Suchergebnisse

Constitutional loyalty, the importance ascribed to complying with constitutional rules, is difficult to measure across countries due to differences in context, history, and culture. We overcome this challenge by exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic as an ideal setting in which societies around the world face a novel and similar public health crisis, inducing governments to adopt comparable policies. Based on a survey carried out in 53 countries around the world in 2021, we show that citizens' support for Covid-19 mitigation policies declines if courts signal doubts about their constitutionality. We further demonstrate that this effect of constitutional loyalty depends on citizens' characteristics, such as their confidence in the courts and their moral convictions.

Although international sanctions are a widely used instrument of coercion, their economic effects are still not well-understood. This study uses a novel dataset and an event study approach to evaluate the economic consequences of international sanctions, thereby visualizing pre-treatment and treatment dynamics in countries subject to sanctions. Our analysis focuses on the effects of sanctions on GDP growth as well as on various transmission channels through which sanctions suppress economic activity. We document a significant negative effect of sanctions on the growth rate of GDP and its components (consumption and investment) as well as on trade and foreign direct investment. Given that sanctions exert their adverse effect over the first years of a sanction episode and that sanctioned countries fail to recover during or immediately after the episode, we demonstrate the usefulness of sanctions as a political instrument of coercion. Long-lasting sanctions regimes, however, may not provide the political incentives needed to force additional concessions. ; This Version: October 26, 2021

Although international sanctions are a widely used instrument of coercion, their economic effects are still not fully understood. This study uses a novel dataset and an event study approach to evaluate the economic consequences of international sanctions, thereby accounting for pre-treatment dynamics in countries subject to sanctions. Our analysis focuses on the effects of sanctions on GDP growths as well as various transmission channels through which sanctions affect economic activity. We document a significant negative effect of international sanctions on GDP growth and its components (consumption, investment, and government expenditures) as well as on trade and foreign direct investment. Additional panel difference-in-differences estimations reveal that this detrimental effect is driven by financial sanctions and US unilateral sanctions.

Although international sanctions are a widely used instrument of coercion, their economic effects are still not fully understood. This study uses a novel dataset and an event study approach to evaluate the economic consequences of international sanctions, thereby accounting for pre-treatment dynamics in countries subject to sanctions. Our analysis focuses on the effects of sanctions on GDP growths as well as various transmission channels through which sanctions affect economic activity. We document a significant negative effect of international sanctions on GDP growth and its components (consumption, investment, and government expenditures) as well as on trade and foreign direct investment. Additional panel difference-in-differences estimations reveal that this detrimental effect is driven by financial sanctions and US unilateral sanctions.

International audience ; Most corruption research suffers from one common problem: There is no objective measure of public-sector corruption for a cross-section of countries. Studies on the determinants or the effects of corruption typically rely on indicators of corruption perception. In recent years, a second type of indicator reflecting experience with bribery has become available. If corruption perception is primarily informed by experience with corruption, these two types of indicators should be very highly correlated, which they are not. This study examines the variation in individual corruption perception that cannot be explained by individual corruption experience alone. We find that both respondent characteristics and country characteristics affect corruption perception beyond what can be explained by individuals' first-hand experience of corruption. Some of these biases may force us to reevaluate results of corruption research that is based on perception data, as well as the anti-corruption policies designed in response to these results.

International audience ; Most corruption research suffers from one common problem: There is no objective measure of public-sector corruption for a cross-section of countries. Studies on the determinants or the effects of corruption typically rely on indicators of corruption perception. In recent years, a second type of indicator reflecting experience with bribery has become available. If corruption perception is primarily informed by experience with corruption, these two types of indicators should be very highly correlated, which they are not. This study examines the variation in individual corruption perception that cannot be explained by individual corruption experience alone. We find that both respondent characteristics and country characteristics affect corruption perception beyond what can be explained by individuals' first-hand experience of corruption. Some of these biases may force us to reevaluate results of corruption research that is based on perception data, as well as the anti-corruption policies designed in response to these results.