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We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.

When legislators and governors clash over the size of American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins? Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state budget negotiations that follows the "staring match" logic captured by divide‐the‐dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical support for our predictions.

Can electoral reforms such as an independent redistricting commission and the top-two primary create conditions that lead to better legislative representation? We explore this question by presenting a new method for measuring a key indicator of representation—the congruence between a legislator's ideological position and the average position of her district's voters. Our novel approach combines two methods: the joint classification of voters and political candidates on the same ideological scale, along with multilevel regression and post-stratification to estimate the position of the average voter across many districts in multiple elections. After validating our approach, we use it to study the recent impact of reforms in California, showing that they did not bring their hoped-for effects.

This study extends previous field experimental research on turnout by considering how institutional context moderates the effect of mobilization. Taking advantage of a setting in which some registrants are assigned to vote by mail, the authors find that a door-to-door mobilization campaign has a larger effect on the participation of those who vote at polling places than on registrants assigned to cast mail ballots, but only among individuals whose voting behavior is most likely to be shaped by extrinsic social rewards. The authors conclude that there may be payoff for election reform strategies that tap into voting's social rewards. Adapted from the source document.

This study extends previous field experimental research on turnout by considering how institutional context moderates the effect of mobilization. Taking advantage of a setting in which some registrants are assigned to vote by mail, the authors find that a door-to-door mobilization campaign has a larger effect on the participation of those who vote at polling places than on registrants assigned to cast mail ballots, but only among individuals whose voting behavior is most likely to be shaped by extrinsic social rewards. The authors conclude that there may be payoff for election reform strategies that tap into voting's social rewards.

Do legislators and potential legislative candidates respond to the signals that executive election results send out about constituent preferences? This paper takes advantage of the natural experiment provided by California's 2003 recall election -- held at the midpoint of the state's legislative session -- to test theories about the strategic entry of candidates and the ideological mobility of legislators. First, we show that a surge in support for one party in an executive election can help that party recruit more experienced legislative candidates than usual, while qualified leaders in the other party are discouraged from running in districts where the surge is particularly strong. Second, we show that legislators in the weakening party, particularly those in the most competitive districts, will moderate their behavior after the executive election results signal their electoral vulnerability.