Suchergebnisse

Is income equality possible in modern capitalism? Yes. Would it hurt the economy? No.

Sociologists have contributed relatively little to our understanding of rising inequality of earnings and income in the United States. The author considers both why that has been the case and the degree to which it matters. Suggestions are offered about how a comparative perspective can help to shed some light on developments in the United States.

Peter Hall & David Soskice suggest that institutional coherence is conducive to successful macroeconomic outcomes. Countries with corporate governance arrangements, industrial relations systems & other institutions that are congruent either with those of a coordinated market economy or with those of a liberal market economy are expected to perform better, while nations with less coherent institutional frameworks are expected to fare worse. I use a measure of institutional coherence devised by Peter Hall & Daniel Gingerich & another I develop here to assess the impact of institutional coherence on variation in economic growth & employment growth across 18 affluent countries over the period 1974-2000. The results offer little support for the institutional coherence hypothesis. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

According to an influential view, in the United States pay for less skilledworkers is lowand government benefits are stingy, but this facilitates the creation of newjobs and encourages such individuals to take those jobs. Inmuch of WesternEurope, relative pay levels are higher for those at the bottom and benefits are more generous, but this is said to discourage job creation and job seeking. This article offers a comparative assessment of this trade-off viewbased on pooled timeseries cross-section analyses of 14 countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings suggest that greater pay equality and a higher replacement rate do reduce employment growth in lowproductivity, private-sector service industries and in the economy as a whole. However, these effects are relatively weak. The results point to a variety of viable options for countries wishing to maintain or move toward a desirable combination of jobs and equality.

A commonly-held view suggests that affluent nations face a tradeoff between incomes and jobs. According to this view, in the United States pay for workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution (relative to those in the middle) is very low and government unemployment-related benefits (the replacement rate) are stingy, but this facilitates the creation of lots of new jobs and encourages such individuals to take those jobs. The result is a high rate of employment and low unemployment. In much of Western Europe relative pay levels are higher for those at the bottom and benefits are more generous, but this is said to discourage job creation and to reduce the willingness of the unemployed to accept low-wage jobs. The consequence is low employment and high unemployment. I undertake a comparative assessment of this tradeoff view, based on pooled cross-section time-series analyses of 14 OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings suggest that greater pay equality and a higher replacement rate do reduce employment growth in low-productivity private-sector service industries and in the economy as a whole. However, these effects are relatively weak. The results point to a variety of viable options for countries wishing to maintain or move toward a desirable combination of jobs and equality. ; Eine weit verbreitete Ansicht ist, dass in Industrienationen ein Zielkonflikt zwischen Einkommen und Beschäftigung besteht. Demzufolge sind die Löhne in den USA am unteren Ende der Einkommensverteilung im Vergleich zu den mittleren Einkommen sehr niedrig und gesetzliche Arbeitslosenbezüge ausgesprochen gering bemessen. Dies aber stimuliert sowohl die Schaffung neuer Arbeitsplätze als auch die Bereitschaft der Erwerbstätigen, sich mit niedrigen Einkommen zufrieden zu geben. Das Resultat ist eine hohe Beschäftigungs- und eine niedrige Arbeitslosenquote. In vielen westeuropäischen Ländern ist das Niveau der Niedrigeinkommen höher und sind Arbeitslosenbezüge großzügiger. Dies aber hemmt, nach Ansicht vieler, die Entstehung neuer Arbeitsplätze und die Bereitschaft von Arbeitslosen, niedrig bezahlte Arbeit anzunehmen. Das vorliegende Discussion Paper ist eine vergleichende Untersuchung dieser Zielkonflikt-Ansicht auf der Basis von kombinierten Querschnitts-/Zeitreihenanalysen in 14 OECD-Ländern in den 1980er- und 1990er-Jahren. Die Ergebnisse lassen den Schluss zu, dass eine gerechtere Einkommensverteilung und eine höhere Arbeitslosenvergütung ein geringes Beschäftigungswachstum zur Folge haben, sowohl in Bereichen der Wirtschaft mit geringem Produktivitätsausstoß (Dienstleistungssektor) als auch gesamtwirtschaftlich. Gleichwohl sind die Auswirkungen relativ geringfügig. Die Ergebnisse deuten überdies darauf hin, dass es eine Vielzahl von Lösungsmöglichkeiten zur Herstellung beziehungsweise Erhaltung eines ausgewogenen Verhältnisses von Beschäftigung und gerechter Einkommensverteilung gibt.

Wage setting has been one of the most heavily studied institutions in the field of comparative political economy over the past two decades, and quantitative measures of wage-setting arrangements have played a major role in this research. Yet the proliferation of such measures in recent years presents researchers with a sizable array from which to choose. In addition, some scholars are rather skeptical about the validity and/or reliability of these measures. This article offers a survey and assessment of fifteen wage-setting measures. It attempts to answer questions about (1) how these indicators differ from one another in conceptualization and measurement strategy; (2) which are the most valid and reliable; (3) the strengths and weaknesses of measures of wage centralization versus those of wage coordination; (4) particular countries or time periods for which there are noteworthy discrepancies in scoring; (5) how sensitive empirical findings are to the choice of wage-setting measure.