Suchergebnisse

The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is an influential paradigm in financial risk management. It formalizes mean-variance optimization of a risky portfolio given the presence of a risk-free investment such as short-term government bonds. The CAPM defines the price of financial assets according to the premium demanded by investors for bearing excess risk.

In the early stage of sponge city promotion, both developers and consumers lack initiative, and the governments can take incentive measures to encourage both groups to actively participate in the construction of sponge city. This paper makes a comparative analysis of the interest composition and obstacles faced by the three key stakeholders: governments, developers, and consumers, and establishes an asymmetric evolutionary game model of governments, developers, and consumers. The dynamic system of the game model is constructed by replicated dynamic equation, and the evolution direction of different stages is obtained by solving the stable equilibrium point of the system. Based on the reasonable assumption of the parameter value, the numerical simulation is carried out for the situation of oversupply, short supply, and balance of supply and demand. The results show that the better evolutionary equilibrium points are (incentive, development, purchase) and (no incentive, development, purchase). The basic factors influencing the decision-making direction of the stakeholder are direct cost, direct benefit, opportunity cost, and opportunity benefit. In a fixed scenario, the decision-making direction is unchanged, and the parameters can change the evolution speed of the whole system, which can reduce the loss or accelerate the promotion. Moreover, some suggestions are put forward for the governments, developers, and consumers in the construction of sponge city.

With the rapid development of mobile technologies in contemporary society, China has seen increased usage of the Internet and mobile devices. Thus, mobile payment is constantly being innovated and is highly valued in China. Although there have been many reports on the consumer adoption of mobile payments, there are few studies providing guidelines on examining mobile payment adoption in China. This study intends to explore the impact of the facilitating factors (perceived transaction convenience, compatibility, relative advantage, social influence), environmental factors (government support, additional value), inhibiting factors (perceived risk), and personal factors (absorptive capacity, affinity, personal innovation in IT (PIIT)) on adoption intention in China. A research model that reflects the characteristics of mobile payment services was developed and empirically tested by using structural equation modeling (SEM) on datasets consisting of 257 users through an online survey questionnaire in China. Our findings show that perceived transaction convenience, compatibility, relative advantage, government support, additional value, absorptive capacity, affinity, and PIIT all have a positive impact on adoption intention, while social influence has no significant impact on adoption intention, and perceived risk has a negative impact on adoption intention. In addition, the top three factors that influence adoption intentions are absorptive capacity, perceived transaction convenience, and additional value.

AbstractThe abolition of agricultural taxes (AAT) (2005–2006) significantly changed the workload, finance, authority and functions of village governments. In agricultural regions, village cadres had their agendas reset, with the top priority switching to the search for new revenues through "attracting investment" (zhaoshang yinzi). This new agenda fits perfectly with the demands of township governments. Facing an even worse fiscal crisis, township governments attempted to cover up their deficits using village revenues. The shared stake in increasing revenue has resulted in the convergence of the functions of township and village authorities. However, the change in the function of village governments has increased the disengagement between cadres and villagers.

As frequent, violent, and organized peasant protests show, China's reform regime has lost its once all-powerful control in the countryside. The sharp decline of village cadres' positional authority in allocating economic resources, which began in post-Mao decollectivization, holds the key to explaining the change. Since the late 1990s, the collapse of village enterprises and the erosion of power over land have cost village cadres their remaining economic levers to engage the villagers as well as their incentives to work for the party-state. The loss of the regime's grip on village cadres and the loss of command by village cadres on peasants have almost synchronized, causing the traditional structure of organizational control to crumble in vast rural areas. In the new, prevailing patterns of village governance, party power is becoming increasingly irrelevant.