Suchergebnisse

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the determinants and the evolution of voluntarily adopted firm‐level corporate governance practices in Brazil from 1998 to 2004 using broad corporate governance scores.Design/methodology/approachThe authors employ a robust panel‐data procedure that accounts for the main sources of endogeneity to a very representative panel of Brazilian firms over a six‐year period. They address the endogeneity that arises from the simultaneous determination of the quality of corporate governance practices, the dependent variable, and possibly several firm attributes that are commonly employed as the determinants of such practices and are supposedly independent. Specifically, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence strongly suggest that the quality of corporate governance practices may influence some of the variables commonly used as its determinants just as much as they may be influenced by them.FindingsThe paper finds that firm‐level corporate governance practices are steadily improving but there is much room for improvement. Heterogeneity has increased. Voluntarily adhering to new stricter listing requirements is associated positively with improvements in firm‐level corporate governance practices. Reducing or not using non‐voting shares improves corporate governance practices.Research limitation/implicationsThe authors found no clear evidence of the influence of other potential determinants of the quality of corporate governance, such as growth prospects, firm size, firm value, and ownership structure. Thus, they doubt previous findings that suggest a causal relationship from value and ownership to corporate governance practices because value and ownership seem to be determined endogenously.Practical implicationsPolicies directed to reduce the use of non‐voting shares should be implemented. Creating strict listing requirements that may be adopted voluntarily by firms could be a feasible solution to improve the quality of corporate governance practices in emerging market countries. Firms in an emerging market that find that issuance in the USA became too expensive or demanding may offer a substitute listing environment with credible requirements to foreign investors. Premium listings may partially compensate emerging market exchanges for their loss of trading to major markets.Originality/valueThe paper examines the evolution of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices in Brazil from 1998 through 2004 while most studies use cross‐section samples over one or a few years. Further, this is one of a few papers to analyze the impact of ownership structure on the quality of corporate governance practices by segregating control and cash flow rights.

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Our experimental design addresses the self-selection and signaling effects that arise when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning institution is exogenous, which can be explained by a difference in the effectiveness of punishment. Subjects respond to punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be reached through milder punishment when third-party sanctions are endogenous. However, overall efficiency does not differ across the two settings as the stricter punishment implemented in the exogenous one sustains high cooperation as subjects interact repeatedly.

The literature has identified three main approaches to account for the way exchange rate regimes are chosen: i) the optimal currency area theory; ii) the financial view, which highlights the consequences of international financial integration; and iii) the political view, which stresses the use of exchange rate anchors as credibility enhancers in politically challenged economies. Using de facto and de jure regime classifications, we test the empirical relevance of these approaches separately and jointly. We find overall empirical support for all of them, although the incidence of financial and political aspects varies substantially between industrial and non-industrial economies. Furthermore, we find that the link between de facto regimes and their underlying fundamentals has been surprisingly stable over the years, suggesting that the global trends often highlighted in the literature can be traced back to the evolution of their natural determinants, and that actual policies have been little influenced by the frequent twist and turns in the exchange rate regime debate.