Suchergebnisse

Wie in anderen kommunistischen Staaten wurde auch in der VR China nach 1949 ein Organisationssystem aufgebaut, das es der Kommunistischen Partei erlaubte, alle Ebenen der Verwaltung sowie die Arbeitsbrigaden unter ihre Kontrolle zu bringen. Instrument dieser Kontrolle waren die Parteizellen. Die ideologische und politische Funktion der Parteizellen ist jedoch im Kontext der marktorientierten Wirtschaftsreform in China kontraproduktiv geworden. Heute werden eher qualifizierte Experten als ideologisch geschulte Kader gebraucht. Zudem ist die ursprünglich enge Bindung an einen Betrieb oder eine Arbeitsbrigade angesichts der zunehmenden Mobilität der Arbeitskräfte in China nicht mehr gegeben. Es kommt so zu einer organisatorischen Erosion an der Basis, die das politische System Chinas bedroht und mittelfristig ein Potential für grundlegenden politischen Wandel bildet. (BIOst-Wpt)

In late 1988 and early 1989, mainland China's intellectuals engaged in heated debates in which the major theme was the necessity and feasibility of no-authoritarianism. After demonstrating how neo-authoritarianism stood out as an alternative policy in the face of socio-economic problems of the 1980s in this country, the authors probe into the intellectual origin and basic precepts of neo-authoritarian theory and its inevitable failure in mainland China's political development. (DÜI-Sen)

"Controlling Bureaucratic Corruption" published on by Oxford University Press.

The temporal persistence and geographical prevalence of corruption in the world have provoked a vast amount of research into its causes. Low civil service remuneration, especially in less developed nations, is believed to be an important contributing factor to corruption. The assumption is that when salaries are low but expectations for service remains high, government officials may demand more compensation from informal or even illegal channels than what is officially sanctioned; hence, corruption arises. Accordingly, increased pay level is assumed to be effective in deterring corruption. Using China as a case, we argue that the relationship between civil service pay and corruption is not as simple as suggested. The empirical evidence gathered from China casts doubt on the assumed connection between the two to debunk the myth that increasing civil service pay contributes to the control of corruption. The article also presents the policy implications of the above analysis for human resource management and civil service governance.

This article examines a particular type of central mandate in China, the mandate for nationwide across-the-board salary increases in the public sector. The making and implementation of this mandate epitomizes the changes and challenges in intergovernmental relations of a transition economy. Our findings show that although the central pay mandates were issued under a number of conditions that favored, or should have even guaranteed, their smooth implementation, local reactions to the mandates have deviated from central expectations. The mandated pay raises have not only failed to win local compliance but also given rise to widespread pay arrears. Based on empirical data from two Chinese counties, this article analyzes the causes of local noncompliance and its implications for intergovernmental management. Adapted from the source document.