Suchergebnisse

Our national security system turns our overall capabilities into active assets, protects us against the threats of an anarchic international system and makes it possible to exploit its opportunities. Today, however, the system is arguably in dire need of reform. Much remains in the dark about how the organizations that safeguard our national security are reformed because international circumstances change. The author examines a crucial historical case of military reform: the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)--the direct predecessor of Central Command. He discusses how the U.S. military adapted to the emerging security challenges in the Persian Gulf in the late 1970s by recasting military command arrangements. The RDJTF was one of the components of President Carter's Persian Gulf Security Framework, which marked a critical strategic reorientation towards the region as a vital battleground in the global competition with the Soviet Union. The author also suggests how national security reforms can be understood more generally. In this way, he lays out some of today's challenges that we must face in effectively restructuring our security and defense establishment. Especially in these times of fiscal restraint, a better grasp of institutional reform is very much needed. Based upon original interviews with key civilians and military officers as well as extensive archival research, including the analysis of material only recently declassified, this monograph is the most complete account of the establishment of the RDJTF thus far ; "March 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-85). ; Long-term strategic thinking meets organizational politics -- The stony road towards the RDJTF -- The legacy : U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf before 1977 -- From Carter's inauguration to the fall of the shah -- From the fall of the shah to the invasion of Afghanistan -- From the invasion of Afghanistan to Reagan's inauguration -- Epilogue : the Reagan administration and Central Command -- Conclusion and perspectives -- The Carter years and military command arrangements for the Persian Gulf -- A historic case, enduring challenges -- Where we are today : the state of the U.S. national security system. ; Our national security system turns our overall capabilities into active assets, protects us against the threats of an anarchic international system and makes it possible to exploit its opportunities. Today, however, the system is arguably in dire need of reform. Much remains in the dark about how the organizations that safeguard our national security are reformed because international circumstances change. The author examines a crucial historical case of military reform: the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)--the direct predecessor of Central Command. He discusses how the U.S. military adapted to the emerging security challenges in the Persian Gulf in the late 1970s by recasting military command arrangements. The RDJTF was one of the components of President Carter's Persian Gulf Security Framework, which marked a critical strategic reorientation towards the region as a vital battleground in the global competition with the Soviet Union. The author also suggests how national security reforms can be understood more generally. In this way, he lays out some of today's challenges that we must face in effectively restructuring our security and defense establishment. Especially in these times of fiscal restraint, a better grasp of institutional reform is very much needed. Based upon original interviews with key civilians and military officers as well as extensive archival research, including the analysis of material only recently declassified, this monograph is the most complete account of the establishment of the RDJTF thus far ; Mode of access: Internet.

"April 11, 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 34-42) ; Mode of access: Internet.

Teaching all strategy, from grand to military, is essential in the preparation of national security professionals and military leaders. The experience of the armed forces in recent wars recommends that those involved with the system of military education seriously study the way strategy is taught. The task is even more imperative because the ambiguous conflicts and the complex geopolitical environment of the future are likely to challenge the community of strategists, civilian as well as military, in ways not seen in the past. In this context, developing the appropriate curriculum and effective methods of teaching strategy will be the responsibility of universities, colleges, and institutions of professional military education. The authors of this compendium ask and answer the central question of how to teach strategy. The findings, insights, and recommendations in this volume are those of professionals who are accomplished in the classroom as well as the crucible of strategy. ; "March 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Introduction / Robert H. Dorff -- The elements of strategic thinking : a practical guide / Robert Kennedy -- The study of strategy : a civilian academic perspective / Robert C. Gray -- Teaching strategy in the 21st century / Gabriel Marcella and Stephen O. Fought -- Teaching strategy : a scenic view from Newport / Bradford A. Lee -- A vision of developing the national security strategist from the National War College / Cynthia A. Watson -- How do students learn strategy? Thoughts on the U.S. Army War College pedagogy of strategy / Harry R. Yarger -- The teaching of strategy : Lykke's balance, Schelling's exploitation, and a community of practice in strategic thinking / Thomaz Guedes da Costa -- Making sense of chaos : teaching strategy using case studies / Volker Franke -- Teaching strategy in 3d / Ross Harrison -- Beyond ends-based rationality : a quad-conceptual view of strategic reasoning for professional military education / Christopher R. Paparone. ; Teaching all strategy, from grand to military, is essential in the preparation of national security professionals and military leaders. The experience of the armed forces in recent wars recommends that those involved with the system of military education seriously study the way strategy is taught. The task is even more imperative because the ambiguous conflicts and the complex geopolitical environment of the future are likely to challenge the community of strategists, civilian as well as military, in ways not seen in the past. In this context, developing the appropriate curriculum and effective methods of teaching strategy will be the responsibility of universities, colleges, and institutions of professional military education. The authors of this compendium ask and answer the central question of how to teach strategy. The findings, insights, and recommendations in this volume are those of professionals who are accomplished in the classroom as well as the crucible of strategy. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Many insurgents groups benefit from sanctuaries in neighboring countries where they are relatively safe from state security forces. These transnational insurgencies complicate traditional counterinsurgency operations in significant ways. Most importantly, transnational insurgencies have the potential to spark conflicts between neighboring countries. This monograph examines several transnational insurgencies that have been active since the end of the Cold War. While many neighboring countries have experienced the escalation of conflict between them as the result of cross-border violence, other states have successfully cooperated in providing border security. In depth case studies of relations between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as India and its eastern neighbors are explored. The lessons learned from this research are applied to contemporary issues facing Iraq and Afghanistan. ; "March 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-61). ; Understanding transnational insurgency -- Transnational insurgencies and interstate conflict -- Rwanda and the Republic of the Congo -- Security cooperation and India's North-Eastern insurgencies -- Current dilemmas in Iraq and Afghanistan -- Moving forward in Iraq and Afghanistan -- Find the right balance between local and central government security capacity -- Improve coordination between security forces, especially between units along the border -- Enhance mechanisms for intelligence sharing -- Promote diplomacy and commercial exchanges in the region -- Conclusion. ; Many insurgents groups benefit from sanctuaries in neighboring countries where they are relatively safe from state security forces. These transnational insurgencies complicate traditional counterinsurgency operations in significant ways. Most importantly, transnational insurgencies have the potential to spark conflicts between neighboring countries. This monograph examines several transnational insurgencies that have been active since the end of the Cold War. While many neighboring countries have experienced the escalation of conflict between them as the result of cross-border violence, other states have successfully cooperated in providing border security. In depth case studies of relations between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as India and its eastern neighbors are explored. The lessons learned from this research are applied to contemporary issues facing Iraq and Afghanistan. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii. ; "April 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Summary -- The stage -- The state and the insurgency : theory in the American context -- Different models -- Public support : the center of gravity -- The American response -- COIN operations -- Today's challenges in Afghanistan -- Conventional bias -- Provincial reconstruction teams -- Afghanistan by design -- Origins -- The concept -- Structure -- Chain of command -- Nation team -- A shift in strategy -- The move to Kabul -- Reorganizing the military -- Civil-military reality -- Problems at the national and regional levels -- Changes in Kabul -- Regional dynamic for the PRTs -- INTRA-PRT dynamics -- Lack of guidance and uncertain command -- Cult of personality -- The difficulty of distant command -- Military dominance -- Antecedents from Vietnam -- A long road -- Focus on counterinsurgency -- Failure to change -- The arrival of Komer -- CORDS : "can OCO really do something?" -- Civil-military integration, at last -- Vertical organization -- Team structure -- Assessment by participants -- Chain of command -- Performance in the field -- Problems -- Effects and evaluation -- Results -- Finale -- Lessons from Vietnam -- The Army's reaction to the Vietnam War -- Why the segregated response? -- Cultural differences -- The Military -- State and other civilian agencies -- Pink on pink -- "It didn't take Lincoln this long" -- World War II, its general, and the American psyche -- The American way of war -- Team America -- MacArthur's legacy -- The role of unity of command : an examination of doctrine and language -- Unity of effort : the fruit of unity of command -- The path to unified authority within the military -- Joint doctrine and the principle of command -- Unity of command begets unity of effort -- Unity of effort : the best hope in absence of unity of command -- The multiagency alternative -- Differences in joint publication terminology -- Foreigners -- JP 3-08 terms and the broader government -- Prospects -- Insurgency -- The concerns about unified authority -- The ameliorative effects of unified authority -- Eliminating remote management -- Diminishing the role of personality : lifting the floor, not raising the roof -- Coupling authority with responsibility -- A new structure -- Model -- The country team -- The tactical level -- ISAF -- Achieving the new model -- CODA. ; "Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war. ; "June 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 130-166). ; Introduction -- The good war? : American public opinion and the war in Afghanistan -- Casualties -- Casualties plus politics -- Afghan-specific explanations -- The "deputy sheriff" : Australian public opinion and the Afghan war -- Casualties -- Casualties plus politics -- Afghanistan-specific theories -- Back on Afghanistan's plains : public support for the Afghan war in Britain -- Casualties -- Casualties plus politics -- Afghan-specific theories -- Farewell to the blue helmets : Canadian public opinion on Afghanistan -- Casualties -- Casualties plus politics -- Afghanistan-specific theories -- Conclusion -- Sarkozy's war : France takes to the frontline -- Casualties -- Casualties plus politics -- Afghanistan-specific theories -- Still struggling with the guilt of the past : Germany's Afghan agonies -- Casualties -- Casualties plus politics -- Afghanistan-specific theories -- Conclusion -- Summary. ; Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war. ; Mode of access: Internet.

There has been a growing recognition in the post-Cold War era that culture has increasingly become a factor in determining the course of today's complex and interconnected world. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq extended this trend to national security and military operations. There is also a growing recognition by the national security community that culture is an important factor at the policy and strategy levels. Cultural proficiency at the policy and strategy levels means the ability to consider history, values, ideology, politics, religion, and other cultural dimensions and assess their potential effect on policy and strategy. The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) is one systematic and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses. The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be of fundamental importance in determining such behavior and thus are of importance in policy and strategy formulation and outcomes. These dimensions are (1) Identity, or the basis for defining identity and its linkage to interests; (2) Political Culture, or the structure of power and decisionmaking; and (3) Resilience, or the capacity or ability to resist, adapt or succumb to external forces. Identity is the most important, because it ultimately determines purpose, values and interests that form the foundation for policy and strategy to attain or preserve those interests. ; "May 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 27-32). ; Why culture? -- Cultural dimensions of leadership, operations and strategy -- What is culture? -- The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) -- The ACFSP and the United States -- Common themes across the ACFSP dimensions -- Identity -- Political culture -- Resilience. ; There has been a growing recognition in the post-Cold War era that culture has increasingly become a factor in determining the course of today's complex and interconnected world. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq extended this trend to national security and military operations. There is also a growing recognition by the national security community that culture is an important factor at the policy and strategy levels. Cultural proficiency at the policy and strategy levels means the ability to consider history, values, ideology, politics, religion, and other cultural dimensions and assess their potential effect on policy and strategy. The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) is one systematic and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses. The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be of fundamental importance in determining such behavior and thus are of importance in policy and strategy formulation and outcomes. These dimensions are (1) Identity, or the basis for defining identity and its linkage to interests; (2) Political Culture, or the structure of power and decisionmaking; and (3) Resilience, or the capacity or ability to resist, adapt or succumb to external forces. Identity is the most important, because it ultimately determines purpose, values and interests that form the foundation for policy and strategy to attain or preserve those interests. ; Mode of access: Internet.

North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs have drawn international attention for years. In the early 1960s, Pyongyang began to pursue the capability to produce advanced weapons systems, including rockets and missiles. However, foreign assistance and technology, particularly from China and the Soviet Union, were instrumental in the acquisition of these capabilities. The ballistic missile inventory now totals about 800 road-mobile missiles, including about 200 Nodong missiles that could strike Japan. In April 2007, North Korea for the first time displayed two new missiles: a short-range tactical missile that poses a threat to Seoul and U.S. Forces in South Korea, and an intermediate-range missile that could potentially strike Guam. Although North Korea has not demonstrated the ability to produce a nuclear warhead package for its missiles, its missiles are believed to be capable of delivering chemical and possibly biological munitions. North Korean media and government officials claim the country needs a nuclear deterrent to cope with the "hostile policy of the United States," but Pyongyang has never officially abandoned its objective of "completing the revolution in the south." Little is known about North Korean military doctrine and the role of its ballistic missiles, but National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Ch*ong-il has ultimate authority over their disposition. ; "February 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-95). ; Introduction -- DPRK national strategy and motivations -- Historical background of DPRK missile development -- Institutional setting: Research and development -- Production -- Bases and deployment -- Warheads -- Command control -- Conclusion. ; North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs have drawn international attention for years. In the early 1960s, Pyongyang began to pursue the capability to produce advanced weapons systems, including rockets and missiles. However, foreign assistance and technology, particularly from China and the Soviet Union, were instrumental in the acquisition of these capabilities. The ballistic missile inventory now totals about 800 road-mobile missiles, including about 200 Nodong missiles that could strike Japan. In April 2007, North Korea for the first time displayed two new missiles: a short-range tactical missile that poses a threat to Seoul and U.S. Forces in South Korea, and an intermediate-range missile that could potentially strike Guam. Although North Korea has not demonstrated the ability to produce a nuclear warhead package for its missiles, its missiles are believed to be capable of delivering chemical and possibly biological munitions. North Korean media and government officials claim the country needs a nuclear deterrent to cope with the "hostile policy of the United States," but Pyongyang has never officially abandoned its objective of "completing the revolution in the south." Little is known about North Korean military doctrine and the role of its ballistic missiles, but National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Ch*ong-il has ultimate authority over their disposition. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 2

"This monograph considers the changing fortunes of the Palestinian movement, HAMAS, and the recent outcomes of Israeli strategies aimed against this group and Palestinian nationalism external to the Fatah faction of the Palestinian Authority. The example of HAMAS challenges much of the current wisdom on "insurgencies" and their containment. As the author, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, demonstrates, efforts have been made to separate HAMAS from its popular support and network of social and charitable organizations. These have not been effective in destroying the organization, nor in eradicating the will to resist among a fairly large segment of the Palestinian population. It is important to consider this Islamist movement in the context of a region-wide phenomenon of similar movements with local goals, which can be persuaded to relinquish violence, or which could move in the opposite direction, becoming more violent. Certainly an orientation to HAMAS and its base must be factored into new and more practical and effective approaches to peacemaking. At the same time, HAMAS offers a fascinating instance of the dynamics of strategic reactions, and the modification of Israeli impulses towards aggressive deterrence, as well as evolution in the Islamist movements' planning and operations. As well, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict bears similarities to a long-standing civil conflict, even as it has sparked inter-Palestinian hostilities in its most recent phase. The need for informed and critical discussion of the future of Islamism in the region continues today. We offer this monograph to those who wish to consider this particular aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli-Arab conflict"--Foreword. ; "December 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-91). ; Introduction - Current Context - HAMAS Roots in Short - Summary of Recommendations - Background - Postponement of Militant Islamism? - Islamic Jihad - HAMAS' Growth - Points of Doctrine - Relations with the PLO-Fatah and the Peace Processes - Oslo - Revolutionary Resistance vs. Overwhelming Force (Means) - Ends - Recognition - Two States - Mistakes - HAMAS and Arab Political Currents - HAMAS' Troubles with Jordan - HAMAS in Syria - HAMAS and Saudi Arabia - Practicing Religion - Political and Military Structure - Zakat and Community - Hostages - HAMAS' Threat Value - HAMAS, the West, and the United States - Recommendations. ; "This monograph considers the changing fortunes of the Palestinian movement, HAMAS, and the recent outcomes of Israeli strategies aimed against this group and Palestinian nationalism external to the Fatah faction of the Palestinian Authority. The example of HAMAS challenges much of the current wisdom on "insurgencies" and their containment. As the author, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, demonstrates, efforts have been made to separate HAMAS from its popular support and network of social and charitable organizations. These have not been effective in destroying the organization, nor in eradicating the will to resist among a fairly large segment of the Palestinian population. It is important to consider this Islamist movement in the context of a region-wide phenomenon of similar movements with local goals, which can be persuaded to relinquish violence, or which could move in the opposite direction, becoming more violent. Certainly an orientation to HAMAS and its base must be factored into new and more practical and effective approaches to peacemaking. At the same time, HAMAS offers a fascinating instance of the dynamics of strategic reactions, and the modification of Israeli impulses towards aggressive deterrence, as well as evolution in the Islamist movements' planning and operations. As well, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict bears similarities to a long-standing civil conflict, even as it has sparked inter-Palestinian hostilities in its most recent phase. The need for informed and critical discussion of the future of Islamism in the region continues today. We offer this monograph to those who wish to consider this particular aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli-Arab conflict"--Foreword. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The author seeks to assist planners and decisionmakers in thinking about and preparing for possible future contingencies concerning North Korea. He does not dwell on war or conflict scenarios involving North Korea because military planners have already focused considerable effort and attention on these. It is entirely possible that the fate of the country as a political, territorial, and juridical entity is intimately bound up with the fate of the Kim Jong Il regime, but one should not assume this to be so. In other words, the collapse of the Kim regime may not lead to the collapse of North Korea as a state. Moreover, one should not assume that even if the regime collapse is followed by state collapse that these events would inexorably lead to Korean unification. ; "March 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-43). ; Research focus and terms of reference -- The future of what? State versus regime, failure versus collapse -- Challenges -- Degrees of dictatorship and criteria of collapse -- A failing/eroding totalitarian regime -- Future trajectories and scenarios -- None of the above: toward a hybrid scenario -- Conclusions and implications -- Key indicators of regime change. ; The author seeks to assist planners and decisionmakers in thinking about and preparing for possible future contingencies concerning North Korea. He does not dwell on war or conflict scenarios involving North Korea because military planners have already focused considerable effort and attention on these. It is entirely possible that the fate of the country as a political, territorial, and juridical entity is intimately bound up with the fate of the Kim Jong Il regime, but one should not assume this to be so. In other words, the collapse of the Kim regime may not lead to the collapse of North Korea as a state. Moreover, one should not assume that even if the regime collapse is followed by state collapse that these events would inexorably lead to Korean unification. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"This paper seeks to show how social, political, cultural, and environmental factors have combined to impede Iraqi police development in ways that are predictable, understandable, and, with external help, resolvable. The corruption and abuse found in the Iraqi police services cannot simply be explained by poor leadership, the actions of a few corrupt individuals, or even the competing agendas of the various militias that are fighting for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Rather, one must explain why such practices occur despite the fact they are unacceptable according to Iraqi cultural norms." -- P. v. ; "January 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-51). ; "This paper seeks to show how social, political, cultural, and environmental factors have combined to impede Iraqi police development in ways that are predictable, understandable, and, with external help, resolvable. The corruption and abuse found in the Iraqi police services cannot simply be explained by poor leadership, the actions of a few corrupt individuals, or even the competing agendas of the various militias that are fighting for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Rather, one must explain why such practices occur despite the fact they are unacceptable according to Iraqi cultural norms." -- P. v. ; Mode of access: Internet.

North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs have drawn international attention for years. In the early 1960s, Pyongyang began to pursue the capability to produce advanced weapons systems, including rockets and missiles. However, foreign assistance and technology, particularly from China and the Soviet Union, were instrumental in the acquisition of these capabilities. The ballistic missile inventory now totals about 800 road-mobile missiles, including about 200 Nodong missiles that could strike Japan. In April 2007, North Korea for the first time displayed two new missiles: a short-range tactical missile that poses a threat to Seoul and U.S. Forces in South Korea, and an intermediate-range missile that could potentially strike Guam. Although North Korea has not demonstrated the ability to produce a nuclear warhead package for its missiles, its missiles are believed to be capable of delivering chemical and possibly biological munitions. North Korean media and government officials claim the country needs a nuclear deterrent to cope with the "hostile policy of the United States," but Pyongyang has never officially abandoned its objective of "completing the revolution in the south." Little is known about North Korean military doctrine and the role of its ballistic missiles, but National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Chŏng-il has ultimate authority over their disposition ; "February 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-95) ; Introduction -- DPRK national strategy and motivations -- Historical background of DPRK missile development -- Institutional setting: Research and development -- Production -- Bases and deployment -- Warheads -- Command control -- Conclusion ; North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs have drawn international attention for years. In the early 1960s, Pyongyang began to pursue the capability to produce advanced weapons systems, including rockets and missiles. However, foreign assistance and technology, particularly from China and the Soviet Union, were instrumental in the acquisition of these capabilities. The ballistic missile inventory now totals about 800 road-mobile missiles, including about 200 Nodong missiles that could strike Japan. In April 2007, North Korea for the first time displayed two new missiles: a short-range tactical missile that poses a threat to Seoul and U.S. Forces in South Korea, and an intermediate-range missile that could potentially strike Guam. Although North Korea has not demonstrated the ability to produce a nuclear warhead package for its missiles, its missiles are believed to be capable of delivering chemical and possibly biological munitions. North Korean media and government officials claim the country needs a nuclear deterrent to cope with the "hostile policy of the United States," but Pyongyang has never officially abandoned its objective of "completing the revolution in the south." Little is known about North Korean military doctrine and the role of its ballistic missiles, but National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Chŏng-il has ultimate authority over their disposition ; Mode of access: Internet.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the new world order did not bring about a closure of revolutionary warfare. In fact, the Soviet-inspired wars of liberation against imperialism have been eclipsed by reactionary, jihadist wars. By all indications in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, and Iraq, Islamic militants have embraced revolutionary warfare, although not Mao's People's War model. Therefore, a study of revolutionary warfare is apt because the conflict between the West and radical jihadism will continue to take place in dysfunctional, collapsing, or failed states. The author examines the political-military lessons from these conflicts and suggests that the United States should minimize the level and type of assistance to states fighting in an insurgency because these states possess greater advantages than previously supposed. ; "March 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-73). ; Introduction -- Political context framework -- Republic of Vietnam, 1955-63 -- Algeria, 1945-62 -- Nicaragua, 1967-79 -- Conclusions -- Strategic insights -- Recommendations. ; Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the new world order did not bring about a closure of revolutionary warfare. In fact, the Soviet-inspired wars of liberation against imperialism have been eclipsed by reactionary, jihadist wars. By all indications in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, and Iraq, Islamic militants have embraced revolutionary warfare, although not Mao's People's War model. Therefore, a study of revolutionary warfare is apt because the conflict between the West and radical jihadism will continue to take place in dysfunctional, collapsing, or failed states. The author examines the political-military lessons from these conflicts and suggests that the United States should minimize the level and type of assistance to states fighting in an insurgency because these states possess greater advantages than previously supposed. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The author examines the energy context of the simmering Baloch separatist insurgency that has surfaced in recent years in Pakistan's sprawling Balochistan province. In particular, he looks at how Pakistan's mounting energy insecurity--a product of rapid increase in demand coupled with rising scarcity and the region's intensified energy rivalry--has both magnified the economic and strategic importance of this province while at the same time complicating Pakistan's efforts to cope with the province's resurgent tribal separatism. The author concludes that Pakistan's government needs to overhaul its counterinsurgent policies to avoid protracted conflict and to enlist the Baloch as partners in energy development, not antagonists of it. ; "April 2008." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 44-55) ; Introduction -- Energy geopolitics I: Balochstan's energy resources -- Energy geopolitics II: natural gas pipelines -- Energy geopolitics III: Gwadar and the Central Asia transport corridor -- Baloch nationalism: aims and potential -- Pakistan's response to Baloch nationalism -- Conclusion. ; The author examines the energy context of the simmering Baloch separatist insurgency that has surfaced in recent years in Pakistan's sprawling Balochistan province. In particular, he looks at how Pakistan's mounting energy insecurity--a product of rapid increase in demand coupled with rising scarcity and the region's intensified energy rivalry--has both magnified the economic and strategic importance of this province while at the same time complicating Pakistan's efforts to cope with the province's resurgent tribal separatism. The author concludes that Pakistan's government needs to overhaul its counterinsurgent policies to avoid protracted conflict and to enlist the Baloch as partners in energy development, not antagonists of it. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Until Russia and the United States experience a change on government in 2008, the prospects for additional strategic arms control agreements, limits on destabilizing military operations, and joint ballistic missile defense programs appear unlikely. Yet, near-term opportunities for collaboration in the areas of cooperative threat reduction, third-party proliferation, and bilateral military engagement do exist. ; "April 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-53). ; Stalemated subjects -- Areas of potential near-term opportunity -- Concluding observations. ; Until Russia and the United States experience a change on government in 2008, the prospects for additional strategic arms control agreements, limits on destabilizing military operations, and joint ballistic missile defense programs appear unlikely. Yet, near-term opportunities for collaboration in the areas of cooperative threat reduction, third-party proliferation, and bilateral military engagement do exist. ; Mode of access: Internet.