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Local government administration shapes the fate of modern democracy; because it is a medium where interest groups in the state stake and resolve their claims to political power through peaceful means. The grass root election in Nigeria since 1999 till date has been complex especially with opposition party since 1999 till date; and this violence cut across Nigeria. The democratic experiment in the administration of local government is marred with chaos, fraud, rigging, and all imaginable form of malpractices. This makes electoral process uninteresting in the grass root. The question remains is there active competition among competing aspirants of various political parties at the grass root level. The process of democratization will thrive when rural dwellers that form the bedrock of political process are allowed to make inputs in policies at the local level. Local government administration in Nigeria has been consistent with the exclusion of opposition parties. The theoretical nature of the paper examines concept, evolution and factors that hang ruling party in power against opposition party on the process of grass root election in Nigeria fourth republic, and suggest ways to resolve some attitudes meted by ruling party during electioneering to sustain our nascent democracy. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n16p17

Singapore's 2020 general election was held amidst the country's most serious public health and economic crises in the country's history. Despite expectations that these parallel crises would precipitate a flight to safety and result in a strong performance by the dominant People's Action Party (PAP), the ruling party received its third lowest popular vote share (61.2%) and lowest ever seat share (89.2%) since independence. This article engages explanations for the unexpected results and argues that the vote swing against the PAP was enabled by a hitherto largely overlooked factor: the 2020 election included two opposition parties that could credibly compete with the PAP on the valence considerations that drive voting behaviour in Singapore, giving voters a perceived safe alternative to the PAP at the constituency level. Quantitative tests support the notion that party credibility—rather than demographic factors, incumbency advantages, Group Representation Constituencies, or assessments of the PAP's fourth generation leaders—best explain variation in the vote swing against the PAP. Ultimately, the results suggest that the PAP's monopoly on party credibility is no longer assured, thus portending greater opposition competitiveness and pressure against the PAP in future elections. Nonetheless, the PAP's dominance remains intact and there is little evidence of a general appetite among the electorate for a non-PAP government, suggesting the likelihood of smaller course corrections rather than major steps towards democratization in the coming years (Pac Aff/GIGA)

The Biden administration has indicated that it sees Israel's escalated campaign on the Lebanese front as a golden opportunity to diminish Hezbollah's role in Lebanon.But despite the unprecedented heavy blows Israel has inflicted on the party, including the assassination of its late leader Hassan Nasrallah in an airstrike on September 27, this task may prove more difficult than policy makers in Washington would like to admit. This owes in no small part to the lack of local Lebanese partners willing to sign on thus far to the Biden administration's apparent new Lebanon policy.US Plans to marginalize HezbollahAccording to the Wall Street Journal, the Biden administration is devising a plan to bypass Hezbollah in the election of a new Lebanese president after almost two years of a presidential vacuum.Meanwhile, the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar has claimed that Washington's ambassador to Beirut, Lisa Johnson, has called on Lebanese political factions to prepare for a post-Hezbollah era."Hezbollah has become very weak after the strikes that were directed at it, targeting its leaders and killing its Secretary-General (Nasrallah), and therefore, it can no longer impose what it wants, and there is a new political phase that the country will witness soon in which the party has no place," Johnson is quoted as telling party leaders.U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller appeared to confirm that Washington is pursuing the goal of marginalizing Hezbollah politically."What we want to see come out of this situation, ultimately, is Lebanon able to break the grip that Hezbollah has had on the country—more than a grip, break the stranglehold that Hezbollah has had on the country and remove [the] Hezbollah veto over a president," Miller told reporters earlier this month.The Lebanese political landscapeHezbollah and allied groups, like the Shiite "Amal" party, support the candidacy of Suleiman Franjieh, leader of the Christian "Marada" movement known for his strong ties to Hezbollah. Washington's preferred candidate meanwhile is believed to be the Lebanese army chief, Gen. Joseph Aoun.The major Lebanese political factions in the country break down primarily along sectarian lines.Hezbollah and Amal, both of which represent the Shiite community, while the most prominent Sunni party is the "Future" movement led by former premier Saad Hariri. Other Christian parties "include the "Lebanese Forces," and the "Free Patriotic Movement." The Progressive Socialist Party is the most popular Druze faction.Any attempt to diminish the status of Hezbollah would require the cooperation of more than one of these factions. But aside from Lebanese Forces Christian party leader and staunch Hezbollah rival Samir Geagea, there appears to be little enthusiasm for the Biden administrations plans thus far.This was reflected in a meeting organized by Geagea under the title "In Defense of Lebanon" in which he unveiled a new roadmap that includes the election of a president who would be committed to the implementation of international resolutions, including UNSCR 1559, which, among other provisions, calls for the disarmament of the movement.Leading figures from the traditional anti-Hezbollah camp were notably absent from this meeting, including Hariri who continues to reside in the United Arab Emirates after announcing his withdrawal from politics in early 2022. Senior officials from Hariri's Future Movement, like former premier Fouad Siniora, also did not attend Geagea's meeting.This should not come as much of a surprise, however, given the tangible shifts in the Sunni-Shiite sectarian dynamics in Lebanon as a result of the Gaza war. That the Shiite Hezbollah decided to carry out cross-border operations against Israel in support of the people in Gaza and the Palestinian Hamas movement—both of which are predominantly Sunni—has earned it the support of most Lebanese Sunnis. Some of the country's Sunni groups have even joined Hezbollah in conducting attacks against Israel. The Lebanese al-Jamaa al-Islamiya, which is a local offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has coordinated with Hezbollah in carrying out cross-border operations.This situation contrasts sharply with that which existed when Hezbollah dispatched fighters to support the Syrian government against an armed rebellion that was launched by predominantly Sunni groups more than a decade ago. As a result, many Lebanese Sunnis came to see Hezbollah as complicit in Sunni persecution in Syria.But Hezbollah's support for the Sunnis in Gaza, along with the unprecedented ferocity of the Israeli offensive against the coastal enclave has changed that perception. It now appears that prominent Lebanese Sunni politicians and factions feel they can ill afford to be seen as taking sides against Hezbollah.Of no less significance is the Biden administration's full-fledged support for Israel in its war efforts. With the administration throwing its full weight—whether reluctantly or not—behind the Israeli military campaign, Lebanese Sunni political elite do not want their names tied to any U.S.-led initiative to reshape Lebanese politics, least of all one which seeks to marginalize the group that has maintained steadfast support for Gaza.The Free Patriotic Movement, which is the second largest Christian party in parliament behind the Lebanese Forces, has criticized Hezbollah's decision to launch attacks on Israel in support of Gaza. But it has also emphasized that the election of a president must be accomplished through reaching a local Lebanese consensus and not as a result of external pressures.Jubran Bassil, the leader of the movement has also stated that Israel's military operations were aimed at the entire country and not just Hezbollah.Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze community, also boycotted the meeting organized by Geagea. Instead, he is taking part in trilateral talks that also include the caretaker prime minister, Najib Miqati, and the speaker of the parliament and Hezbollah's staunch Shiite ally, Nabih Berri, who also represents Hezbollah in those talks. The three have stressed the importance of electing a president acceptable to all parties.The Druze leader, who once spearheaded a campaign against Hezbollah, has even gone as far as declaring his openness to supporting Franjieh, Hezbollah's preferred candidate for the presidency.Importantly, Jumblatt, who has strongly criticized the Western stance in the current conflict while coming out strongly in support of Hezbollah, is known as Lebanon's political kingmaker representing a crucial non-aligned bloc in parliament. Given that Lebanon's president is elected by the parliament, the votes of this bloc will likely be crucial in electing a new president.The Israeli handThere are other reasons that make enlisting in an anti-Hezbollah initiative an undesirable option for the majority of Lebanon's political elite more broadly.Chief among these is that U.S. objectives appear to align very closely with the narrative coming out of Israel. "Free your country [from Hezbollah] so that this war can end," declared Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in remarks addressed to the Lebanese people after the assassination of Nasrallah.With Israel designated as an enemy by the Lebanese state and the escalation of its bombing of the country, including central Beirut, few would want to be associated with any effort that can be so clearly linked with Israeli objectives.Meanwhile, Israel's conduct of its war against Hezbollah, including the killing of Lebanese Army soldiers, serves only to reinforce the notion of Israel as an enemy of the Lebanese state. With the Lebanese military remaining the only major institution respected by all parties in the country, such attacks contradict the notion that Israel is only at war with Hezbollah. For that matter, they also undermine U.S. interests, given that Lebanon's armed forces are one of Washington's closest allies in the region.

Barr reviews PARTIES AND POLITICS: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore by Hussin Mutalib.

AbstractHow do international observers decide whether to criticize or condone electoral fraud in a country? We argue that this decision depends on the identity of the victims of electoral fraud. A monitoring organization is more likely to overlook fraud committed against groups that are deemed dangerous by its sponsor. Based on this insight, we hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era election monitors are more tolerant of fraud against Islamic challengers, especially when Islamic movements are perceived as a threat to political stability. In support of our hypothesis, we find that outside monitors are more likely to endorse an election in countries with an Islamic opposition party and an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign. Furthermore, we find that the effect is driven by Western monitoring organizations and becomes stronger after the September 11 attacks. Our findings provide a simple yet powerful insight: the calculus of outside observers depends not only on who they wish to see in power, but also who they want to keep from power.

When elections are free and fair, why do some political parties rule for prolonged periods of time? Most explanations for single-party dominance focus on the dominant party's origins, resources, or strategies. In this article, we show how opposition parties can undermine or sustain single-party dominance. Specifically, opposition parties should be central in explaining single-party dominance in countries with highly disproportional electoral systems and a dominant party whose vote share falls short of a popular majority. Employing a quantitative analysis of Indian legislative elections as well as a paired case study, we show that opposition coordination plays a crucial part in undermining single-party dominance.

The power to remove the government via no-confidence motion is a powerful tool afforded to the opposition. By triggering the government's downfall, opposition parties can substantially influence policy direction in parliamentary democracies. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how government and opposition parties interact to determine the occurrence of no-confidence motions and their chance of success. In this project, I develop a simple formal model that identifies the factors influencing when opposition parties propose no-confidence motions and their outcomes. I find support for these expectations by estimating an empirical model that is explicitly derived from the underlying theoretical model. Unlike previous empirical studies of government stability, this project honors the strategic interactions that occur between government and opposition parties. In addition to the possibility of the motion passing, opposition parties are motivated by electoral considerations, which induce different behaviors at various stages of the electoral cycle. This project offers a number of implications for the study of parliamentary politics, including theories of opposition behavior, democratic accountability, and government duration and termination.

Variance in partisan choice among South African voters can be predicted on the basis of what is known about the way voters see economic trends, evaluate government performance, perceive political parties, and rate party leaders. However, in this analysis it is demonstrated that factors related to racial divisions shape and filter how voters perceive political performance, and to some extent lead different voters to emphasize different performance criteria. But race does not affect the way voters make decisions. Thus, South Africa's opposition parties are weak not because black voters, the overwhelming majority of the electorate, operate with?a decision-making apparatus that emphasizes unity over performances or is hostile to pluralism and opposition. Rather, support for the African National Congress can be accounted for first, by positive ratings of its performance in government and second, by the fact that those black voters dissatisfied with the performance of the African National Congress (ANC) do not see a legitimate alternative among the existing opposition partie.

Scholars frequently expect parties to act strategically in parliament, hoping to affect their electoral fortunes. Voters assumingly assess parties by their activity and vote accordingly. However, the retrospective voting literature looks mostly at the government's outcomes, leaving the opposition understudied. We argue that, for opposition parties, legislative voting constitutes an effective vote-seeking activity as a signaling tool of their attitude toward the government. We suggest that conflictual voting behavior affects voters through two mechanisms: as a signal of opposition valence and as means of ideological differentiation from the government. We present both aggregate- and individual-level analyses, leveraging a dataset of 169 party observations from 10 democracies and linking it to the CSES survey data of 27,371 respondents. The findings provide support for the existence of both mechanisms. Parliamentary conflict on legislative votes has a general positive effect on opposition parties' electoral performance, conditional on systemic and party-specific factors.