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THE WORD INDEPENDENT IN THE UNITED STATES (US) CONTEXT IS MOST PROPERLY USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS. THOSE COMMISSION ARE NOT INDEPENDENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL. BOTH THE COMMISSIONS AND THE AGENCIES OF THE REGULAR CABINET DEPARTMENTS LIVE IN A REGIME OF STATUTORY DUTIES UNDER WHICH CONGRESSIONAL STATUES NOT PRESIDENTIAL POLICIES CONTROL MUCH OF THEIR BEHAVIOR. BOTH ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. COMMISSIONS BASICALLY ARE INDEPENDENT IN THE SENSE THAT THEY ARE USUALLY NOT SUBJECT TO THE COMPLETE CONTROL BY COMMISSIONERS OF ONE POLITICAL PARTY. THEY ARE SOMEWHAT INDEPENDENT OF THE PRESIDENT IN THAT NO SINGLE PRESIDENT HAS APPOINTED ALL THE COMMISSIONERS OF A PARTICULAR COMMISSION AND COMMISSIONERS MAY ONLY BE DISMISSED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR CAUSE. AMERICAN EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT EUROPEAN UNION (EU) INDEPENDENT AGENCIES WILL CREATE SEVERE PROBLEMS OF CO-ORDINATION, LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL. THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT ALLEVIATED BY THE CLAIM THAT EU AGENCIES WILL HAVE PURELY INFORMATIONAL ROLES BECAUSE INFORMATION IS A KEY ELEMENT IN POLICY-MAKING AND POLICY CONTROVERSY.

Roberta S. Karmel, Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School, reviews Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles new book Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics. Professor Karmel examines and evaluates each chapter of Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics from her own unique perspective based on her experience as a staff member and, later, commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, director of the New York Stock Exchange, and member of the National Association of Securities Dealers (now the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA")). Professor Karmel concludes that the book is well-written, well-researched, and fairly balanced and a helpful guide to the study of agencies in the United States.

AbstractLegitimacy is a central concern for independent agencies tasked with shaping policies. While expertise‐based and reputation‐sourced authority bases are assumed to be relevant for agency legitimacy, their individual and joint effects on citizens' perceptions lack comprehensive examination. To address this gap, the study integrates insights from bureaucratic politics, bureaucratic reputation, and cognitive psychology. Our survey experiment with Dutch citizens, focusing on the European Food Safety Authority, suggests that expertise‐based authority positively affects perceived agency legitimacy, while a negative reputation has detrimental effects. Furthermore, expertise‐based authority moderates the impact of reputation, amplifying positive effects and mitigating negative ones. This implies that agencies are more susceptible to reputational threats when they lack expertise‐based authority. The study advances the theoretical tenets of bureaucratic reputation theory and offers effective strategies for agencies to strengthen their legitimacy among the most critical audience in democratic political systems—citizens.

Abstract.  Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an (almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision‐making. Second, drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation supports the transformation of interaction from interest‐based bargaining to deliberative arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence.

"Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's
perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory
output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led
to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an
(almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized
functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of
independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social
systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an
increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision-making. Second, drawing
on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation
supports the transformation of interaction from interest-based bargaining to deliberative
arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are
made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence." (author's abstract)