Payments for ecosystem services and poverty reduction: concepts, issues, and empirical perspectives
In: Environment and development economics, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 245-254
ISSN: 1355-770X
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In: Environment and development economics, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 245-254
ISSN: 1355-770X
World Affairs Online
In: Baker , M , Bulte , E & Weisdorf , J L 2006 ' The Origins of Governments : From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy ' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen , Cph.
We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally "switch" from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be "trapped" at lower levels of technology – perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions
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In: Journal of development economics, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 225-235
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 81, Heft 2, S. 453-466
SSRN
In: Environment and development economics, Band 1, Heft 4, S. 433-443
ISSN: 1469-4395
ABSTRACTTo protect the elephant, trade in ivory has been banned since 1990. In this paper, we demonstrate that this ban's effect on elephant populations is ambiguous. Depending on the discount rate, among other things, the trade ban can either increase or decrease optimal population size. If the decision-maker's discount rate exceeds a certain threshold, the optimum stock of elephants is greater with a trade ban. Since the threshold is in the range of possible social discount rates, the success of the trade ban in promoting elephant conservation will vary spatially and temporally, depending on the characteristics and level of development of countries with significant elephant populations.
In: Journal of development economics, Band 153, S. 102710
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: NBER Working Paper No. w26286
SSRN
Working paper
In: The journal of development studies, Band 54, Heft 10, S. 1756-1774
ISSN: 1743-9140
World Affairs Online
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 30, S. 70-79
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 112, Heft 446, S. 22-47
ISSN: 0001-9909
World Affairs Online
In: European journal of political economy, Band 30, S. 70-79
ISSN: 0176-2680
We study how corruption affects economic activities of households in rural Liberia. A proxy of corruption of community leaders is obtained by directly monitoring the diversion of inputs associated with a development project. We measure quantities of these inputs twice; before and after the chief stored them, and interpret any 'gaps' between these measurements as indicative of diversion by the chief (or corruption). We use this 'gap' proxy to explain variation in economic behaviour across respondents, and find that corrupt community leaders cause reduced levels of income generating activities that are economically important: corruption leads to a 50% reduction in rice planted and to nearly equally large reductions in trade activity. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]
In: Public choice, Band 148, Heft 3, S. 353-381
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 148, Heft 3-4, S. 353-380
ISSN: 1573-7101
We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of an unchecked ruler making decisions regarding the development of a resource rich country. Resources serve as collateral and facilitate the acquisition of loans. The ruler chooses either to stay in power while facing the risk of being ousted, or loot the country's riches by liquefying the resources through lending. We show that unstructured lending from international credit markets can create incentives to loot the country; and an enhanced likelihood of looting causes greater political instability, and diminishes growth. Using a treatment effects model, we find evidence that supports our predictions. Adapted from the source document.
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 110, Heft 440, S. 339-366
ISSN: 0001-9909
World Affairs Online
In: Public choice, Band 148, Heft 3-4, S. 353-380
ISSN: 1573-7101