Estate Acts, 1600 to 1830: A New Source for British History
In: NBER Working Paper No. w14393
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w14393
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w14107
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w13757
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w14004
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w14120
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12983
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In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Band 5, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
Eight states established deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917. All abandoned the systems between 1921 and 1930. Scholars debate the costs and benefits of these policy experiments. New data drawn from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate that deposit insurance influenced the composition of bank suspensions in these states. In typical years, suspensions due to runs fell. Suspensions due to mismanagement rose. During the penultimate year of each system, the bank failure rate rose to an unsustainable height and the system ceased operations.
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12594
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w23629
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w23828
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w32345
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w26710
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In: American economic review, Band 106, Heft 5, S. 538-542
ISSN: 1944-7981
In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.