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Audio- and video-recordings are the major sources of data in qualitative research today. There is now a substantial literature about the task of transcribing these recordings, though this mainly relates to socio-linguistic and discourse analysis. In general, this takes the view that transcripts construct the talk or action that they portray rather than reproducing what is given. In this article I argue that while this is true in important respects, in that many decisions are involved in producing transcripts, there is also an important sense in which both the strict transcription of words used and the descriptions of speakers' behaviour are aimed at capturing something that exists independently of the transcription process. 'Construction' and 'givenness' are both metaphors and we must take care not to be misled by either of them.

Analytic induction (AI) is an interpretation of scientific method that emerged in early twentieth-century sociology and still has some influence today. Among the studies often cited as examples are Becker's articles on marijuana use. While these have been given less attention than the work of Lindesmith on opiate addiction and Cressey on financial trust violation, Becker's work has distinctive features. Furthermore, it raises some important and interesting issues that relate not only to AI but to social scientific explanation more generally. These concern, for example, the presence and nature of causal systems in the social world, the relationship between historical and generalizing approaches, the character and role of social scientific theories, and how they are generated. In this article Becker's research is examined in detail, and these issues explored through comparisons with the work of Lindesmith and Cressey.

In a recently published "one-act play," Norman Denzin alleges that I and others have misinterpreted the kind of qualitative inquiry he promotes and are insufficiently open-minded. In response, I argue that he positions his critics via a modernist notion of resisting progress that is rhetorically illegitimate, and obscures and misrepresents their arguments, partly through use of the play format. I insist that research is a distinct form of activity, different in character from both art and politics, and that pursuing one under the auspices of another is unethical.

The potential gains and practical problems associated with secondary analysis of qualitative data have received increasing attention in recent years. The discussions display conflicting attitudes, some commentators emphasising the difficulties while others emphasise the benefits. In a few recent contributions the distinctiveness of re-using data has come to be questioned, on the grounds that the problems identified with it - of data not fitting the research questions, and of relevant contextual knowledge being absent - are by no means limited to secondary analysis. There has also been a more fundamental claim: to the effect that these problems are much less severe once we recognise that, all data are constituted and re-constituted within the research process. In this article I examine these arguments, concluding that while they have much to commend them, they do not dissolve the problems of 'fit' and 'context'.

Analytische Induktion (AI) und die Methodologie der Grounded Theory (GTM) haben lange Zeit die Konzeptbildung und Praxis qualitativer Forschung beeinflusst. Zugleich bleibt deren Beziehung – sowohl hinsichtlich ihrer historischen Entwicklung als auch mit Blick auf ihre konzeptuelle Struktur – weitgehend unklar. In diesem Beitrag beschäftige ich mit einigen Hindernissen, die einem Verständnis entgegenstehen: Alfred LINDESMITH, ein Hauptarchitekt der AI und Anselm STRAUSS, Mitbegründer der GTM, studierten zur gleichen Zeit bei Herbert BLUMER und arbeiteten in verschiedenen Projekten zusammen. Aber nur STRAUSS leistete zusammen mit Barney GLASER einen detaillierten Vergleich beider Ansätze. Doch auch dieser Vergleich hinterlässt Verunsicherung über die genaue Art der Ähnlichkeiten und Differenzen und ihrer Gründe. Die Beziehung von AI und GTM zu BLUMERs methodologischem Erbe erschwert eine Einordnung noch zusätzlich.

The word critical has become an honorific title used by researchers to commend their work, or the particular approach they adopt. Conversely, the work of others is often dismissed on the grounds that it is "uncritical". However, there are important questions about what the term critical means, about what we should be critical of, and about the form that criticism ought to take. These questions are addressed here in relation to both the role of the social researcher itself and that of researchers operating as public intellectuals. It is argued that the distinction between these roles is an important one, and has implications for what can legitimately be criticised, on what grounds, and in what way. In each case, there are proper limits to criticism, albeit different ones. Like anything else, criticism is not always a good thing.