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The problem I have in mind is the problem of the possible justification of subjecting one's will to that of another, and of the normative standing of demands to do so. The account of authority that I offered, many years ago, under the title of the service conception of authority, addressed this issue, and assumed that all other problems regarding authority are subsumed under it. Many found the account implausible. It is thin, relying on very few ideas. It may well appear to be too thin, and to depart too far from many of the ideas that have gained currency in the history of reflection on authority. The present article modifies some aspects the account, and defends it against some criticism made against it.

The problem I have in mind is the problem of the possible justification of subjecting one's will to that of another, and of the normative standing of demands to do so. The account of authority that I offered, many years ago, under the title of the service conception of authority, addressed this issue, and assumed that all other problems regarding authority are subsumed under it. Many found the account implausible. It is thin, relying on very few ideas. It may well appear to be too thin, and to depart too far from many of the ideas that have gained currency in the history of reflection on authority. Criticism can be radical, rejecting the service conception altogether. Or it can be more moderate, accepting the service conception or some of its central traits, especially the normal justification thesis, as setting necessary conditions for the legitimacy of authority, but denying that they constitute sufficient conditions. Most commonly, moderate critics argue that legitimate authority, at any rate legitimate political authority, presupposes a special connection between rulers and ruled, a special bond that is overlooked by the service conception. My purpose is to revisit the problem of authority, and to examine moderately critical claims, or some of them. I will start by explaining in the first section some background methodological points. Part II will briefly restate the service conception and the way it deals with the problem of authority. Part III develops the service conception and elaborates some of its implications by dealing with a series of only loosely connected questions and doubts to which it .is open. Part IV examines in general terms the argument that authority, at any rate political authority, presupposes a special link, missing in the service conception, between government and the governed. Part V considers the possibility that such a link is forged by consent, whereas Part VI comments on the possibility that the link is constituted by identification with or membership of the political community (or some other group).

El objeto de este artículo es volver de nuevo sobre la concepción de la autoridad como servicio, examinando algunas de las críticas que se le han dirigido. En la primera sección se exponen los presupuestos metodológicos fundamentales de la concepción. En la segunda sección se esbozan los perfiles generales de la concepción de la autoridad como servicio, así como la manera en la que ésta aborda el problema de la autoridad. En la sección tercera se exponen brevemente una serie de dificultades adicionales a las que se enfrenta la concepción, refinando la teoría y exhibiendo alguna de sus ventajas. En la sección cuarta se examina a grandes rasgos el argumento de que la autoridad, o al menos la autoridad política, presupone un vínculo especial, ausente en la concepción de la autoridad como servicio, entre el gobierno y los gobernados. En la sección quinta se considera la posibilidad de que tal vínculo sea forjado por el consentimiento, mientras que en la sección sexta se examina la posibilidad de que el vínculo se constituya en virtud de la identificación con o la pertenencia a la comunidad política (o a algún otro grupo). ; The purpose of Raz in this article is to revisit the service conception of authority. The author focuses his attention on some of the objections that were addressed to this conception. In the first section of his work, the fundamental methodological premises of the conception are explained. In the second section, the main features of the service conception are introduced to the reader, as well as how this conception approaches the problem of authority. In the third section, several additional difficulties confronting the conception are explored; all this considerations help the author to perfect his theory, showing then some of its advantages. In the fourth section, it is briefly considered the argument on the special link presumed between government and citizens specifically in the case of political authorities and how this argument is missing in the service conception. In the fifth section, it is taken into consideration the possibility for that link to be forged by consent, whereas in the sixth section, it is considered whether that link should be constituted by identification with or membership of the political community (or any other group).

The purpose of Raz in this article is to revisit the service conception of authority. The author focuses his attention on some of the objections that were addressed to this conception. In the first section of his work, the fundamental methodological premises of the conception are explained. In the second section, the main features of the service conception are introduced to the reader, as well as how this conception approaches the problem of authority. In the third section, several additional difficulties confronting the conception are explored; all this considerations help the author to perfect his theory, showing then some of its advantages. In the fourth section, it is briefly considered the argument on the special link presumed between government and citizens specifically in the case of political authorities and how this argument is missing in the service conception. In the fifth section, it is taken into consideration the possibility for that link to be forged by consent, whereas in the sixth section, it is considered whether that link should be constituted by identification with or membership of the political community (or any other group). ; El objeto de este artículo es volver de nuevo sobre la concepción de la autoridad como servicio, examinando algunas de las críticas que se le han dirigido. En la primera sección se exponen los presupuestos metodológicos fundamentales de la concepción. En la segunda sección se esbozan los perfiles generales de la concepción de la autoridad como servicio, así como la manera en la que ésta aborda el problema de la autoridad. En la sección tercera se exponen brevemente una serie de dificultades adicionales a las que se enfrenta la concepción, refinando la teoría y exhibiendo alguna de sus ventajas. En la sección cuarta se examina a grandes rasgos el argumento de que la autoridad, o al menos la autoridad política, presupone un vínculo especial, ausente en la concepción de la autoridad como servicio, entre el gobierno y los gobernados. En la sección quinta se considera la ...

The Practice of Value explores the nature of value and its relation to the social and historical conditions under which human agents live. At the core of the book are the Tanner Lectures delivered at Berkeley in 2001 by Joseph Raz, who has been one of the leading figures in moral and legal philosophy since the 1970's. Raz argues that values depend importantly on social practices, but that we can make sense of this dependence without falling back on cultural relativism. In response, three eminent philosophers, Christine Korsgaard, Robert Pippin, and Bernard Williams, offer their own distinctive reflections on the connections between value and practice. The book begins with an introduction by Jay Wallace, setting the scene for what follows, and ends with a response from Raz to his commentators. The result is a fascinating debate, accessible to readers throughout and beyond philosophy, about the relations between human values and human life. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1299/thumbnail.jpg

Joseph Raz is one of the world's leading philosophers of law, and in his Seeley Lectures he reflects critically on one of the central tenets of ethical thought, the view that values are universal. He concludes that we should try to understand what is and what is not entailed by the universality of values, with such an understanding central to the future hopes of mankind, rather than abandoning the belief altogether. This is a concise humane account of some fundamental questions of social existence. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1305/thumbnail.jpg

This book focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act and an exclusionary reason not to follow some competing reasons. Exclusionary reasons are explained, and used to unlock the secrets of orders, promises, and decisions as well as rules. Games are used to exemplify normative systems. Inevitably, the analysis extends to some aspects of normative discourse, which is truth – apt, but with a diminished assertoric force. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1265/thumbnail.jpg