Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper discusses one strategy that Chinese crewing agencies adopt to compete with each other in the global seafarer labour supplying market. This strategy is related to Chinese seafarers' social insurance participation. It shows that crewing agencies utilised a dual workforce – 'company‐owned seafarers' and 'externally hired seafarers'. Externally hired seafarers, though in precarious employment, are offered higher salaries in place of social insurance coverage. By contrast, company‐owned seafarers are paid less, though enjoy social insurance arranged by agencies. This strategy serves to segment the seafarer labour market, conceal the level playing field and help agencies recruit seafarers cost‐effectively, though in violation of labour rights. This paper argues that this strategy grows out of the competitive landscape co‐shaped by the national regulatory and institutional settings and the global structure of the shipping industry.

This work analyses the potential of hybrid solar thermoelectric photovoltaic generators (HSTEPVGs) through evaluating their efficiency in converting solar power into electricity for a system consisting of a PV cell placed directly on top of a thermoelectric generator. A theoretical model for terrestrial application which includes the possibility of thermal and optical concentrations is reported. As in the case of pure solar thermoelectric generators, an optimal operation temperature also exists for HSTEPVGs determined by the temperature dependences of both the solar cells and the thermoelectric generators. The study reports an efficiency gain of 4%-5% with respect to the sole PV case, especially in the case of optical concentrations which mitigate the solar cell temperature sensitivity. In addition to these interesting results, the work also reveals the major constrains expected for this approach, along with technological challenges especially regarding the optical properties of the device encapsulation and the solar cell degradation. ; European Union's Horizon 2020 (Grant 745304)

The Communist Party of China has embarked on a massive restructuring of the Party and state institutions. The Party has strengthened its grip over the state, taking over six State Council institutions that had previously dealt with the work of civil servants, the media, ethnic affairs, religious affairs, overseas Chinese affairs, and computer network and information security. At the state level, seven ministries were created while six ministries were abolished.

In March 2018, Chinese lawmakers approved changes to China's Constitution that included removing the term limit on the presidency and vice presidency, allowing President Xi Jinping to remain in power beyond 2023. Other key changes to the constitution include the establishment of supervisory commissions, incorporation of Xi's ideology, emphasis on Party leadership and a requirement for all state functionaries to take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution when assuming office.

China's ambitious military reform deepens with the establishment of a new commission on 22 January 2017 helmed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The new commission will oversee the integration of military and civilian development. Xi aims to nurture Chinese defence manufacturers that are comparable to Lockheed Martin and Boeing in the United States and develop a military-industrial complex for the military modernisation commensurate with its rising international profile.

In a new wave of reform, China's Central Military Commission remains a party-state organ of the highest military control. Politically, the reorganisation enhances intra-People's Liberation Army (PLA) supervision and inter-section checks, and paves the way for the personnel reshuffle before the 19th Party Congress scheduled in 2017. Strategically, the military reshuffle is to advance the PLA's joint operational capability, facilitate modernisation of weapon systems, accelerate China's transition towards maritime power and improve the PLA's systemic commanding efficiency.

In 2015, the XI administration snared 30 ministerial-and-above officials including Guo Boxiong of the Central Military Commission for corruption; abolished the long-delayed one-child policy; restructured state-owned enterprises; and overhauled the military by rejigging existing military regions and executing a cut of 300,000 army personnel. In the stock market meltdown, many officials, securities brokers and fund managers were arrested for insider trading and market manipulation. The stabilisation of the market laid the foundation for many long-awaited financial reforms.

President Xi Jinping gave the directives to investigate Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou, breaking the immunity of Politburo Standing Committee members and Central Military Commission leaders from anti-graft probes. Xi has consolidated the once-fragmented power to himself by heading several newly established leading small groups. He has also rolled out many socioeconomic and political reform tasks long obstructed by vested interests. Xi's full power consolidation heavily relies on his control of the People's Liberation Army.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has shown himself to be a tough and charismatic leader whose vision is to fulfill the "Chinese dream". He has adopted a hardline policy on official extravagance, corruption and online criticism, and is a steadfast reformist in his first year of office. Xi's austerity policy on official extravagance is to placate civil anger over official profligacy in an economic slowdown and consolidate Xi's populist image.