Suchergebnisse

US President Joe Biden is considering a change to US nuclear declaratory policy. Ever since the beginning of the nuclear age, Washington has stated that it could retaliate with a nuclear response to both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks. This declaratory policy may soon be restricted: President Biden would like to reduce the role of nuclear weapons through a "sole purpose" (SP) declaration. Accordingly, the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons would be to deter and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks. The United States would pledge to never use nuclear weapons against conventional aggression. However, contrary to the expectations of SP pro­ponents, this change would hardly reduce the nuclear risks that the United States face today. Moreover, US allies in Europe and Asia already fear that SP would diminish their security. For Germany specifically, it is worth asking what kind of political and military consequences an SP policy could have. (author's abstract)

Aus französischer Sicht + Benutzerkommentar

In Auszügen aus Artikeln und Reden des Marschalls Ustinow wird vor dem historischen Hintergrund der Stellenwert der sowjetischen Streitkräfte beim Aufbau des Sozialismus dargelegt und in Verbindung mit der sowjetischen Militärdoktrin und den Abrüstungspositionen der UdSSR näher präzisiert. Die NATO-Länder postulieren eine vermutliche Rüstungsüberlegenheit der UdSSR. In der Tat bestehe jedoch Parität der militärischen Kräfte zwischen Ost und West. Die Verteidigungspolitik der UdSSR hat defensiven Charakter und ihre Abrüstungsvorschläge werden vom Prinzip der gleichen Sicherheit geleitet. BIOst/Pkf

Aus US-amerikanischer Sicht

1. The Arrival of the Bomb -- 2. The Strategy of Hiroshima -- 3. Offence and Defence -- 4. Aggression and Retaliation -- 5. Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly -- 6. Strategy for an Atomic Stalemate -- 7. Massive Retaliation -- 8. Limited Objectives -- 9. Limited Means -- 10. The Importance of Being First -- 11. Sputnik and the Soviet Threat -- 12. Soviet Strategy after Stalin -- 13. The Technological Arms Race -- 14. New Sources of Strategy -- 15. The Strategy of Stable Conflict -- 16. Disarmament to Arms Control -- 17. Operational Nuclear Strategy.-18. Khrushchev's Second-Best Deterrent -- 19. Defending Europe -- 20. No Cities -- 21. Assured Destruction -- 22. Britain's 'Independent' Nuclear Deterrent -- 23. France and the Credibility of Nuclear Guarantees -- 24. A NATO Nuclear Force -- 25. The Unthinkable Weapon -- 26. China's Paper Tiger -- 27. The Soviet Approach to Deterrence -- 28. The McNamara Legacy -- 29. Salt, Parity and the Critique Of Mad -- 30. Actions and Reactions -- 31. Selective Options -- 32. ICBM Vulnerability -- 33. The Rise of Anti-Nuclear Protest -- 34. Strategic Defences -- 35. Soviet Doctrine from Brezhnev to Gorbachev -- 36. The End of the Cold War -- 37. Mutual Assured Safety -- 38. Elimination or Marginalization -- 39. The Second Nuclear Age -- 40. The Nuclear War on Terror -- 41. Proliferation: The Middle East and the Pacific -- 42. The Return of Great Power Politics -- 43. Primacy and Maximum Deterrence -- 44. Can There Be A Nuclear Strategy?