Suchergebnisse

Policies to promote marriage are controversial, and it is unclear whether they are successful. To analyze such policies, it is essential to distinguish between a marriage that is created by a marriage-promoting policy (marginal marriage) and a marriage that would have been formed even in the absence of a state intervention (average marriage). In this paper, we exploit the suspension of a cash-on-hand marriage subsidy in Austria to examine the differential behavior of marginal and average marriages. The announcement of this suspension led to an enormous marriage boom (plus 350 percent) among eligible couples that allows us to identify marginal marriages. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we show that marginal marriages are surprisingly as stable as average marriages, but have fewer children and have them later in marriage. Notably, the children born to marginal marriages are similar in terms of health at birth.

Volunteering participation rates vary greatly across countries even when the potential volunteers' individual characteristics are controlled. We therefore analyze the volunteers' motives against the backdrop of the predominant political and economic environment in different countries, focusing on the state's role in influencing an individual's decision to volunteer. Combining individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD countries, we identify three channels through which governmental activities influence voluntary labor: size of the state (i.e., amount of public social expenditure), political consensus between voters and the government, and government support for democratization. Adapted from the source document.

This paper explores one potentially important channel through which immigration may drive support for extreme right-wing parties: the presence of immigrants in one's neighborhood. We study the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, this party increased its share of votes from less than 5 percent in the early 1980s to 27 percent by the year 1999. Using past regional settlement patterns as a source of exogenous variation, we find a significantly positive effect of the residential proximity of immigrants on FPÖ votes, explaining roughly a quarter of the cross-community variance in FPÖ votes. It is the presence of low- and medium-skilled immigrants that drives this result; high-skilled immigrants have no (or even a negative) effect on FPÖ votes.

This paper explores the capability of the state to affect the individual's decision to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expenditure decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (fiscal crowding out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowding out). And finally, the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the individual's engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals' willingness to volunteer.

This paper explores the capability of the state to affect the individual's decision to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expenditure decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (fiscal crowding out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowding out). And finally, the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the individual's engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals' willingness to volunteer.

This paper explores the capability of the state to affect the individual's decision to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expenditure decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (fiscal crowding out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowding out). And finally, the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the individual's engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals' willingness to volunteer.

SUMMARYThis paper explores individual motives for volunteering. The analysis is based on the interpretation of volunteering as a consumption good (consumption model) or as a mean to increase individual's own human capital (investment model). We present an econometric framework taking into account self selection into volunteering and simultaneity between the volunteering decision and the determination of income in order to test these two models and to identify the underlying motives. We find strong statistical evidence for the investment model with a highly robust and significant impact of volunteering on the wage rate. Within the framework of the investment model it turns out that the number of volunteering hours plays a major role in explaining this wage premium. This supports the significance of skill acquisition to accumulate human capital, the importance of deepening of social contacts and signalling willingness to perform. As far as the consumption model is concerned we find no clear statistical evidence for its validity.

This paper deals with a cross section analysis of local compensation payments to farmers for their provision of landscape amenities in alpine tourist communities. These payments can be interpreted as the outcomes of Coasian negotiations. Based on Austrian data we empirically identify the underlying determinants of the negotiating process. The probability for a positive negotiation outcome depends on politico-economic factors such as municipal revenues per resident and the share of votes for distinct parties in parliamentary elections. Whereas benefits associated with landscape amenities also play an important role transaction costs of bargaining are of minor relevance. If the variety of the countryside seems to be endangered tourist communities start compensating their farmers for landscape-enhancing activities. Local subsidy schemes supplement European Union and national policies in support of rural areas as they internalize positive agricultural externalities.