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International audience ; In this paper, I focus on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the "Political Coase Theorem" (PCT) lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory. ; L'objectif de ce papier consiste à fournir un survol critique de l'approche en termes de droits de propriété en ce qui concerne l'extension des coûts de transaction à l'activité appropriative et au pouvoir coercitif. Le théorème de Coase est la pierre angulaire des deux branches de cette approche, à savoir la branche d'actifs spécifiques (Williamson) et la branche de l'Université de Washington (Barzel, Cheung, et North). Cependant, ces deux branches divergent sur l'étendue de l'application du théorème de Coase. Alors que la branche en termes de spécificité des actifs le réduit aux transactions volontaires, la branche de l'Université de Washington l'étend tant et si bien qu'il comprend l'activité appropriative, le pouvoir coercitif, et la politique. Cette extension est nommée " le théorème politique de Coase ". Dans ce papier, on explore comment ces deux approches arrivent à des résultats contradictoires eu égard aux coûts de transaction des actifs génériques et idiosyncrasiques. Puis, on examine dans quelle mesure ces résultats contradictoires sont liés à la façon dont le théorème de Coase est formulé initialement selon chaque branche. On démontre que l'hypothèse principale pour intégrer les coûts de l'activité appropriative et de la mise en œuvre violente (violent enforcement) dans les coûts de transaction repose sur l'idée selon ...

Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.

Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.

We investigate the long-term effects of the important presence of Jews in Eastern Europe before the Second World War and their disappearance during the Holocaust. The Pale of Settlement, the area which Jewish residents were confined to in the Russian Empire, is used as a source of exogenous variation in the size of the Jewish population before the Second World War. Based on election and survey data, we find that current residents of the Pale, compared to their counterparts outside the Pale, vote more for socialist anti-market parties, have lower support for market economy and democracy, are less engaged in entrepreneurship, but exhibit higher levels of trust. At the same time, the Pale has no lasting effects on average consumption, income, and education levels. Regression discontinuity at the Pale border helps identification. We show that the effect of the Pale is related to the former presence of Jews rather than the inflow of new migrant population into the formerly-Jewish areas. We suggest a possible mechanism and present evidence consistent with it: non-Jewish population, at the time when two groups lived together side-by-side, developed persistent anti-market culture and bonding trust, rooted in ethnic hatred towards Jews. We show that, consistent with the mechanism, current residents of towns closer to places of pogroms exhibit higher trust and anti-market attitudes even controlling for the historical share of Jews in the population and the Pale. ; Nous analysons les effets à long terme de la présence importante des Juifs en Europe de l'Est avant la seconde guerre mondiale et de leur extermination pendant l'Holocauste. Nous utilisons la «Zone de résidence», le territoire dans lequel les Juifs ont été confinés sous l'empire russe, en tant que source de variation exogène de la taille de la population juive avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. En utilisant des résultats des élections et des enquêtes, nous établissons que les résidents présents dans la «Zone de résidence» (comparés aux habitants à l'extérieur de la «Zone de résidence») votent plus pour les partis socialistes s'opposant au marché, sont moins favorables au marché et à la démocratie, sont moins entrepreneurs, mais expriment plus de confiance dans autrui. En même temps, la «Zone de résidence» n'a pas d'effets durables sur les niveaux moyens de consommation, de revenu ou d'éducation. Les régressions de discontinuité à la frontière de la «Zone de résidence» contribuent à l'identification du phénomène. Nous montrons que l'impact de la «Zone de résidence» est lié à la présence passée des Juifs plutôt qu'à l'arrivée de nouvelles populations sur les territoires habités précédemment par les Juifs. Nous proposons un mécanisme pouvant expliquer cet effet et présentons une évidence empirique à son appui : la population non-juive, lorsque les deux groupes ont vécu côte-à-côte, a développé une culture anti-marché et une confiance 'fusionnelle' (bonding) fondée sur la haine ethnique. Nous montrons, ce qui est compatible avec ce mécanisme, que les résidents contemporains des villes proches des endroits où les pogroms ont eu lieu, sont moins favorables au marché et expriment plus de confiance envers autrui, même lorsque nous contrôlons pour la part historique de la population juive et la « Zone de résidence ».

We investigate the long-term effects of the important presence of Jews in Eastern Europe before the Second World War and their disappearance during the Holocaust. The Pale of Settlement, the area which Jewish residents were confined to in the Russian Empire, is used as a source of exogenous variation in the size of the Jewish population before the Second World War. Based on election and survey data, we find that current residents of the Pale, compared to their counterparts outside the Pale, vote more for socialist anti-market parties, have lower support for market economy and democracy, are less engaged in entrepreneurship, but exhibit higher levels of trust. At the same time, the Pale has no lasting effects on average consumption, income, and education levels. Regression discontinuity at the Pale border helps identification. We show that the effect of the Pale is related to the former presence of Jews rather than the inflow of new migrant population into the formerly-Jewish areas. We suggest a possible mechanism and present evidence consistent with it: non-Jewish population, at the time when two groups lived together side-by-side, developed persistent anti-market culture and bonding trust, rooted in ethnic hatred towards Jews. We show that, consistent with the mechanism, current residents of towns closer to places of pogroms exhibit higher trust and anti-market attitudes even controlling for the historical share of Jews in the population and the Pale. ; Nous analysons les effets à long terme de la présence importante des Juifs en Europe de l'Est avant la seconde guerre mondiale et de leur extermination pendant l'Holocauste. Nous utilisons la «Zone de résidence», le territoire dans lequel les Juifs ont été confinés sous l'empire russe, en tant que source de variation exogène de la taille de la population juive avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. En utilisant des résultats des élections et des enquêtes, nous établissons que les résidents présents dans la «Zone de résidence» (comparés aux habitants à l'extérieur de la «Zone de résidence») votent plus pour les partis socialistes s'opposant au marché, sont moins favorables au marché et à la démocratie, sont moins entrepreneurs, mais expriment plus de confiance dans autrui. En même temps, la «Zone de résidence» n'a pas d'effets durables sur les niveaux moyens de consommation, de revenu ou d'éducation. Les régressions de discontinuité à la frontière de la «Zone de résidence» contribuent à l'identification du phénomène. Nous montrons que l'impact de la «Zone de résidence» est lié à la présence passée des Juifs plutôt qu'à l'arrivée de nouvelles populations sur les territoires habités précédemment par les Juifs. Nous proposons un mécanisme pouvant expliquer cet effet et présentons une évidence empirique à son appui : la population non-juive, lorsque les deux groupes ont vécu côte-à-côte, a développé une culture anti-marché et une confiance 'fusionnelle' (bonding) fondée sur la haine ethnique. Nous montrons, ce qui est compatible avec ce mécanisme, que les résidents contemporains des villes proches des endroits où les pogroms ont eu lieu, sont moins favorables au marché et expriment plus de confiance envers autrui, même lorsque nous contrôlons pour la part historique de la population juive et la « Zone de résidence ».

We investigate the long-term effects of the important presence of Jews in Eastern Europe before the Second World War and their disappearance during the Holocaust. The Pale of Settlement, the area which Jewish residents were confined to in the Russian Empire, is used as a source of exogenous variation in the size of the Jewish population before the Second World War. Based on election and survey data, we find that current residents of the Pale, compared to their counterparts outside the Pale, vote more for socialist anti-market parties, have lower support for market economy and democracy, are less engaged in entrepreneurship, but exhibit higher levels of trust. At the same time, the Pale has no lasting effects on average consumption, income, and education levels. Regression discontinuity at the Pale border helps identification. We show that the effect of the Pale is related to the former presence of Jews rather than the inflow of new migrant population into the formerly-Jewish areas. We suggest a possible mechanism and present evidence consistent with it: non-Jewish population, at the time when two groups lived together side-by-side, developed persistent anti-market culture and bonding trust, rooted in ethnic hatred towards Jews. We show that, consistent with the mechanism, current residents of towns closer to places of pogroms exhibit higher trust and anti-market attitudes even controlling for the historical share of Jews in the population and the Pale. ; Nous analysons les effets à long terme de la présence importante des Juifs en Europe de l'Est avant la seconde guerre mondiale et de leur extermination pendant l'Holocauste. Nous utilisons la «Zone de résidence», le territoire dans lequel les Juifs ont été confinés sous l'empire russe, en tant que source de variation exogène de la taille de la population juive avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. En utilisant des résultats des élections et des enquêtes, nous établissons que les résidents présents dans la «Zone de résidence» (comparés aux habitants à l'extérieur de ...

We investigate the long-term effects of the important presence of Jews in Eastern Europe before the Second World War and their disappearance during the Holocaust. The Pale of Settlement, the area which Jewish residents were confined to in the Russian Empire, is used as a source of exogenous variation in the size of the Jewish population before the Second World War. Based on election and survey data, we find that current residents of the Pale, compared to their counterparts outside the Pale, vote more for socialist anti-market parties, have lower support for market economy and democracy, are less engaged in entrepreneurship, but exhibit higher levels of trust. At the same time, the Pale has no lasting effects on average consumption, income, and education levels. Regression discontinuity at the Pale border helps identification. We show that the effect of the Pale is related to the former presence of Jews rather than the inflow of new migrant population into the formerly-Jewish areas. We suggest a possible mechanism and present evidence consistent with it: non-Jewish population, at the time when two groups lived together side-by-side, developed persistent anti-market culture and bonding trust, rooted in ethnic hatred towards Jews. We show that, consistent with the mechanism, current residents of towns closer to places of pogroms exhibit higher trust and anti-market attitudes even controlling for the historical share of Jews in the population and the Pale. ; Nous analysons les effets à long terme de la présence importante des Juifs en Europe de l'Est avant la seconde guerre mondiale et de leur extermination pendant l'Holocauste. Nous utilisons la «Zone de résidence», le territoire dans lequel les Juifs ont été confinés sous l'empire russe, en tant que source de variation exogène de la taille de la population juive avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. En utilisant des résultats des élections et des enquêtes, nous établissons que les résidents présents dans la «Zone de résidence» (comparés aux habitants à l'extérieur de ...

International audience ; Why do some societies have political institutions that support productively inefficient outcomes? And why does the political power of elites vested in these outcomes often grow over time, even when they are unable to block more efficient modes of production? We propose an explanation centered on the interplay between political and cultural change. We build a model in which cultural values are transmitted inter-generationally. The cultural composition of society, in turn, determines public-goods provision as well as the future political power of elites from different cultural groups. We characterize the equilibrium of the model and provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of cultural revivals. These are characterized as movements in which both the cultural composition of society as well as the political power of elites who are vested in productively inefficient outcomes grow over time. We reveal the usefulness of our framework by applying it to two case studies: the Jim Crow South and Turkey's Gülen Movement.

International audience ; Why do some societies have political institutions that support productively inefficient outcomes? And why does the political power of elites vested in these outcomes often grow over time, even when they are unable to block more efficient modes of production? We propose an explanation centered on the interplay between political and cultural change. We build a model in which cultural values are transmitted inter-generationally. The cultural composition of society, in turn, determines public-goods provision as well as the future political power of elites from different cultural groups. We characterize the equilibrium of the model and provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of cultural revivals. These are characterized as movements in which both the cultural composition of society as well as the political power of elites who are vested in productively inefficient outcomes grow over time. We reveal the usefulness of our framework by applying it to two case studies: the Jim Crow South and Turkey's Gülen Movement.

Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions? And why do such failures often coincide with cultural movements that glorify the past? We propose a model highlighting the interplay—or lack thereof—between institutional change and cultural beliefs. The main insight is that institutional change by itself will not lead to a more efficient economy unless culture evolves in tandem. This is because institutional change can be countered by changes in cultural values complementary to a more "traditional" economy. In our model, forward-looking elites, who benefit from a traditional, inefficient economy, may over-provide public goods that are complementary to the production of traditional goods. This encourages individuals to transmit cultural beliefs complementary to the provision of traditional goods. A horse race results between institutions, which evolve towards a more efficient (less traditional) economy, and cultural norms, which are pulled towards "tradition" by the elites. When culture wins the horse race, institutions respond by giving more political power to traditional elites—even if in doing so more efficient institutions are left behind. We call the interaction between these cultural and institutional dynamics a cultural revival.

Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions? And why do such failures often coincide with cultural movements that glorify the past? We propose a model highlighting the interplay—or lack thereof—between institutional change and cultural beliefs. The main insight is that institutional change by itself will not lead to a more efficient economy unless culture evolves in tandem. This is because institutional change can be countered by changes in cultural values complementary to a more "traditional" economy. In our model, forward-looking elites, who benefit from a traditional, inefficient economy, may over-provide public goods that are complementary to the production of traditional goods. This encourages individuals to transmit cultural beliefs complementary to the provision of traditional goods. A horse race results between institutions, which evolve towards a more efficient (less traditional) economy, and cultural norms, which are pulled towards "tradition" by the elites. When culture wins the horse race, institutions respond by giving more political power to traditional elites—even if in doing so more efficient institutions are left behind. We call the interaction between these cultural and institutional dynamics a cultural revival.

This paper investigates the impact of political leaders' migration experience on the quality of their leadership. We build up an original database on the personal background of 932 politicians who were at the head of the executive power in a developing country over the 1960-2004 period. We put forward a positive e ffect of the leader having studied abroad on the level of democracy in his country during his tenure. This e ffect is shown to be independent from the leader's education level, as well as from his profession. Moreover, it is mainly driven by countries with a poor initial level of democracy. These results are con rmed by various robustness tests. They propose a new channel through which migration may a ect politics in the sending countries, namely the emergence of the elites.

International audience Why do some societies have political institutions that support productively inefficient outcomes? And why does the political power of elites vested in these outcomes often grow over time, even when they are unable to block more efficient modes of production? We propose an explanation centered on the interplay between political and cultural change. We build a model in which cultural values are transmitted inter-generationally. The cultural composition of society, in turn, determines public-goods provision as well as the future political power of elites from different cultural groups. We characterize the equilibrium of the model and provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of cultural revivals. These are characterized as movements in which both the cultural composition of society as well as the political power of elites who are vested in productively inefficient outcomes grow over time. We reveal the usefulness of our framework by applying it to two case studies: the Jim Crow South and Turkey's Gülen Movement.

International audience In this paper, I focus on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the "Political Coase Theorem" (PCT) lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory. ; L'objectif de ce papier consiste à fournir un survol critique de l'approche en termes de droits de propriété en ce qui concerne l'extension des coûts de transaction à l'activité appropriative et au pouvoir coercitif. Le théorème de Coase est la pierre angulaire des deux branches de cette approche, à savoir la branche d'actifs spécifiques (Williamson) et la branche de l'Université de Washington (Barzel, Cheung, et North). Cependant, ces deux branches divergent sur l'étendue de l'application du théorème de Coase. Alors que la branche en termes de spécificité des actifs le réduit aux transactions volontaires, la branche de l'Université de Washington l'étend tant et si bien qu'il comprend l'activité appropriative, le pouvoir coercitif, et la politique. Cette extension est nommée " le théorème politique de Coase ". Dans ce papier, on explore comment ces deux approches arrivent à des résultats contradictoires eu égard aux coûts de transaction des actifs génériques et idiosyncrasiques. Puis, on examine dans quelle mesure ces résultats contradictoires sont liés à la façon dont le théorème de Coase est formulé initialement selon chaque branche. On démontre que l'hypothèse principale pour intégrer les coûts de l'activité appropriative et de la mise en œuvre violente (violent enforcement) dans les coûts de transaction repose sur l'idée selon ...

At the creation of the European Community in 1957, little attention was paid to environmental concerns. It's only in 1997, after decades of debate, that the 'Integration Principle' became formally engraved in European treaties. This principle, requiring all policies to take environmental concerns into account, represents a major landmark in the institutionalisation of environmental policy. Yet the effects of this integration appear unclear. So does its meaning. Does the Integration Principle ensure an effective impact of sustainable development institutions in Europe? We aim to answer this question by casting light on the origin and significance of the Integration Principle. We recapitulate the policy events leading to the formal integration of environmental concerns within EU policy since the 1970s. We highlight its gradual extension from a horizontal (cross-sectoral) to a vertical (cross-societal) dimension and stress the challenges posed by the necessary cross-societal integration of sustainable development policy. As a step toward answering the above question, our hypothesis is that the effectiveness of an institution depends on its integration not only across policy or economic sectors but also across governance levels. We derive implications with regard to the importance of learning to eco-innovation.