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This is the second of two papers on measurement models in sociology. The concepts of Ordinal Graph and Ordinal Simplex are elaborated and their applicability to some major theoretical problems outlined.

A dynamic structure is defined as one where the number of relations in the structure is changing over time. The theory of structural balance is outlined in the context of incomplete structures, as dynamic structures are necessarily incomplete at some instant. Theorems concerning the partitioning properties of incomplete symmetric and non-symmetric structures are considered. Finally, the theory of balance is placed on a probabilistic footing.

The paper develops systematically the theory of `structural' and `pure' measurement systems falling below the interval and ratio levels. Pure measurement, it is argued, concerns the properties of objects and structural measurement the relationships between objects. The exposition provides the ground-work for a forthcoming second paper on measurement and the structure of sociological theory.

The article explores the role that subjective evidence of causality and associated counterfactuals and counterpotentials might play in the social sciences where comparative cases are scarce. This scarcity rules out statistical inference based upon frequencies and usually invites in-depth ethnographic studies. Thus, if causality is to be preserved in such situations, a conception of ethnographic causal inference is required. Ethnographic causality inverts the standard statistical concept of causal explanation in observational studies, whereby comparison and generalization, across a sample of cases, are both necessary prerequisites for any causal inference. Ethnographic causality allows, in contrast, for causal explanation prior to any subsequent comparison or generalization.

Abstract
We study the Iterated Bilateral Reciprocity game in which the need for help arises randomly. Players are heterogeneous with respect to 'neediness' i.e. probability of needing help. We find bounds on the amount of heterogeneity which can be tolerated for cooperation (all players help when asked to help) to be sustainable in a collectivity. We introduce the notion of Generalised Reciprocity. Individuals make a costly first move to benefit another under the reasonable expectation that either the other or somebody else will reciprocate. We hope that these tentative attempts at extending Axelrod's seminal work on cooperation will inspire future efforts in the field of organisational culture and social theory more generally.

What are the determinants of the level of trades unions' wage-rate claims? To answer this question, a range of simplified models is examined. One set of these models pictures bargainers being influenced when setting claims by looking backward to past variations in the cost of living, past changes in general wage-rates, the gap between the union's claims and settlements in previous bargaining rounds, and the time since their last settlement. A second set pictures bargainers looking forward, as some versions of expectation theory suggest, to rationally expected future price increases, expected future wage-rate changes, and the time to the next claim. Another model pictures bargainers tactically setting claims beyond their realistic expectations in anticipation of settlements being forced at a level below their stated claims. Applications of these models to nine groups of workers represented by five large British trades unions over the period 1947 to 1970 shows that claims appear to be more influenced (though only weakly) by retrospective than by prospective price increases (so there is little support for monetarists' rational expectations theory of inflation) though they appear to be more influenced by prospective than by retrospective increases in general wage-rates. Claims are uninfluenced by the gap between past claims and settlements or by time variables, but there is strong support for the bargaining tactics hypothesis.

Have British Trade Unions increased their power since the Second World War? To answer this question the concept of power is analysed. Three logically independent but contingently connected dimensions are distinguished: potential power, the exercise of power and the result of power. The bargaining power of a Trade Union is defined, independently of its potential power, as its exercise of power in institutionalized national wage rate bargaining with employers. A simplified model is devised, where bargaining power is operationalized in terms of preferences (claims) and the results of power (settlements). Application of this model to nine groups of workers represented by five large British Trade Unions shows that there has been no linear increase in their bargaining power over the period 1947 to 1970.

A review article focused on T. R. Gurr, WHY MEN REBEL (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U Press, 1970). Abell calls Gurr's book 'the most comprehensive & sustained effort to applyfrustration-aggression theory to the macro-soc phenomenon of collective pol'al violence.' It 'is the best treatment of collective violence to come out of North Amer sociol for some yrs.' Gurr centers his analyses around 3 major variables-(1) the potential for collective violence, (2) the potential for pol'al violence, & (3) the magnitude of pol'al violence. These are tied into a causal model. A 'lack of theoretical development' is noted, but this lack is endemic to sociol. There is little or no theoretical work on the way the shape of distributions at the individual level influences behavior at the collectivity level. Several conceptual slips are noted in the book & some weaknesses in Gurr's causal structure are pointed out. It is concluded that 'there is little dynamic thinking in this work but it surely provides a firm foundation for further disciplined work in this direction. Jenkins calls the book 'a thorough systematization of Anglo-Saxon theorizing in violence & revolt.' It summarizes a whole Sch of res & reflects both its strengths & weaknesses. But after 400 pages it is still not clear whether the basic questions are structural or applied technological ones. Gurr apparently has failed to read K. Marx's theoretical work on the subject. Violence is defined by him as a certain kind of behavior, & this is considered superficial & unsci'fic. Apart from the theoretical inadequacy of the concept of behavioral violence, it also implies a value bias. Finally, Gurr's book is seen to reflect the whole present malaise of US soc sci. M. Maxfield.