Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe article asks the following question: Why do policymakers choose one (or more) agent(s) to perform new delegated policy functions? In order to shed light on the factors that drive policymakers' choice of a single or a multiple agencies delegation framework, the article investigates policymakers' choice to delegate macroprudential regulatory responsibility to either the central bank or to a committee made up of more than one financial regulator. Based on the analysis of an original dataset in 53 countries, we show that the choice among alternative delegation frameworks is driven by the logic of "policy control": policymakers, who want to control policies with distributive consequences, choose the single agency model under conditions of political uncertainty and low agency independence.

AbstractThis symposium homes in on an area of public administration that has been through a period of significant change in the last ten years. Since the global financial crisis, central banks have expanded their operations in financial markets, buying up vast quantities of assets as part of expansive monetary policy strategies. They have also played a leading role in the reform of financial regulation and have been entrusted with enhanced authority to supervise financial institutions. This activity has taken place amid heightened political contestation, with central banks increasingly viewed as the quintessence of a technocratic mode of governance that eschews traditional democratic control. The purpose of this symposium is to consider how central banks' reputation, accountability and regulatory roles have changed since the financial crisis, and what those changes tell us about the balance of power between independent regulatory agencies and elected policy‐makers.

This article advances a reputation‐based account to explain the relative salience that different issues assume in central banks' communication. Based on an innovative dataset consisting of a corpus of speeches by the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the United States (also known as the Fed) delivered from 2006 to 2016, the analysis shows that the most salient issues in the Fed's communication are shaped by reputational concerns about policy reversals. Specifically, when these concerns are higher, the Fed is more likely to focus on issues related to areas where its reputation is weak or not yet established—that is, issues related to credit easing and systemic financial regulation. In contrast, issues related to activities where the Fed's reputation is established are likely to become less salient—that is, issues related to economic activity and inflation. A similar pattern of issue attention is observed when the Fed addresses political audiences compared to other audiences.

This article advances a reputation-based account to explain the relative salience that different issues assume in central banks' communication. Based on an innovative dataset consisting of a corpus of speeches by the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the United States (also known as the Fed) deliv- ered from 2006 to 2016, the analysis shows that the most salient issues in the Fed's communication are shaped by reputational con- cerns about policy reversals. Specifically, when these concerns are higher, the Fed is more likely to focus on issues related to areas where its reputation is weak or not yet established—that is, issues related to credit easing and systemic financial regulation. In contrast, issues related to activities where the Fed's reputation is established are likely to become less salient—that is, issues related to economic activity and inflation. A similar pattern of issue attention is observed when the Fed addresses political audiences compared to other audiences.