Suchergebnisse

The article is built on four propositions. First, there is a latent potential within the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration. Second, at present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the 'dark matter' of German politics. Third, the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical agenda is not due to the inherent 'enlightenment' of the German political class about the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the preferences of rational acting politicians. Finally, these systemic disincentives are to be found within the formal institutions of the German polity. The key ideas here are of 'hard' versus 'soft' Eurosceptical narratives, sustained versus heresthetic agendas, and 'polis constraining' versus 'polis shaping' strategies for their promotion. Political agents' choice of strategy depends on the nature of the institutional setting within which they are operating. The institutional configuration of the Federal Republic provides poor returns for party-based Euroscepticism. The mobilisation of popular unease about aspects of European integration remains an unattractive option for rational acting political agents.

The article is built on four propositions. First, there is a latent potential within the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration. Second, at present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the 'dark matter' of German politics. Third, the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical agenda is not due to the inherent 'enlightenment' of the German political class about the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the preferences of rational acting politicians. Finally, these systemic disincentives are to be found within the formal institutions of the German polity. The key ideas here are of 'hard' versus 'soft' Eurosceptical narratives, sustained versus heresthetic agendas, and 'polis constraining' versus 'polis shaping' strategies for their promotion. Political agents' choice of strategy depends on the nature of the institutional setting within which they are operating. The institutional configuration of the Federal Republic provides poor returns for party-based Euroscepticism. The mobilisation of popular unease about aspects of European integration remains an unattractive option for rational acting political agents.

This article explores a number of themes common to the work of Gordon Smith and to more formal models of coalition behaviour, with an empirical focus on coalition bargaining in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is argued that numerical formation criteria alone are poor predictors of actual coalition outcomes, and that institutional structures and norms - particularly partisan ideology - play a decisive role. Parallels are drawn between de Swaan's 'median legislator' theory and Smith's concept of the 'politics of centrality' and two conclusions are reached. First, that the dynamics of coalition behaviour have remained remarkably stable, despite changes in the numerical composition and ideological range of the German party system. Second, that the formation of the Red-Green coalition in 1998 does represent a change in those dynamics, but that there is no evidence to suggest that the Federal Republic is moving beyond the politics of centrality.

Recent elections around the world have seen young voters come out in large numbers to support young leaders running for office, such as New Zealand's Jacinda Ardern in October 2020. At the same time, however, young voters have shown strong support for relatively older candidates such as Jeremy Corbyn in the United Kingdom and Bernie Sanders in the United States. While the former is consistent with the descriptive representation literature, the latter is not. This article deploys an experimental design involving 1000 young participants to analyse young voter support for older candidates. We find that young voters are significantly more likely to support older candidates if they are aware that these candidates champion general left-wing policies, but the same is not true for young candidates. We also find that ceteris paribus younger voters do not prefer younger candidates to older candidates.