Sanctions and homogeneity of intra-party preferences are the two main pathways to party unity in roll-call votes. However, only a few works have managed to properly measure the degree of polarization within the party, and therefore the link between ideological preferences and parliamentary voting behaviour has not yet been fully tested. Looking at the internal debates held during party congresses and analysing motions presented by party factions through quantitative text analysis, the present article provides a new measure of intra-party polarization that is exogenous to the parliamentary arena. This measure is used to disentangle the effect of ideological heterogeneity on MPs voting behaviour, net of the party whip. Our results show that factional heterogeneity negatively affects party unity. This effect, however, is conditional on the strength of whipping resources available to the party leader. When the electoral system or the intra-party candidate selection process allows strong discipline to be enforced, the negative effect of heterogeneous preferences on party unity is lower or no longer significant. However, since absences can be a strategy by which to express dissent while avoiding sanctions, they should be considered as an additional voting option and this is crucial to understanding the impact of intra-party heterogeneity on party unity.
The present work analyzes the interaction between intra-party politics and party system, focusing on inter-factional bargaining dynamics within Italian parties (from 1946 to 2010). We provide a game-theoretic model based on the 'exit, voice and loyalty' framework that helps to understand intra-party decision-making and factional bargaining under the threat of a party fission. Starting from our theory we derive several hypotheses concerning the degree of factionalism, the patterns of portfolio allocation (office payoffs) and party position-taking (policy payoffs) and the determinants of faction breakaways. These hypotheses will be tested thanks to data gathered from party congresses. These data allow to shed light on how factional bargaining shape the party and, through it, the whole political system. We will focus on the impact of internal rules, assessed by looking at party statutes, as well as on the effect of divergent factional preferences, measured through a quantitative text analysis applied to congress motions presented by party factions. We also take into account the impact of exogenous elements like the electoral rules or party system competitiveness. Our results shown that factions are driven by policy, office and electoral motives. For the sake of preserving party unity the whole amount of payoffs available within a party is shared among all factions in proportion to their strength in party body. Consensual dynamics are enhanced when the need for party unity increases, such as in competitive party systems or when new general elections approach. Under very competitive conditions, powerful minorities may even exploit their blackmail power by threatening to break away in order to increase their quota of payoffs. On the contrary in low competitive environments the party leader will trade unity for cohesion, and will overpay the mainstream faction no matter the danger of a split carried out by internal minority. This effect is even more clear among parties whose leader is selected by party members through a direct election. By appealing directly to members and voters, the leader is able to get rid of factional constraints and she will exploit this larger degree of autonomy to reward her followers. However, when party unity is an issue at stake even autonomous leader will revert to fair dynamics of payoffs allocation in order to keep the party together. Consensual dynamics are in fact a deterrent for party fission. On the other side other elements contribute to preserve party unity. Among them, disproportional electoral systems, preference voting and the loyalty effect, while low democratic party statutes and centralized decision-making processes tend to increase the probability of party breakup. To conclude, our research shown the effect of factional politics on policy-making, coalition bargaining and in the electoral market. Intra-party division seems to decrease MPs cohesiveness in roll call votes lowering party effectiveness in policy-making. Heterogeneity jeopardizes also party's chance to get in office, unless autonomous leaders manage to solve the problem of credible commitment. In addition, when factional strife ends up in a party splits, the party will suffer a loss that seems to be proportional to the strength of the splinter group. To sum up, going beyond the assumption of party as unitary actor, we proved that parties are the output of an inter-factional bargaining where factional preferences, leader autonomy and party system conditions interact and impact on the internal decision-making process wielding effects on the whole political system.
This work investigates the process of position-taking, focussing on the factional bargaining within the party. Exploiting two recently built datasets that estimated the policy positions of Italian parties and factions from 1946 to 2010, we investigate if and to what extent factions bind the party leader in choosing the platform. We find confirmation for the idea that party positions are linked to factional preferences. Overall, the party works as a 'bounded oligarchy'. Furthermore, the electoral payoff of party unity increases the impact of factional constraints when general elections approach. In line with the cartel party theory, however, autonomous leaders who are directly elected by a wider selectorate can get rid of factional ties choosing more moderate and vote-maximizing platforms. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
This article develops a reputational theory of political falsehoods. Politicians are motivated by the desire to build a positive reputation, therefore, they will be more likely to deliver false statements (incurring the risk of being fact-checked) when the potential benefit outweighs the cost. This happens as new elections come closer, since the electoral benefit of falsehoods increases along with the probability of being checked too late (after the election day). Politicians are less likely to issue falsehoods in detailed statements and in scripted communication, since the reputational cost is higher because such falsehoods would be considered intentional. Conversely, the stronger trust that voters attribute to politicians on issues they own, allows politicians to lie on such topics. Statistical analysis of almost 8000 statements released by politicians and assessed by fact-checkers, in the United States and Italy (2007–2018), supports the hypotheses. The results hold irrespective of party affiliation.
El Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, hoy Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF), fue la institución decisiva que en el siglo xix, no solo determinó la formación de las finanzas republicanas, sino también la formación del Estado caudillista. Por la contabilidad del Ministerio de Hacienda se filtraba todo el gasto público y por la voz de sus ministros se difundía el pensamiento económico de la época, siempre en relación con los mercados internacionales, en épocas de auge y crisis. Comprende: Estudio institucional del Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, el comportamiento de la economía republicana en el siglo xix, en el contexto de los gobiernos que a nuestro juicio fueron los más importantes, por ser determinantes para la época, analizamos las memorias de los principales ministros de Hacienda y Comercio en los gobiernos de San Martin, Simón Bolívar (1821-1826), gobiernos de Ramón Castilla (1845-1862).
The Ministry of Finance and Commerce (today the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), was the decisive institution that in the 19th century, not only determined the formation of republican finances, but also the formation of the caudillo state. All public expenditure was filtered, and by the voice of its ministers the economic thought of the time was disseminated, always in relation to international markets, in times of boom and crisis, including: Institutional study of the Ministry of Finance and Commerce, the behavior of the republican economy in the nineteenth century, in the context of the governments that in our opinion were the most important, being determinants for the time, analyzed the memories of the main ministers of Finance and Commerce in the governments of San Martin, Simón Bolívar (1821-1826), governments of Ramón Castilla (1845-1862). ; El Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, hoy Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF), fue la institución decisiva que en el siglo xix, no solo determinó la formación de las finanzas republicanas, sino también la formación del Estado caudillista. Por la contabilidad del Ministerio de Hacienda se filtraba todo el gasto público y por la voz de sus ministros se difundía el pensamiento económico de la época, siempre en relación con los mercados internacionales, en épocas de auge y crisis. Comprende: Estudio institucional del Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, el comportamiento de la economía republicana en el siglo xix, en el contexto de los gobiernos que a nuestro juicio fueron los más importantes, por ser determinantes para la época, analizamos las memorias de los principales ministros de Hacienda y Comercio en los gobiernos de San Martin, Simón Bolívar (1821-1826), gobiernos de Ramón Castilla (1845-1862).
