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The starting point is the consideration of the human being as a symbolic animal: a being who works, behaves, understands and transforms the world making use of symbols. Symbols are signs with a meaning. The total system of verbal signs is language. With it, reality is not only statically shaped, but also structured for action. The fully human action is at the same time symbolic—literary, in the broad sense of the word—and directly transforming the world. There is a continuity between ordinary language, subliterature and literature. The function of this symbolic system is very visible today in television, radio, movies and mass media. It seems that present information is perfect for every man. Is it really so? Drawbacks in the way of transmitting information are studied, as are the symbolic strategies for social action favoring freedom. A strategy for community, but not mass, communication and individualized, but not individualistic, communication is the impending task concerning social action through the information media.

Thirteen scholars-whose backgrounds range from community organizing, to law, telecommunication, architecture, city planning, art, policy studies, and urban communication-examine public communication venues and opportunities, all of which are impacted by municipal regulation

Abstract
This paper compares the freedom of communication in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, departing from the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is noted that there are differences, as specified herein. Regulatory texts invite to speak of two distinct models, though this may be a far-fetched statement. This paper makes the following concluding remarks: 1) There are many concepts of freedom of expression that are compatible with democracy; the one derived from the Sullivan Judgment in the US (and in Europe from the Lingens Judgment) is not the only one, although it is currently considered the most consist­ent with democracy. This point is not discussed here. 2) Major changes sometimes occur through seemingly small details. In this sense, the shift of the burden of proof in defama­tion cases (Sullivan) has created an earthquake in the legal regime governing the press. The Sullivan doctrine can be summarized as follows: first, errors are inevitable, as freedom of speech requires 'breathing room'; second, the malice of those accused of defamation must be proven; third, it is necessary to prove the lack of veracity of the slanderer. This doctrine allows the press to play its role as the watchdog of freedom. 3) In Spain, the press also appears to play this role, thus requiring us to ask whether there is, or ever was, a Sullivan Judgment in Spanish jurisprudence. We tend to attribute the privileged position of the press in Spain to the fact that the Constitutional Court has given preferential consid­eration to freedom of speech when it is in conflict with honor, intimacy and self-image privacy. This preference is justified by its connection to democracy. Since the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court (STC hereafter) 6/1981 of 16 March, the Spanish Consti­tutional Court has stressed the importance of freedom of information for democracy, and since the STC 159/1986 of 16 December, the Constitutional Court has suggested the pref­erential position of freedom of expression. However, the incorporation of the Sullivan doc­trine into the Spanish system occurred through STC 6/1988 of 21 January, almost ten years after the passage of the Constitution into law.

This book examines the underlying theoretical issues concerning the nature of political freedom. Arguing that most previous discussions of such freedom have been too narrowly focused, it explores both conservativism from Edmund Burke to its present resurgence, the radical tradition of Karl Marx, as well as the orthodox liberal model of freedom of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin. Political Freedom argues that these three accounts of political freedom - conservative, liberal and radical - all have internal weaknesses which render them unsatisfactory.In the second part of the book

An experiment was conducted to investigate variables which affect a communicator's attribution of freedom to a communicatee. A communicator delivered a communication to a communicatee who reacted either favorably or unfavorably. Further, the communicator expected to have to deliver
a subsequent communication either to the same communicatee or to a different communicatee. As predicted, greater freedom was attributed to the communicatee (1) when the reaction to the communication was favorable than when it was unfavorable, and (2) when a subsequent communication was to
be directed toward the same communicatee than when it was to be directed toward a different communicatee. These findings were discussed in terms of a person's need for compliance and the role of the attribution of freedom in serving this need. The study also provided evidence about the
relationship between the attribution of freedom and liking.