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AbstractA large number of articles have analysed 'the one constant' in the economic effects of trade unions, namely that collective bargaining reduces employment growth by 2–4% points per year. Evidence is, however, mostly related to Anglo‐Saxon countries. We investigate whether a different institutional setting might lead to a different outcome, making the constant a variable entity. Using linked‐employer‐employee data for Germany, we find a negative correlation between being covered by a sector‐wide bargaining agreement or firm‐level contract and employment growth of about 1% point per annum. However, the correlation between employment growth and collective bargaining is not robust to the use of panel methods. We conclude that the results of the literature using cross‐section data might be driven by selection.

In this study, Norwegian linked employer–employee panel data covering 1994–96 are used to estimate workers' marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for safety, thus providing unique comparisons between estimates of MWPs from hedonic wage, quit and job duration models. Hedonic wage regressions show that higher injury hazards imply higher wages. Quit and duration regressions show that higher injury hazards imply higher job exit probabilities, while higher wages reduce the job exit probabilities. Differences in the estimated MWP figures indicate that search frictions cause sizeable bias in MWP figures from hedonic wage models, and that MWP issues should be addressed from a dynamic perspective.