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The purpose of this paper is to present a new theory of the cartel party. My argument is straightforward. Assuming that parties are the political analog of firms, that party systems are the political analog of markets, that the shares of the electorate are the political analog of the market shares that firms control, Western European party systems share with oligopolistic markets some structural features. Yet, to know whether Western European party systems resemble oligopolistic markets, we need to know whether Western European party systems are non-competitive political markets exactly in the same way in which oligopolistic markets are not competitive. That is we need to know whether changes in (political) supply are competitive adaptations to changes in demand or not. Hence, to focus on supply is not enough. We need to look at changes in supply relative to changes in demand. Moreover, since voters' perception of parties' political offer to the electorate does not simply reflect some objective conditions but is instead mediated by subjective factors (preferences, expectations, ideas, and so on…) I further suggest that the perception of the cartel may not be determined by parties' objectively oligopolistic practices, but it can simply be based on the perception of oligopolistic behavior, that is on the gap between the electorate's demands and the market's perceived supply.

The paper investigates the development of party finance and party finance legislation in Germany and Italy. The main claim of the paper is that the differences between German and Italian party finance reflect differences in the party finance legislation enacted in the two countries, which, in their turn, are a result of how the German and the Italian constitutional principles were translated into practice.

A recent survey conducted in a sample of 83 countries by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in collaboration with the World Bank Institute on the "Relations between the Legislature and the Executive in the Context of Parliamentary Oversight" allows cross-national comparison for the role of legislatures in the budgetary process. One of the survey's most significant indications is that legislatures in presidential systems are generally more involved in the preparation of the budget than legislatures in either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. The picture, however, is very different when we look at legislatures' oversight of the budget. Parliaments are generally more involved in the examination and final approval of the budget than are legislatures in presidential and semi-presidential systems1. In the light of these considerations, it should not be terribly surprising to find that the executive is more likely to be accountable to the legislature for its spending in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems.

Although few scholars would dispute from an empirical point of view the fact that parties change their electoral strategies, ideological stances and organizational structures over time, there is not much agreement on how these changes, above all party organizational change, have to be understood from a theoretical point of view. This is especially true with regard to the transformations that party organizations have undergone from the early 1970s on. In fact, although party organizational changes in the past three decades have generally been considered to be signs of the so called party crisis, the agreement on this analytical perspective is far from being unanimous. The party crisis interpretation of parties' organizational changes has recently been challenged by Katz and Mair. These scholars remarked that the party crisis is predicated on the assumption that the mass party of social integration represents the only model of party organization and that any departure from the experience of the mass party model indicates the failure of the party tout court.

The three faces of accountability -- Electoral and inter-institutional accountability -- Electoral accountability in non-Western settings -- Accountability: non-electoral and systemic -- Religion and accountability -- Religious denominations and good governance -- The cultural determinants of accountability.

Accountability is not an event, but a process. The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss the three faces or phases of accountability: taking into account, keeping into account and giving an account. In doing so attention is paid to the fact that parties and candidates in the course of one election need to learn and take into account what voters want, that their activities as elected official need to reflect the voters' demands and that they need to go back to the voters to explain what they did when they were in office.

"This important book explores the cultural conditions that favour political accountability. It examines the channels through which accountability can be secured and the role that accountability plays in ensuring good governance. In addition to problematizing the notion of accountability, the book suggests that it is the product of three different - albeit, related - processes: taking account of voters' preferences, keeping account of voters' preferences, and giving account of one's performance in office. It further explores the relationship between accountability and political culture by analyzing the relationship between accountability and religion, religious denomination, familism, civicness, secularism and postmaterialism, revealing that the level of accountability is influenced by the diffusion of post-material values and by the level of civicness in a given country. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in governance, the political economy of institutions and development, democracy, and more broadly to political science, international relations, political theory, comparative politics, sociology and cultural studies"--