Suchergebnisse

In all democratic societies, the public are encouraged to vote in order to have a say in how their government is run. But do all votes count equally? Looking at how representatives vote, and if this represents the preferences of their constituents, John Griffin and Brian Newman find that high income earners and whites have far greater levels of 'voting power' than low income earners and African Americans. Since incumbents have little incentive to appeal to nonvoters and those who have little voting power, the authors find that African Americans who vote are no better off than African Americans who don't. If citizens increasingly perceive these inequalities, then this may be a further disincentive for them to vote, leading to questions of democratic legitimacy.

In keeping with the demands of political philosophers, America's constitutional design harnesses elected officials to the mass public's prevailing views, but also provides avenues for the opinions of disenfranchised groups and numerical minorities to be reflected in policy. We seek to shed light on this constitutional balancing act by studying U.S. senators' decisions on thirty-six roll call votes related to the practice of slavery between 1835 and 1847. These voting decisions are modeled using the prevalence of antislavery petitions sent to Congress over the same period from each state's residents. We observe considerable and systematic senator representation of perceived majority opinion on antislavery petitions, despite the presence of nineteenth-century institutions buffering senators from the public. We also report evidence that the representation of disenfranchised women's views (as expressed in petitions) relative to those of men varied by party, and in ways that are predictable. Finally, we observe that senators sometimes represented perceived minority viewpoints, seemingly motivated by their political ambitions. These findings not only hold important implications for our understanding of democratic representation, but also for the processes of American political development.

Presidents face incentives to move toward the median voter as elections approach. We explore the racial consequences of these electoral incentives. As presidents move toward the center, they move away from ideologically noncentrist groups like the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). Comparing the president's annual budget proposal to the CBC's alternative budget from 1980 to 2012, we test whether Democrats' (Republicans') budgets are less (more) congruent with the CBC's alternative budgets in election years. Typically, Democrats' budgets are much more congruent than Republicans' with the CBC's budgets. However, in election years, Democrats' budget proposals tend to move away from the CBC's ideal such that Democrats' budgets are no better aligned with the CBC than are Republicans' budgets.