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This essay examines various conceptions of autonomy in relation to recent artistic practices. Starting from the apparent opposition between modernist notions of the autonomy of art and theorizations of political autonomy, the text problematizes the notion of the autonomy of art by using Jacques Rancière's notion of the aesthetic regime. Focusing on the importance of the act and performance in the art of the last decades, it is argued that while political and artistic autonomy may never quite converge, aesthetic acts can under certain circumstances function in both the political and the artistic register, simultaneously or successively. The aesthetic act thus stages a passage from the artistic to the political, and vice versa.

After some preliminary res premises, the regularities & diff's in esthetic opinion were studied through a group exp. 4 groups of judges, each comprised of 5 individuals, were formed. Group A consisted of artists of established reputation; Group B of established artists who were also instructors at the Sch of the Art Instit of Chicago; Group C of PhD students in theoretical mathematics at the U of Chicago; & Group D of graduate students in the executive programs in the Sch of Business at the U of Chicago. These judges were asked to evaluate the Art Instit of Chicago by 31 senior students in fine arts. Judges made 3 independent evaluations on the basis of craftsmanship, originality, & over-all esthetic value. Rating had to be done on a 1-9 point scale with a 'prenormalized' distribution; ie, the judge had to select 1 drawing to be rated 1, 2 to be rated 2 & 8 each, 4 to be rated 3 & 7 each, 5 to be rated 4 & 6, & the remaining 7 to be rated 5 or average. The following findings emerged: (1) Re consistency of esthetic evaluation within groups of judges: Artists agreed only moderately, although to a statistically signif degree, re craftsmanship, originality & over-all esthetic merit of the drawings. The agreement within the art teacher group was substantially higher. Both the mathematics & the business students tended to agree among themselves more highly than the artists. (2) Re relationship among originality, craftsmanship, & over-all value in esthetic judgments: A high rating in one dimension generally tended to carry with it automatically a high rating in the other dimension. But it is noted that the further the judges were from professional involvement in art, the more independent were their evaluations of the same drawing on the several dimensions. (3) Re relation of esthetic judgments among the 4 groups: There tended to be a high agreement between the 2 art groups, & also between the 2 non-art groups, but a lower agreement between the 2 art groups together vs the 2 non-art groups. (4) Re 'realism' vs 'abstraction': abstract drawings tended to be rated higher by all judges. Finally, the evaluations of a few individual drawings by all 20 judges are discussed & the patterns of judgment re 2 pictures are found to be related to the actual status of the artist. It is observed that the setting may have influenced the results of the study. In Sch's where artists & teachers hold diff points of view or where diff artistic values are current, there may be diff findings. Res in diff settings would be helpful. 5 Tables. M. Maxfield.

AbstractThe essay suggests that (despite some hostile twentieth-century criticism) there is such a thing as a characteristically 'aesthetic attitude', and that this idea can indeed shed light on the production and reception of works of art, as well as on the appreciation of nature. It argues, further, that the response to individual 'particularity' implicit in the aesthetic attitude renders this attitude continuous with that of ethical attention to – and appreciation of – individual persons: we are concerned here with distinct, but related, aspects of the valuable 'in itself' or 'for its own sake'.

A brief comment is made about the relation of sport and art before looking at the nature of sport and the aesthetic perception of it. Three aspects of sport- the skilful, the dramatic and the good contest — are then phenomenologically analysed as exemplifying both some central features of sport as well as their possibility for yielding different dimensions of aesthetic experience.

A review essay on books by (1) Diego A. von Vacano, The Art of Political Power: Machiavelli, Neitzsche, and the Makings of Aesthetic Political Theory (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007) & (2) Haig Patapan, Machiavelli in Love: The Modern Politics of Love and Fear (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).

Translation: Sibley, Frank N. "A Contemporary Theory of Aesthetic Concepts" in G. Dickie, R. Sclafani (eds.). 1977. Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology. New York: St. Martins Press.
Translated by Vygandas Aleksandravičius; edited by Antanas Katalynas.

International audience ; This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). Arnold Berleant, in his essay "The Aesthetic Politics of Environment," explains: Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.[1] In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual involvement,[2] concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-dwellers' gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.

International audience ; This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). Arnold Berleant, in his essay "The Aesthetic Politics of Environment," explains: Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.[1] In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual involvement,[2] concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-dwellers' gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.

International audience ; This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). Arnold Berleant, in his essay "The Aesthetic Politics of Environment," explains: Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.[1] In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual involvement,[2] concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-dwellers' gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.

International audience ; This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). Arnold Berleant, in his essay "The Aesthetic Politics of Environment," explains: Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.[1] In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual involvement,[2] concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-dwellers' gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.

International audience This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). Arnold Berleant, in his essay "The Aesthetic Politics of Environment," explains: Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.[1] In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual involvement,[2] concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-dwellers' gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.

International audience ; This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). Arnold Berleant, in his essay "The Aesthetic Politics of Environment," explains: Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.[1] In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual involvement,[2] concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-dwellers' gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.

International audience ; This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). Arnold Berleant, in his essay "The Aesthetic Politics of Environment," explains: Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.[1] In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual involvement,[2] concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-dwellers' gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.

Prominent positions in the contemporary theoretical field of the humanities tend to conceptualize late modern communities in general as aesthetic communities of taste. In regard to political communities, this means reducing the political to an implication of the aesthetic discourse. This article argues for addressing the aesthetic and the political as distinct discourses that are, on the other hand, always engaged with each other in a conflictual interplay. Both discourses draw on and appeal to the ability of judgement, but according to their own distinct principles, and depending on their respective weight in the conflictual interplay, this entails quite different perspectives with regards to political practice and community formation.

Performing arts have by nature the possibility to emotionally involve the audience in ways, which are, in some important sense, "direct" and active, instead of contemplative. The audience is in the presence of flesh and blood people doing various things and of events happening in front of them. In other words, the artistic event happens live, in front of the spectators' eyes and ears, and sometimes it can even end with the audience turned into performers. This fact has lead some scholars to affirm that, to a certain extent, performing arts seem to cancel or at least to minimize the gap between art and life. This trend is mainly strong in more or less new art forms and art movements, like Performance Art, Happening, etc., that, for reasons of different kinds (aesthetic, social, political, philosophical, etc.), refused the idea of art as work and encouraged art as action and event. This idea of art as something "fluid", not fixed, not ontologically steady, and as expression of free invention seems to come to fruition also in some art technique and ways of execution, like improvisation in jazz or in certain forms of theatrical play. It would seem obvious, then, to employ this idea of art as action, event and process in contrast with the traditional conception of art -based on works that should become objects of a particular experience, differentiated from the ordinary path of life by an alleged "aesthetic distance". I will argue, on the contrary, that aesthetic "difference", "distance" and "disinterest" are basic features also of the appreciation of art forms based on events or processes and that this stands even if art as a whole is taken as better understandable in terms of performance, event, action and process rather than in the traditional terms of work and composition.