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To deal with the methodological problems of historical contextualism, it is useful to distinguish between (1) Text, (2) Context, (3) History, (4) Contextualism and (5) Historicism.1 A text is by turn the outcome, and object, of all writing or research. A context is any perspective on a text, including the background data that one may append to it. History is a narrative, a story, which is focused upon a text or context - in as far as the two are the same, viewed as propositions. 'Contextualism' is a methodological claim that valid history is only secured or demonstrated via the reconstruction of 'the context' - especially where the latter is to do with a perspective on the background to a text. Historicism is disinclined either to extract present moral judgements from, or apply them to, the past; it resists more broadly any form of social generalisation over extended units of chronological time2; it thereby displays a liability to overrate the importance of the sometimes 'spectacular differences' (Popper 1960: p.101) between various historical periods. Historical contextualism may be construed as a new variety of historicism. The emphasis of the present account is more broadly upon the logical futility of historical contextualism in general, and less upon its specifically historicist character.

Examines historical contextualism, a methodological claim that valid history is only demonstrated via the reconstruction of a context (ie, a perspective) regarding the text being studied. It is argued that contextualism is logically futile since no observer or researcher can form a perspective on any text without somehow altering it, thereby changing the context under examination. Further, as a form of relativism, historical contextualism denies that morality can enter into historical study & thereby render the history of thought seemingly irrelevant to contemporary moral issues. It is concluded that, while contextualism requires that history be viewed in its original context, history should be informed by modern perspectives as well. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

THIS ARTICLE RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TOLERANCE CAN BE SEEN TO FIT MORE INTO ONE TRADITION OF THOUGHT THAN ANOTHER. THE AUTHOR'S SUMMARY VIEW OF THE MATTER IS THAT ONE IS WELL-PLACED TO LOCATE TOLERANCE WITHIN ANY TRADITION, AT LEAST WHERE THERE IS EXPRESS OR IMPLICIT EVIDENCE OF SOME FORM OF CONTENTION FOR IT. INASMUCH AS TOLERANCE IS NOT A UNIVERSAL VALUE (IN THE SENSE EARLIER STIPULATED), AND INASMUCH AS THE POTENTIAL OBJECTS OF TOLERANCE WITHIN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS NECESSARILY DIFFER, THEN IT WOULD APPEAR IN PRINCIPLE TO BE PERFECTLY POSSIBLE TO INCORPORATE SOME (NOT ANY) LEGITIMATE AND COHERENT PLEA FOR TOLERANCE WITHIN EVERY TRADITION WITHOUT DOING THE LEAST VIOLENCE EITHER TO THE TRADITION OR TO THE TOLERANCE.