Suchergebnisse

Analyzes NATO's role in security of Eurasia and Eastern and Central Europe, including the Balkans, Baltics, Caucasus, and Central Asia; suggests a more holistic approach towards countries with weak political leadership. Adapted from the concluding chapter of "Brassey's Eurasian and East European security yearbook: 2000 edition," edited by Ustina Markus and Daniel N. Nelson, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey's Inc. (ISBN cloth 1-57488-248-1; $45) (ISBN paper 1-57488-249-X; $29.95).

As NATO's membership and function widen, it transits from a "latent war community" to something akin to an international regime aimed at collective security. During and after such a process, successful integration into the "new" alliance will have little to do with a state's military contribution or strategic advantage. Instead, principal emphasis will be placed on how a state and its army behave. This discussion concerns the behavioral standards of a "civil army"—an ideal type to which no system can lay claim, but which allows comparative assessments. In a brief survey of east-central and southeast Europe, attention is given to signs of criminality, procurement fraud, limited civilian roles in defense, diminished public image of armies, low compliance of high commands, and other evidence that building civil armies requires further effort. Concluding comments note policy alternatives for U. S. and NATO efforts to accelerate civil-military transitions.

Good neighbors are rare. Those who are most proximate might offer the potential for mutual assistance and reassurance. Mistrust and rivalry, however, seem endemic among individuals and groups sharing space and resources. Schopenhauer's simile refers to porcupines who huddle together in the winter to keep warm, but separate as they feel each other's quills, until they discover "a mean distance at which they could most tolerably exist." Referring to Schopenhauer, Freud observed that "No one can tolerate a too intimate approach to his neighbor."

Germany's security dilemma is to fulfill the larger role in Europe and global security that is expected after reunification, while not rekindling a sense of threat particularly among neighbors to the east. Opinion surveys of Germans and Central/East Europeans reveal substantial difficulties were Germany to become more assertive. Changes in German behavior and constitutional interpretation suggest a maturation or "normalization" of German foreign policy. Thus far, th changes have emphasized traditional forms of diplomacy and alliance behavior focused on using the enlarged capacities of a reunited Germany that more direc pursue German interests. An alternative way by which to perform a larger security role are discussed, particularly in light of data regarding the mutual perceptions of Germans among neighboring peoples and leaders. (SOI : PM: S. 62)

Germany's security dilemma is to fulfill the larger role in Europe & global security that is expected after reunification, while not rekindling a sense of threat, particularly among neighbors to the East. Opinion surveys of Germans & Central/East Europeans reveal substantial difficulties if Germany were to become more assertive. Changes in German behavior & constitutional interpretation suggest a maturation or "normalization" of German foreign policy. Thus far, these changes have emphasized traditional forms of diplomacy & alliance behavior focused on using the enlarged capacities of a reunited Germany that more directly pursue German interests. Alternative ways by which to perform a larger security role are discussed, particularly in light of data regarding the mutual perceptions of Germans among neighboring peoples & leaders. Adapted from the source document.