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"POC-30." ; "6 Apr 92." ; Shipping list no.: 92-382-P. ; Caption title. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 1-2, 3rd group). ; Mode of access: Internet.

During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for

The author presents the results of the research in the field of defining the competencies for military professionals in command and control in military operations. The main purpose of the article is to familiarize the readers with the proposal of the recommendations for implementing an integrated approach to defining the competencies needed for military personnel within the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic. On the basis of the analysis of the national strategic documents, analysis of the system of management of educational and training activities and evaluation of the current competency model for the members of the Czech Armed Forces, the recommendations were drawn up to introduce a conceptual approach to defining the competencies for military personnel. This set of proposed measures provides a baseline for applying the competency model as a human resource management tool.

There is general agreement that 'work' is a primary concept for Cognitive Ergonomics (CE). However, there is little agreement how the domain of work might best be modelled. This paper assesses two contrasting approaches to such modelling. The first, and implicit approach, derives from domain experts. The second, and explicit approach, derives from domain research. The approaches are illustrated by an initial analysis of the domain of military command and control and specifically of models of the Vincennes incident. Implicit and explicit domain models are assessed in terms of the incident events. It is concluded that both models have potential to support design, but the explicit model also has potential to support research. The need for explicit domain modelling to support validation of CE design knowledge is underlined.

Disaster researchers advocate for a flexible problem-solving approach emphasizing creativity, initiative, and improvisation in disaster response. Researchers decry the rigid approach widely referred as the "military model," or command and control. Yet practitioners often support this "command post" approach to response. Researchers and practitioners, however, fail to recognize that the model they either reject or support, respectively, is an inaccurate representation of actual military command and control in both doctrine and practice. This article compares military and disaster literature command and control archetypes and presents them as remarkably similar. In so doing, it challenges existing command and control paradigms and argues that the research view is quite similar to the true military approach. The central aim of this paper seeks to dismiss inaccurate assumptions of the command and control model while persuading critics to adopt a new and more informed assessment of the military model in its modern form.