reforms - the Corporate Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Equity tax (ACE). Using an imperfect-competition model for a small open economy, it is shown that the well-known neutrality property of ACE does not hold. Both corporate tax regimes distort market entry and equilibrium prices. A main result is that a small open economy should levy a positive source tax on capital in markets with free firm entry. Which tax system is better from a welfare point of view, depends on production technology, the competitive effects of ACE and CBIT, and whether entry is excessive or suboptimal at the given corporate tax rate. Imposing tax income neutrality yields a higher corporate tax rate with ACE, which increases the scope for CBIT to be welfare improving.
In: IEB Working Paper N. 2015/27
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Working paper