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In recent decades, the term "politics" has become almost synonymous with conflict. Results from eight studies show that individuals averse to conflict tend to select out of surveys and discussions explicitly labeled as "political." This suggests that the inferences researchers draw from "political" surveys, as well as the impressions average Americans draw from explicitly "political" discussions, will be systematically biased toward conflict. We find little evidence that these effects can be attenuated by emphasizing deliberative norms. However, conflict averse individuals are more willing to discuss ostensibly political topics such as the economy, climate change, and racial inequality, despite reluctance to discuss "politics" explicitly. Moreover, they express greater interest in politics when it is defined in terms of laws and policies and debate is deemphasized. Overall, these findings suggest the expectation of conflict may have a self-fulfilling effect, as contexts deemed explicitly "political" will be composed primarily of conflict seekers.

AbstractThere are a number of observed gender differences in the frequency of political discussion, perceived levels of expertise, and importantly, openness to persuasion. This article explores the consequences of these differences for political choices. Given the difficulty in separating influence from homophily with observational data, this paper relies on a group-based experiment. Results suggest that when selecting between candidates, women are more likely to accept information from others, even if the information in the signals is not helpful. Men, on the other hand, often ignore outside signals in favor of sticking with their own choices even when outside signals would be helpful to their decision-making. A reanalysis of a previously published experiment on social communication leads to similar gender differences.

"Generations of political scientists argue that American politics needs strong, cohesive parties to function effectively. Yet more recently, many worry that such vigorous partisan sentiments--most notably, the rising hostility between the parties--can damage democracy, as partisans willingly undermine the system if it means stopping their disliked opponents. Is this the case? This book offers a nuanced evaluation of when and how partisan animosity matters in today's highly charged--but fluid--political environment, using data from two of the most tumultuous years in recent American history, 2019 to 2021. The authors show that partisan animus powerfully shapes political behaviors, but its effects are conditional, not constant. They develop a theory of the conditions that make partisan animosity most salient, and show that, in the absence of these, other thought processes take over. While partisan animosity makes democratic functioning more difficult (e.g., by politicizing seemingly non-political issues, undermining compromise), it does not inevitably lead to democratic erosion (e.g., the rejection of foundational democratic norms or the endorsement of violence). Partisan hostility has degraded American democracy, but it does not in itself represent an existential threat. The future of democracy depends on how politicians respond to the rise of animosity"--

AbstractAffective polarization – partisans' dislike and distrust of those from the other party – has reached historically high levels in the United States. While numerous studies estimate its effect on apolitical outcomes (e.g., dating and economic transactions), we know much less about its effects on political beliefs. We argue that those who exhibit high levels of affective polarization politicize ostensibly apolitical issues and actors. An experiment focused on responses to COVID-19 that relies on pre-pandemic, exogenous measures of affective polarization supports our expectations. Partisans who harbor high levels of animus towards the other party do not differentiate the "United States'" response to COVID-19 from that of the Trump administration. Less affectively polarized partisans, in contrast, do not politicize evaluations of the country's response. Our results provide evidence of how affective polarization, apart from partisanship itself, shapes substantive beliefs. Affective polarization has political consequences and political beliefs stem, in part, from partisan animus.

Abstract There is reason to believe that an increasing proportion of the news consumers receive is not from news producers directly but is recirculated through social network sites and email by ordinary citizens. This may produce some fundamental changes in the information environment, but the data to examine this possibility have thus far been relatively limited. In the current paper, we examine the changing information environment by leveraging a body of data on the frequency of (a) views, and recirculations through (b) Twitter, (c) Facebook, and (d) email of New York Times stories. We expect that the distribution of sentiment (positive-negative) in news stories will shift in a positive direction as we move from (a) to (d), based in large part on the literatures on self-presentation and imagined audiences. Our findings support this expectation and have important implications for the information contexts increasingly shaping public opinion.